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ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains three essays related to fixed investment and crude oil.  
The first essay examines the implications of building a cross-border oil infrastructure 
project within the context of the bargaining problem (the Nash bargaining solution, 
and the alternating offer bargain of Rubinstein). We examine the viability of the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, which is employed as a case study - for the 
multinational corporation, and the three host countries (Azerbaijan, Turkey, and 
Georgia) by examining the profitability of the project for each partner with two 
different bargaining formulations (simultaneous and sequential bargaining). The 
findings suggest that the project is feasible for the partners when the transit charge is 
greater than $3 per barrel (this is the Break-Even charge at which the project 
produces a zero total surplus); but for a tariff charge higher than this rate, the project 
generates returns for each participant greater than his outside option. Furthermore, 
the outcomes show how with bargaining over discounted flows, each bargaining 
scenario results in a different total surplus. Thus, the participants’ discount rates, 
their bargaining orders, and their outside options are the determinants of the gross 
payoffs they receive over the life of the project. 
The second essay examines the effect of oil abundance on domestic investment in 22 
oil-exporting non-OECD countries over the period 1996-2010. Employing static and 
dynamic panel estimators, the oil impact is investigated in light of other investment 
determinants which reflect government policies including output growth, inflation, 
the exchange rate, and financial and openness factors. Estimation results indicate that 
oil abundance exerts an adverse effect on gross domestic investment in these 
countries, implying the necessity of improving institutional quality and oil 
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management polices to better exploit oil revenues and direct them towards enhancing 
domestic investment, thereby sustained economic growth in these countries.  
The third essay examines the effect of the oil price and oil price volatility on 
domestic fixed investment in a group of oil-importing OECD countries from 1970 to 
2012 within the framework of the production function. Estimation results indicate 
that there is a long run relationship running from oil prices and the other control 
variables (output, trade, inflation, and the exchange rate) to investment where the 
long run coefficient on the oil price is negative and significant, but the short run 
coefficient on oil prices is insignificant. Thus, the outcomes of this study indicate 
that high oil prices are contributing to investment decline, which affirms the 
importance of adopting long run energy policies that might lessen investment 
reliance on non-renewable energy sources.   
iv 
  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  
I am grateful to my principal supervisor Professor John Bennett for the professional 
support, help, and advice I received from him in all stages throughout my PhD. His 
cooperation and assistance were very helpful to accomplish this thesis. I highly 
appreciate the time he took to provide me with his feedback and valuable comments. 
To him I owe my profound gratitude. 
Dima Bagh 
June 2015  
  
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1. Shareholders’ shares in the BTC Company…...…………………..... 17 
Table 2.2. The outcomes of simultaneous and sequential bargaining between 
the concerned parties in the BTC project …………………………. 41 
Table 2.3. The net payoffs of the participants in the BTC project when they all 
have equal discount rates……..…………………………………….. 42 
Table 2.4. The net payoffs of the participants in the BTC project when they 
have different discount rates……………………………………....... 43 
Table 2.5. Total annual wages paid to the workers in the three countries during 
the construction and operational phases in US$................................. 46 
Table 2.6. The shares of the surplus which the participants in the BTC project 
receive with both simultaneous and sequential bargaining………….  48 
Table 2.7. Wages paid to the three countries during the three years 
construction phase ………………………………………………….. 48 
Table 2.8. The payments to Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia when the tariff 
charge is $3.5/barrel………………………..……………………... 51 
Table 2.9. The participants’ gross and net payoffs from the BTC project        
when the tariff charge is $3.5/barrel …………………………….. 53 
Table 2.10. Net payoffs the bargainers receive with different possible 
configurations of discount rates…………………………………….. 60 
Table 3.1. GDP growth, investment, saving, and oil rents (average over the 
last four years) for each country in the study sample ……………….       80 
Table 3.2. Main statistics about the variables used in the investment model….. 99 
Table 3.3. Correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables used in 
the investment model ……………………………………………..... 100 
Table 3.4. The effect of oil and other control variables on gross domestic 
investment using Random Two-Way Estimates……………………. 103 
Table 3.5. The effect of oil and other control variables on gross domestic 
investment using Fixed Two-Way Estimates……………………….. 105 
vi 
Table 3.6. The effect of oil rents on gross domestic investment controlling for 
other explanatory variables using the GMM estimation method……  109 
Table 3.7. The effect of oil exports on gross domestic investment controlling 
for other explanatory variables using the GMM estimation 
method……………………………………………………………..... 112 
Table 4.1. The Correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables in 
the investment model ……………………………………………..... 138 
Table 4.2. Durbin-Watson Statistics to check the autocorrelation between the 
residuals of the differenced oil price series in each country in the 
sample …………………………………………………………….... 140 
Table 4.3. Tests for ARCH disturbances based on OLS Residuals for the 
residuals of the differenced oil price series in each country in the 
sample.……………………………………………………………....    141 
Table 4.4. LLC panel unit root test of the variables in their level forms…….… 144 
Table 4.5. IPS panel unit root test of the variables in their level forms ……….. 145 
Table 4.6. LLC unit root test for the differenced variables…………………….. 146 
Table 4.7. IPS unit root test for the differenced variables……………………....  146 
Table 4.8. Fixed Two-Way Estimates of the static investment model using 
differenced variables……………………………………………....... 148 
Table 4.9. The Two-Way Random Effects estimates of the static investment 
model using lagged differenced variables…………………………... 149 
Table 4.10. Random Effects estimates of the dynamic investment model with 
lagged differenced explanatory variables…………………................  151 
Table 4.11. Parameters estimates of the investment model with lagged 
differenced explanatory variables using the two-step GMM 
estimator ……………………………………………………….....… 152 
Table 4.12. Pedroni cointegration test results …………..……………………... 154 
Table 4.13. Kao cointegration test results …………………………….……….. 155 
Table 4.14. Pedroni cointegration test results (I / P) …………………..………. 156 
Table 4.15. Kao cointegration test results (I / P) …………………………….… 156 
Table 4.16. The long run coefficients of the individual countries……………...  158 
vii 
Table 4.17. Estimating the long run coefficients using the one-way Random 
Effects estimator …………………………………………………..... 160 
Table 4.18. Estimating the long run coefficients using the two- step system 
GMM estimator………………………………………………..……. 161 
Table 4.19. IPS panel unit root on the Error Correction Term (ADF lags are 
set to be MAIC) ……………………………………………….....…. 163 
Table 4.20. Parameter estimates of the ECM using the Two-way Random 
Effects estimator…………………………………………………...... 164 
Table 4.21. Wald test for the joint significance of the coefficient estimates 
resulted from using the Two-way Random Effects estimator……..... 165 
Table 4.22. Parameter estimates of the ECM using the GMM estimator………  166 
Table 4.23. Wald test for the joint significance of the coefficient estimates 
resulted from using the GMM estimator……………………………. 166 
  
viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1. The route of the BTC oil pipeline …………………………..……. 16 
Figure 2.2. Seismic hazard distribution map for the areas through which the 
BTC oil pipeline passes………………………………………….. 25 
Figure 2.3. Equity holders in the BTC Company …………………………...... 44 
Figure 2.4. The assumed alternative route to the BTC pipeline …….……....... 49 
Figure 2.5. The payments to the host countries (% the annual total 
payments)…………………………………………….………...... 52 
Figure 2.6. Gross payoffs versus the outside options when the tariff charge is 
$3.5/barrel …………………………………………………......... 53 
Figure 2.7. Players’ proportions of the total surplus with simultaneous and 
sequential bargaining…………………………………….............. 55 
Figure 2.8. The total surplus with both simultaneous and sequential 
bargaining - millions of $............................................................... 56 
Figure 3.1. Factors affecting gross domestic investment …………………..... 72 
Figure 3.2. Azerbaijan’s oil supply and GDP growth from 1993 to 2010…..... 81 
Figure 3.3. Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 for the countries included in 
our sample………………………………………………….……. 86 
Figure 4.1. Crude oil spot prices……………………………………………… 131 
Figure 4.2. Growth rates of global crude oil supply and demand between 
1970 and 2012……………………………………………..…….. 132 
  
ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT………………………………………………….. iv 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………….………. v 
LIST OF FIGURES …………………………………………………….…. viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………….……... ix 
  
CHAPTER ONE   
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………... 1 
  
 
CHAPTER TWO   
 TRANSNATIONAL PROJECT EVALUATION: THE 
BARGAINING PROBLEM: THE BTC OIL PIPELINE 
PROJECT AS A CASE STUDY 
 
 
2.1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………. 8 
2.2. An overview on transnational infrastructure projects………………… 11 
2.2.1. Literature on transnational projects……………………………… 11 
2.2.2. Investment in oil and gas projects ……………………………….. 12 
2.3. The BTC oil pipeline project …………………………………………... 14 
2.3.1. Planning period ………………………………………………….. 14 
2.3.2. Pipeline ownership ………………………………………………. 17 
2.3.3. Project Agreements ……………………………………………… 18 
2.3.4. Pipeline financing and constructing …………………………….. 20 
2.3.5. Economic Implications of the Pipeline………………………….. 21 
x 
2.3.6. Concerns over the project……………………………………….. 21 
2.3.6.1. Human rights and environmental concerns ………………. 21 
2.3.6.2. Safety concerns …………………………………………… 23 
2.3.6.3. Security concerns ………………………………………… 26 
2.4. The bargaining problem ………………………………………………. 27 
2.4.1. The cooperative versus the strategic approach………………….  27 
2.4.2. The BTC oil pipeline bargaining model …………………………. 30 
2.4.2.1. Assumptions ………………………………………………. 31 
2.4.2.2. Simultaneous bargaining ………………………………….. 35 
2.4.2.3. Sequential Bargaining …………………………………….. 37 
2.4.2.4. Simultaneous verses sequential bargaining ……………… 40 
2.5. An application of the bargaining problem - a case study……………. 44 
2.5.1. An empirical example on the BTC pipeline project ……………. 44 
2.5.2. Sensitivity analysis of bargainers’ discount rates ………………. 57 
2.6. Conclusions…………………………………………………………….. 63 
Appendix A2 ……………………………………………………………….. 65 
 Appendix B2……………………………………………………………….. 66 
  
CHAPTER THREE  
 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF OIL ON DOMESTIC 
FIXED INVESTMENT IN NON-OECD OIL-EXPORTING 
COUNTRIES 
 
 
3.1. Introduction……………………………………………………………..  70 
3.2. Literature review……………………………………………………….. 72 
3.2.1. Investment-related literature ……………………………………. 72 
3.2.2. Natural resource abundance, economic growth, and investment ... 75 
xi 
3.3. Overview on Non-OECD oil-exporting economies……………………. 78 
3.3.1. Oil rents versus output growth …………………………………... 79 
3.3.2. Using oil rents …………………………………………………… 82 
3.4. Model specification, methodology and data…………………………… 89 
3.4.1. Model specification ……………………………………………… 89 
3.4.2. Methodology …………………………………………………….. 93 
3.4.3. Data ……………………………………………………………… 95 
3.5. Estimation results ……………………………………………………… 102 
3.5.1. Outcomes of the static specification……………………………... 102 
3.5.2. Outcomes of the dynamic specification …………………………. 107 
3.6. Conclusions…………………………………………………………….. 116 
  
CHAPTER FOUR  
 OIL AND INVESTMENT IN OIL-IMPORTING OECD 
COUNTRIES 
 
 
4.1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………. 118 
4.2. Literature review ………………………………………………………. 120 
4.2.1. Oil prices and macro level economic activities …………………. 120 
4.2.2. Oil prices and firm level investment…………………………….. 125 
4.3. Overview on oil shocks since the 1970s ……………………………… 127 
4.3.1. Pricing crude oils ……………………………………………….. 127 
4.3.2. Oil shocks since the 1970s ……………………………………… 130 
4.4. Model specification and data………………………………………….. 134 
4.4.1. The investment model……………………………………………. 134 
4.4.2. Data ……………………………………………………………… 136 
xii 
4.5. Methodology ………………………………………………………….. 142 
4.5.1. Panel unit root tests ……………………………………………… 142 
4.5.2. Estimating the differenced investment model …………………… 147 
4.5.2.1. The static specification ……………………………………. 147 
4.5.2.2. The dynamic specification of the investment model……… 150 
4.5.3. Panel cointegration test ………………………………………….. 152 
4.5.4. Estimating the long run coefficients …………………………….. 157 
4.5.5. The long and short run effect of oil prices on investment ……….. 162 
4.6. Conclusions ……………………………………………………………. 168 
  
CHAPTER FIVE 
  
CONCLUDING REMARKS ………………………………………………. 170 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………….. 176 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Crude oil is a vital energy source and a highly demanded commodity in the global 
economy, and thus changes in its price might have significant implications on the 
supply and the demand sides, in oil-exporting/importing economies and in transit 
countries through which oil is carried by cross-border oil pipelines.  
In oil-producing countries, the oil industry, which involves various activities ranging 
from exploration, development, extraction, refining, transporting and trading 
petroleum products, is associated with huge capital expenditures, a high level of 
technological and management expertise, and substantial investment and 
environmental risks. Given that exports from petroleum products are a key 
component of merchandise trade in oil-exporting nations, oil revenues account for 
substantial amounts of their budgets, and thus a higher price of oil can imply 
significantly larger oil-related incomes. Therefore, these countries aim at managing 
oil production, maintaining targeted price levels, and channelling oil proceeds 
towards sustainable economic growth. 
The transmission mechanism through which oil prices influence real economic 
activities includes the supply and demand channels. The supply side impacts are 
related to the fact that energy is a basic input to production, and therefore an increase 
in oil prices leads to a rise in the cost of production which in turn induces firms to 
decrease output. On the demand-side, oil price fluctuations could affect adversely on 
consumption through its positive relation with disposable income, and on investment 
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by raising firms costs and possibly by increasing uncertainty (see Ferderer, 1996; 
Lescaroux and Mignon, 2008; Ghalayini, 2011).  
The price of crude oil is affected by various factors. Traditionally, changes in the 
levels of oil supply or oil demand are viewed as the main factors that cause oil price 
fluctuations. High demand and low supply are expected to drive the price upwards, 
while low demand and high supply decrease the price. Also, refinery infrastructure, 
such as oil pipelines, might cause disruptions and thus a temporary loss of oil supply 
to markets under circumstances of aging, technical problems, and political unrest. 
Inventory levels can also affect the price of oil since low oil inventories involve 
uncertainty about the market’s ability to meet the required demand which might 
drive the price of oil upwards. Furthermore, the marginal cost of production and 
technological changes, such as those related to offshore drilling, are likely to 
influence the price of crude oil. The price of oil can be also affected by weather 
conditions, such as hurricanes causing damage to offshore oil fields, pipelines, and 
refineries.  
The crucial role played by crude oil in the global economy has stimulated researchers 
to investigate factors affecting oil prices, and to examine the implications of oil on 
the economies of both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries using different 
methodologies and samples. For instance, some studies (see, e.g., Barsky and Kilian, 
2004; Kilian, 2008; and  Hamilton, 2008) have focused on the response of output 
growth and consumer price inflation to oil price shocks in oil-importing economies, 
while others have examined the impact of oil prices on external balances (see, e.g., 
Ostry and Reinhart, 1992; Gavin, 1992; and Kilian et.al, 2009). Also, a number of 
scholars have focused on the micro-level, and thus observed the impacts of oil prices 
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and oil price uncertainty using firm-level data. Yet, only a limited number of studies 
have paid attention to the implications of oil revenues/prices on domestic fixed 
investment.  
Therefore, this thesis attempts to bridge this gap by focusing on crude oil and 
domestic fixed investment throughout transit, oil-exporting, and oil-importing 
countries. It aims at answering the following questions: 
 What are the implications of constructing cross-border oil infrastructure projects 
on the economies of involved transit-countries, and how might different 
bargaining scenarios affect the revenues from transit-fees that the concerned 
countries receive for transporting oil through their lands?  
 Is oil in oil-rich developing economies often a curse, rather than beneficial, and 
do these countries well manage their oil revenues and use them to finance capital 
investment projects?  
 How do changes in the price of crude oil affect the economies of oil-importing 
developed economies, and is there a long run equilibrium relationship between 
the price of oil and domestic fixed investment in these countries. 
The above questions are answered throughout three essays in this thesis, presented in 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4.  
Chapter 2 examines the implications of building an oil-pipeline project on the transit 
economies through which the pipeline passes by employing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) oil pipeline project as a case study. As a transnational project, building an oil 
pipeline involves various economic, political, and environmental risks to the transit 
countries. Hence, setting a wide range of legal and regulatory frameworks, and 
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considering mechanisms that protect human rights, and reduce the prospective 
environmental risks, are vital for the participants in such cross-border projects. That 
necessitates reaching a mutually beneficial agreement between the project partners 
through bargaining. 
The chapter, therefore, considers the bargaining problem confronting the 
multinational corporation, that builds the project, and the three host countries 
(Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey) at the time that the project agreement was made, 
to find out the viability of the oil pipeline to the participants. After introducing the 
bargaining model of the BTC project employing bargaining theory (the Nash 
bargaining solution, and the alternating offer bargain of Rubinstein), the implications 
of two different bargaining formulations (simultaneous and sequential bargaining) 
for the participants are shown. The multinational corporation receives returns from 
building the oil pipeline, and each of the three host countries expects to get revenues 
through transit fees. The tariff charge per barrel, however, is unknown by the time of 
making the agreement, but the parties have to make the decision depending on their 
future expectations of their forthcoming proceeds. Thus, we find the break-even tariff 
charge at which a zero surplus would be obtained. The results suggest that the project 
is feasible for the multinational corporation and the three host countries when the 
tariff charge is higher than the break-even tariff charge of $3/barrel, which is, in turn, 
within the tariff range expected by some commentators upon signing the agreement.     
Given that we have no available information on the financial agreement between the 
participants in the deal, we find a range of potential payoffs for the participants by 
considering both simultaneous and sequential bargaining, assuming a tariff charge 
higher than the break-even one. In each case, Azerbaijan (the country with the oil 
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deposits) obtains the highest payoff, followed by the multinational corporation, then 
by Turkey (the country with the oil marine terminal), and finally by Georgia (through 
which the pipeline runs). 
Chapter 3 examines how domestic fixed investment is affected by oil abundance in 
oil-exporting developing countries. So far, fixed investment-related studies have 
analysed the linkage between domestic investment and several other macroeconomic 
variables, such as foreign direct investment, domestic saving, trade openness, 
financial development, the exchange rate, and exchange rate uncertainty (see e.g. 
Byrne and Davis, 2005); while natural resource-related literature has often examined 
the effects of resource abundance on economic growth in oil-rich developing nations. 
But the relationship between domestic fixed investment and oil abundance in oil-
exporting developing countries is yet to be examined.  
It has been debated that natural resources can be an important source of funds for 
financing productive investment projects, and thus boosting sustainable economic 
growth in oil-rich developing nations. Although the empirical findings of some 
studies indicate that a resource boom boosts economic growth in these countries, the 
experience of many of oil-rich developing economies reveals poor governance, great 
inequality, high levels of corruption, and low economic growth (Karl, 2007). 
We thus attempt to provide further analysis on the implications of resource 
abundance on the economies of developing countries by examining whether oil 
abundance boosts fixed domestic investment, which is a basic determinant of 
economic growth, in a panel of 22 oil-exporting economies. By using oil rents and 
oil exports as proxies for oil abundance, the (static and dynamic) investment model is 
specified, controlling for other investment determinants. The static model is 
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estimated using Random and Fixed Effects estimators, while the dynamic model is 
estimated by employing the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments. In line 
with the literature which has documented adverse resource effects, our results 
indicate that oil abundance affects domestic investment adversely.  
Chapter 4 examines the effect of the crude oil price on domestic fixed investment in 
a panel of oil-importing developed economies. Numerous researchers have 
documented the response of economic growth towards oil price changes. Their 
findings suggest that higher oil prices affect output growth adversely. At the micro 
level, the impact of oil price uncertainty on firm-level investment has been 
investigated, but the results are not conclusive. Classical theory indicates that 
uncertainty can have a positive effect on investment since entrepreneurs might be 
able to grab investment opportunities under conditions of uncertainty (Knight, 1921), 
but several other studies have documented an adverse impact of uncertainty on firm 
level investment as uncertainty about future oil prices causes delays in business 
investment. According to option theory, uncertainty affects investment adversely due 
to the irreversible nature of investment projects (see, e.g. Leahy and Whited, 1996; 
Bond and Cummins, 2004).    
In this context this chapter attempts to analyse the behaviour of fixed investment but 
at the macro-level, employing a panel set of 12 oil-importing OECD economies. We 
find that there is a long run equilibrium relationship between domestic fixed 
investment and the oil price. Therefore, the error correction model is estimated to 
show both the long and short run effects of the oil price and the other explanatory 
variables on domestic fixed investment. Although the results do not show a 
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significant short run effect of the oil price on fixed investment, over the long run 
investment is affected adversely by the oil price.  
Chapter 5 includes conclusions of the results obtained in the three essays, and 
provides suggestions about future research in the area related to investment and oil.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
TRANSNATIONAL PROJECT EVALUATION: 
THE BARGAINING PROBLEM: THE BTC OIL 
PIPELINE PROJECT AS A CASE STUDY 
2.1. Introduction 
Large scale transnational infrastructure projects face massive regulatory, technical 
and social challenges (physical distance, cultural diversity, language barriers and 
technological differences). Constructing such projects therefore requires pervasive 
management of economic, political and environmental risks (Adenfelt, 2010; 
Sovacool, 2009). Investors must be convinced to invest in such projects by setting 
consistent legal and regulatory frameworks and by addressing rigorous participatory 
and transparency mechanisms to ensure that human rights are protected and damage 
to the natural environment is minimized (Sovacool, 2009). Thus, successful project 
financing depends on the strength of the project participants’ commitments, and 
contractual undertakings of the host governments are among such important 
commitments (Sinclair, 1998).  
Transnational projects involve signing an intergovernmental agreement, constituting 
an international treaty between concerned host governments to satisfy project 
sponsors and their lenders. The project sponsors expect all issues related to 
compensation, maintenance services, and risk to be addressed. Hence, the investment 
decision in such projects must be taken by the stakeholders unanimously. Therefore, 
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bargaining, which aims at reaching a mutually beneficial agreement (Sinclair, 1998), 
is a basic step in signing the project contract.  
This chapter therefore focuses on the bargaining problem in transnational 
infrastructure projects by employing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline 
project as an example to examine the viability of this project for each concerned 
party. The chapter comprises four sections. The first section gives an overview of the 
literature on transnational projects and throws light on difficulties associated with oil 
and gas transport projects. In the second section, the BTC pipeline project is 
introduced, and the planning, financing and construction-related details of the project 
are discussed. The potential positive and negative effects of the project on the host 
countries (Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia) are also considered. In the third section, 
the bargaining problem is addressed. A bargaining model of the BTC project is 
introduced, and then the implications of two different formulations of bargaining 
(simultaneous and sequential bargaining) for stakeholders’ profitability are shown. 
Finally, in the fourth section, using available information on the BTC oil pipeline 
project, a numerical illustration is provided and the bargaining outcomes are found.  
We consider the bargaining problem facing the multinational corporation and the 
three countries at the time that the project agreement was made. Thus, for example, 
the tariff charge per barrel that would be obtained in the future, on completion of the 
project, was unknown. This tariff would depend on future conditions in the world oil 
market. Nonetheless, the multinational corporation and the three countries had 
expectations of what the tariff might be and were making decisions accordingly. 
Employing the bargaining model, we find that the break-even charge at which the 
project achieves a zero surplus was $3 per barrel. This is considerably within the 
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tariff price range $2.58-$3.30 that some commentators were quoting at the time 
(Mansley, 2003).  
Our calculations using the Nash bargaining model to find the payoffs the participants 
receive from the project are based on a tariff of $3.5 per barrel. This price was 
chosen because it implies positive payoffs - which we assume that the participants in 
the project expected, given that they agreed the deal.  
Information is not available regarding how the participants bargained over the 
financial arrangements. By considering both simultaneous and sequential bargaining, 
we obtain a range of potential payoffs for the participants. Using estimates of the 
relevant variables we are able to throw some light on the differences in payoffs 
between simultaneous and sequential bargaining. Also, while recognizing that there 
was considerable uncertainty facing participants when the agreement was made, we 
can get a broad idea of whether for some participants the project could have been 
rather marginal in terms of expected payoffs, in which case it is possible that 
motivations beyond the scope of this dissertation, such as political factors, played a 
significant role.  
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2.2. An overview on transnational infrastructure projects 
2.2.1. Literature on transnational projects 
Transnational infrastructure projects located in two or more countries are associated 
with high costs and long life. Since the costs and benefits of such projects are 
distributed between the partners, coordination and building a stable partnership are 
fundamental issues in establishing viable projects. In this context, bargaining theory 
is a potentially important tool in elaborating the partnership-related concerns, yet it is 
hardly applied in the literature on transnational projects. This study therefore 
attempts to begin filling this gap, approaching transnational projects from the 
perspective of bargaining theory. 
Transnational projects have been examined extensively in the project management 
literature, focusing on appropriate behaviour in an international work environment, 
and effective global leadership (House, 2000; Simons et al., 1993). From this 
perspective, due to the challenges faced in managing and organizing transnational 
projects, many studies attempt to provide a better understanding of the factors 
affecting the performance of such projects (Thamhain, 2004; Zakaria et al., 2004). 
Adenfelt (2010), for instance, shows in his study how knowledge sharing affects 
performance by using case study data from a transnational project. He shows that 
transnational project performance is hindered by communication and coordination 
difficulties.  
Furthermore, many authors discuss the outcome-related performance of projects, 
which refers to the extent to which a project is able to meet scheduled costs, time, 
and quality objectives (Hoegl and Weinkauf, 2005). The findings of Maznevski and 
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Chudoba (2000), for example, on transnational project performance, stress the 
relationship between structure and process, and thereby the pattern of interaction 
over time. 
2.2.2. Investment in oil and gas projects 
Investments in oil and gas networks are capital intensive, implying a wide range of 
economic, social, and environmental impacts on many parties over a long lifespan. 
Evaluation of such projects is therefore a crucial task before construction. To a great 
extent, the willingness of investors looking to make a reasonable rate of return on 
their investment in such projects is related to the legal and regulatory framework 
(World Bank, 2004) 
In a typical oil and gas concession agreement defining a government’s obligations 
with regard to the project, the government gives to a company the right to develop a 
project in return for payments which could take one or more forms: fixed rents, 
royalties, profit overrides and/or taxes (Sinclair, 1998). A comprehensive agreement 
for a large oil and gas project should address the government’s obligations to deal 
with the possible risks such as currency availability and convertibility, and political 
force majeure events (e.g., civil unrest, general strikes) (Sovacool, 2009; Sinclair, 
1998). If the government fails to meet its obligations, financial compensation should 
be provided to the project sponsors through compensatory reduction of the 
government’s revenue stream or contingent payment obligations, and so the ability of 
a government to meet its financial and nonfinancial obligations, as stated by Sinclair 
(1998), could be the factor that determines the project’s financeability.  
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To a large extent, co-operation between concerned countries and the overall political 
and economic stability of the region have a crucial impact on the effective operation 
of oil and gas projects (Begoyan, 2004). In developing countries, constructing such 
projects is associated with many difficulties, among which are the following (Hayes 
and Victor, 2003):  
 The investment climate in the countries involved (the country which owns the oil 
fields and the transit countries). Relevant factors include government stability, 
internal conflict, corruption, law and order, ethnic tensions, and bureaucratic 
quality.  
 Complications related to negotiation and management in such cross-border 
projects and the risk of hold-up once the costs are sunk.  
 The volatility of market prices and demand.  
 Pipeline routes may pass through countries that have few or no international 
institutional links that could help in reducing transaction costs and enforcement 
of contracts. Examples of such links are trade institutions that reflect the degree 
of commercial integration of the countries and the willingness of the countries to 
manage such affairs mutually.   
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 2.3. The BTC oil pipeline project 
2.3.1. Planning period 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the energy-rich region in the south Caucasus 
attracted foreign economic and political interest, but several political problems and 
violent conflicts slowed down the entrance of foreign investments to the region. 
However, the establishment of the cease-fire in 1994 between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, and between Georgia and Abkhazia opened up the oil rich region for 
foreign oil companies (see Begoyan, 2004).  
On September 20, 1994 the agreement on joint development and production sharing 
for the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil fields located in the Azeri sector of the 
Caspian Sea was signed between Azerbaijan and AIOC
1
 (Azerbaijan International 
Operating Company - a consortium formed by foreign oil companies and led by BP) 
(BP, 2010). The 1994 contract granted Western oil companies the right to produce oil 
for the first time in newly independent Azerbaijan (Peuch, 2005). As a result, the 
Azeri government would receive approximately 80% of the total profits from a 
combination of royalties and from the share of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan 
Republic (SOCAR), and the remaining 20% of profits would be divided among the 
other Consortium members (Sagheb and Javadi, 1994).
 2
 
                                                          
1
 AIOC includes BP (operator): 34.1%, Chevron: 10.2%, SOCAR: 10% INPEX: 10%, Statoil: 8.6%, 
ExxonMobil: 8%, TPAO: 6.8%, Devon: 5.6%, ITOCHU: 3.9%, and Hess: 2.7% (BP, 2010). Some 
AIOC members, including BP, SOCAR, and TPAO have also invested in the construction of the BTC 
pipeline (See EIA, 2014b). 
2
 According to one Azeri official, a preliminary estimate of Azerbaijan's overall profit was $81 billion 
over 30 years. In addition, the Azeri government would receive a $300 million bonus from the 
Consortium for signing the agreement (Sagheb and Javadi, 1994). 
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All transportation routes from the Caspian region during the Soviet era were built 
through Russia. The Western Early Oil pipeline was built from Azerbaijan to the 
Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa, but this pipeline cannot carry adequate amounts 
of oil via the Black Sea and is severely limited by congestion in the Bosporus and 
Dardanelles straits which separate European from Asian Turkey.  
Therefore, three rival plans to exploit the Caspian reserves were drawn up- a 
northern route through Russia, a southern route through Iran and the central route 
through the Caucasus to the Mediterranean (Thornton and Howden, 2005). Since 
Russia and Iran were considered to be unreliable partners for Western companies, the 
third option was believed to be the most appropriate one (Thornton and Howden 
2005), so PLE (a German originated company) was commissioned to perform the 
feasibility study for the route passing through Georgia. The study was finalised in 
August 1998 (BTC P/L Project Directorate, 2012).  
Figure 2.1 shows the central route, the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) oil pipeline, on 
which the study was carried out: 
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Figure 2.1. The route of the BTC oil pipeline 
 
Source: International Finance Corporation (IFC, 2006) 
It can be seen from the map that the BTC pipeline starts from Azerbaijan, passing 
through Georgia and Turkey to end up at the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. 
The primary source of oil for the BTC pipeline is the ACG oil fields which are about 
100 kilometres off the coast of Baku, and have an estimated 5.4 billion barrels of 
recoverable resources (Smith, 2004). Besides, Kazakhstan - the largest producer of 
the oil in the Caspian region - negotiated space in the BTC pipeline to transport its 
Kashagan oil due to the insufficiency of the existing oil transport infrastructure 
(ECSSD, 2008), and an intergovernmental agreement on the transport of Kazakh oil 
by the BTC pipeline was approved by the president of Kazakhstan on 29 May 2008 
(Jarosiewicz, 2008) 
According to Sovacool (2010), building a pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey would 
create a distribution corridor not only for the current oil, but for any future 
discoveries in Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, especially if Azerbaijan is linked in 
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the future to Kazakhstan (which is rich in oil). Thus, the project is viewed as an 
important element of an overall plan to turn the Caucasus region into a transport 
corridor connecting Central Asia to Western Europe. 
2.3.2. Pipeline ownership   
The 1,768 km BTC oil pipeline project, designed with an initial lifespan of 40 years, 
was opened officially on 13 July 2006 (Dufey, 2009). The Project is owned by BTC 
Company - a consortium of eleven national and international oil companies with 
upstream interests in the Caspian region (Smith, 2004). The shareholders and their 
equity holdings are shown in the following table. 
Table 2.1. Shareholders’ shares in the BTC Company 
   
Source: (BP, 2006) 
It can be seen from Table 2.1 that more than 50% of the equity is held by BP and 
SOCAR. BP is also the operator and the largest shareholder in AIOC, the consortium 
extracting the oil from the ACG fields, with 34.10% of the equity (BP, 2010), and the 
BTC consortium owns the pipeline, with 30.10% of the equity. 
Shareholders in the  
BTC company 
Country % of Equity 
BP  UK 30.10 
SOCAR Azerbaijan 25.00 
Unocal USA 8.90 
Statoil Norway 8.71 
TPAO Turkey 6.53 
TotalFinaElf France 5.00 
Eni Italy 5.00 
Itochu Japan 3.40 
ConocoPhillips USA 2.50 
INPEX Japan 2.50 
Hess Corporation 
Joint venture of Delta Oil (Saudi 
Arabia) with Amerada Hess (US) 
2.36 
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2.3.3. Project Agreements 
On 29 October 1998, the project gained momentum after the Ankara Declaration was 
adopted (Baran, 2005). Later on, negotiations between the BP-led consortium and the 
three countries ended up with a legal regime involving several agreements 
concerning the pipeline’s construction, operation, and the social and environmental 
standards with which the project must comply as follows (The Corner House, 2011; 
Hildyard, 2007; Smith, 2004; Peachey, 2011): 
I. The Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA): The IGA is the trilateral agreement 
between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia signed on 18 November 1999. The IGA 
confirmed each country’s support for development, construction and operation of the 
pipeline across its territory. The IGA is essentially a treaty under public international 
law through which the host governments agree to ensure the security and safety of 
project personnel, facilities, assets, and in-transit petroleum other than the states’ 
commitments with respect to the application of environmental standards. 
 
II. The Host Government Agreements (HGAs) - 2000: Three separate HGAs were 
signed between BTC Company and each of the three countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey). The HGAs define the capital and resources that each participant should 
provide to the project, the timetable of the project, the standards that must be met, 
and the domestic legislation to which the project is subject. The HGAs addressed in 
greater detail the technical, legal and fiscal regime under which BTC Company 
undertakes the project and the mutual rights and obligations of each government and 
BTC Company. The HGAs include rights and guarantees from the concerned 
countries to BTC Company to ensure the success of the project, including land rights 
for the construction and operation of the pipeline, rights to import and export goods 
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and services, rights to transfer and convert currency, and guarantees of economic 
stabilization. Besides, the HGAs addressed the terms of the direct financial 
compensation for each of the host countries, in addition to the process for land 
acquisition and compensation.  
Many concerns were raised by Amnesty International and other NGOs over the 
HGAs that have been incorporated into domestic law in all the three countries and 
override domestic laws (other than the national constitutions) where such law 
conflicts with the terms of the HGAs and the IGA. Furthermore, the agreements 
impose an obligation to compensate BTC Company for any new social or 
environmental legislation that might impinge on the economic equilibrium of the 
project. 
In response to pressure from Amnesty International and other non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), BTC Company signed a unilateral declaration that it would 
not invoke the compensation clauses where new legislation was intended to protect 
human rights. However, the declaration contains a let-out clause whereby BTC 
retains the right to do so if it deems the action of the host government to constitute 
rent-seeking. 
III.. The Joint Statement -2003: Due to the concerns raised by NGOs, the BTC 
Company and the host governments signed a Joint Statement guaranteeing adherence 
to internationally recognized human rights, environmental standards and labour 
rights, with a commitment to the standards adopted in the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights. 
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2.3.4. Pipeline financing and constructing 
Approximately 30% of the BTC pipeline costs were funded by equity contributions, 
while the remaining 70% were funded from other parties comprising export credit 
agencies and political risk insurers
3
, a group of 15 commercial banks
4
, and 
multinational lending agencies - the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development: $250 million, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC): $250 
million (BP, 2004; Hildyard, 2007). 
The pipeline construction continued for three years - from 2003 to 2005 - with a 
different contractor in each country. The Azerbaijan section was constructed by 
Consolidated Contractors International of Greece, while a joint venture of France’s 
Spie Capag and US Petrofac constructed the Georgian section (Alexander's Gas and 
Oil Connections, 2002). In Turkey, BOTAS (the Turkish State Pipeline Company) 
signed a turnkey agreement under which it committed to build the pipeline for a 
fixed price even though analysts, according to FFM (2003), had expected the real 
cost to be more than that price, so the Turkish state took the responsibility of the 
extra cost, in addition to the cost over-runs.  
 
                                                          
3
 Export credit agencies and political risk insurers comprised: the Japan Bank for International Co-
operation (JBIC) and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) of Japan: $580 million and 
$120 million respectively, the Export-Import Bank of the United States of America: $160 million, the 
Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) of the United Kingdom: $106 million, the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) of the United States: $142 million, Compagnie Francaise pour 
le Commerce Exterieur (COFACE) of France: $100 million, Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 
(HERMES) of Germany: $85 million, and SACE S.p.A. – Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero 
(SACE) of Italy: $50 million (BP, 2004; Hildyard, 2007). 
4
 The private banks were: ABN AMRO Bank, Banca Intesa, BNP Paribas, Citibank, Credit Agricole 
Indosuez, Dexia Credit Local, Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, ING Bank, KBC Finance Ireland, 
Mizuho Corporate Bank, Natexis Banques Populaires, the Royal Bank of Scotland, San Paolo IMI, 
Societe Generale, and West LB (Hildyard, 2007). 
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2.3.5. Economic Implications of the Pipeline  
The pipeline project potentially involves substantial economic benefits to each of the 
three countries and to the whole region. Azerbaijan gets considerable benefits 
through royalty and tax proceeds, while Georgia and Turkey receive financial 
benefits through transit fees (IFC, 2006).  
Furthermore, host countries get indirect benefits associated with the purchase of local 
goods and services, employment, and specific programs designed to encourage the 
development of small and medium sized enterprises. For example, in 2002, BP 
opened an Enterprise Centre in Baku in Azerbaijan in order to help local companies 
to develop their business in support of the BTC development and other major oil and 
gas developments in the region (IFC, 2006). 
According to Guney and Ozdemir (2011), the BTC Pipeline became an important 
step for bilateral agreements and economic cooperation which would help in creating 
peace and eliminating ethnic conflicts in the region.  
2.3.6. Concerns over the project 
2.3.6.1. Human rights and environmental concerns 
Financing and construction of the pipeline has triggered several concerns from a 
range of NGOs including Amnesty International and the World Wildlife Fund 
regarding social problems, human rights abuses, and environmental damage caused 
by the oil pipeline. 
In April 2003, six environment and human rights groups lodged a complaint against 
BP under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Part of the complaint 
alleged that BTC Company failed to consult adequately with communities affected 
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by the project on pertinent matters. Hence, on 9 March 2010, the UK National 
Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines (NCP) issued a Revised Final Statement on 
the BTC Complaint. The NCP finds BTC Company in breach of the OECD 
Guidelines which recommends adequate and timely consultation by multinationals 
with local communities impacted by corporate operations (The Corner House, 2011).  
In Turkey, an analysis of the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Turkish 
section of the pipeline by international NGOs in 2003 found violations of the 
relevant World Bank safeguard policies and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) operational policies. Environmental baseline studies were 
inadequate with, for example, only 23 sites studied in Turkey, ignoring migration and 
seasonal effects, although the pipeline route is 1000 km in Turkey (Hildyard, 2007). 
In Georgia, many villages have been affected negatively by the BTC pipeline 
through traffic or water pollution. The sole water source for Tsemi in the Borjomi 
District has been polluted since May 2004, causing the abrupt end of the village’s 
tourist industry which was the primary source of income; besides, the pipeline passes 
through the catchment area for the Tskhratskaro springs leaving tap water muddy 
brown (FFM, 2005).  
Human rights violations alleged by villagers during BTC construction include: illegal 
use of land without compensation, intimidation, lack of public consultation, 
involuntary resettlement and damage to land property (Hildyard, 2007). The BTC 
Company claims to have consulted with all landowners affected by the pipeline, but 
figures from its own environmental impact assessment reveal that less than 2% had 
in fact been consulted, besides lack of access to project documentation; 
misinformation about legal rights and failure to warn villagers of potential dangers of 
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the project (Hildyard, 2007). Thus, the company failed to adequately investigate the 
complaints of intimidation against affected communities by local security forces.  
IFC and the other lenders should be notified of any material changes to project 
implementation that would result in significant environmental or social impacts that 
might not have been sufficiently covered in the Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessments (ESIAs) or catered for in the Environmental and Social Action Plan 
(ESAP)
5
. Although a specific Management of Change mechanism was included in 
the ESAP of BTC to notify the lenders about changes, the criteria developed to 
determine when a change notification to the lenders should be triggered did not work 
well in practice (IFC, 2006). The criteria were rather ambiguous and led to 
disagreements between BTC, the lenders and the independent environmental 
consultant as to what constituted a significant change and whether lender notification 
was warranted (IFC, 2006). 
2.3.6.2. Safety concerns 
Several safety concerns were provoked before and during the pipeline construction. 
BP was highly critical of Turkey's BOTAS which built the BTC pipeline in the 
Turkish section as a turn-key project. Construction was delayed and was over-budget 
and BP has always suspected quality-control issues (Guardian, 2010). During 
construction, the BP’s own external monitoring body - the Caspian Development 
Advisory Panel - warned that the pressure on contractors in Turkey to avoid 
                                                          
5
 An essential component of an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment is the specific measures 
and actions developed to mitigate and manage the environmental and social impacts identified in the 
assessment and committed to by the sponsor. These measures are typically organized into a 
management plan for implementation. IFC and the other lenders required that BTC prepare an ESAP 
which comprised the environmental and social actions and mitigation measures to be taken for the 
project before financial closure (IFC, 2006). 
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incurring financial penalties created an institutional incentive to cut corners and rush 
work, particularly over land acquisition and quality control (Hildyard, 2007).  
Furthermore, pipeline experts who worked on the Turkish section highlighted a 
complete absence of many fundamental safety features including not allowing 
engineers access to construction sites (Hildyard, 2007), as well as the lack of 
necessary specialists in seismic geology, although the pipeline runs through an area 
of substantial seismic activity
6 
(Mansley, 2003). According to Safak et al. (2008), the 
pipeline has not been evaluated comprehensively for its seismic safety and risk.  
A seismic hazard evaluation is an essential step before constructing infrastructure 
projects. It involves studying expected ground motions caused by an earthquake 
calculated on the basis of probability (Natural Resources Canada, 2011). The 
outcomes of these studies are displayed as seismic hazard maps such as Figure 2.2 
which shows the vulnerability of the region through which the BTC pipeline passes, 
ranging from medium - the yellow colour in the map- to very high - the red colour - 
seismic hazard. 
                                                          
6
 There have been major earthquakes in the region, at least 17 major earthquakes directly on the 
pipeline route since 1924 measuring from 5.5 to 7.9 on the Richter scale (Mansley, 2003).  
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Figure 2.2. Seismic hazard distribution map for the areas 
through which the BTC oil pipeline passes 
 
  Source: (World Health Organization, 2010) - The BTC oil pipeline, the thick purple line was   
added by the researcher. 
It can be seen from the map that the oil pipeline crosses zones that have experienced 
large earthquakes in the past causing major damage to the existing pipelines - 
interruption of the flow, huge repair and restoration costs, widespread fires, and 
environmental pollution (Safak et al., 2008). Noticeably, the majority of zones in 
which seismic hazard is very high - shown in red colour - are in the Turkish section. 
Also, the pipeline passes through highly hazardous areas - shown in orange colour - 
in both Georgia and Azerbaijan.   
Another major safety concern was associated with BP’s choice of anti-corrosion 
coating, which had never been used in a similar pipeline, although BP’s own 
consultant warned in 2002 that the chosen coating was inappropriate to protect the 
pipeline. The coated sections of the pipeline have been therefore subject to extensive 
cracking (Hildyard, 2007). BP claimed to have resolved the problem but an 
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investigation by Bloomberg, the financial news agency, found that cracking had 
continued (Gillard, 2004).  
Bloomberg also reported that BP had given the monitoring contract for its Azerbaijan 
assets to Rasco International Ltd., a Baku-based company with no previous pipeline 
monitoring experience (Hildyard, 2007).  
2.3.6.3. Security concerns 
National and international NGOs have warned, before and after funding the project, 
about high risks of conflicts in the region and the possibility that the project would 
exacerbate such conflicts.   
NGOs have raised several inquiries on the adequacy of the assessment conducted by 
lenders on the risks of conflict, especially after the explosion at one of the valves of 
the BTC pipeline in the Turkish section on 5 August 2008 and the Russian-Georgian 
conflict two days after the explosion (Altunsoy, 2008). It has been indicated that the 
UK’s Export Credit Agency did not consider the risks that the pipeline would 
increase conflict in the region (The Corner House, 2008).  
In all host countries, the governments carry security costs as well as any legal 
liabilities for human rights abuses which can result from security operations (FFM, 
2003). The interruption in oil flow through the pipeline after the explosion has led to 
a debate on whether Turkey should compensate the affected companies. Turkey is 
responsible for the security of the pipeline except in cases of force majeure. Thus, 
according to the BTC agreement, if an arbitration tribunal decides that the explosion 
was due to Turkey’s weakness in providing sufficient security, Turkey may have to 
recompense BTC partners (Altunsoy, 2008). 
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2.4. The bargaining problem 
Bargaining aims at finding a mutual beneficial agreement between stakeholders who 
have common interest in negotiation. A main focus of any bargaining theory is on 
two properties: the distribution of the gain from co-operation between the players 
and the efficiency which is associated with the possibility of failure in reaching an 
agreement, or reaching an agreement after some costly delay (Muthoo, 2000). 
This section shows the relation between the cooperative and the strategic approach of 
bargaining, and then introduces the bargaining model of the BTC oil pipeline. 
2.4.1. The cooperative versus the strategic approach 
Bargaining solutions can be found within two main approaches: the cooperative 
approach under which the outcome satisfies a set of desired properties, and the non-
cooperative approach which is based on strategic behaviour assumptions focusing on 
a precise description of a bargaining procedure (see Kreps, 1990). 
The bargaining game in cooperative game theory addresses the problem of two or 
more players facing a set of feasible outcomes reached by unanimous agreement. If 
no agreement is reached, a given disagreement outcome will result, but if the feasible 
outcomes are such that each player can do better than the disagreement outcome, 
then there is an incentive to reach an agreement; but if at least two players differ over 
which outcome is the most preferable, there is a need for negotiation over which 
outcome should be agreed upon.  
Nash defined a two-person bargaining problem by considering a pair 〈𝐹, 𝑑〉, where F  
represents the feasible set (the set of all feasible utility allocations), and 𝑑 represents 
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the disagreement payoff allocation (the disagreement points of players 1 and 2). F is 
a closed, convex non-empty, and bounded subset of ℝ2 , and 𝑑 = (𝑑1, 𝑑2) is a vector 
in ℝ2. Nash looked for a bargaining solution which is an outcome in the feasible set 
satisfying a set of axioms under which the solution is symmetric, feasible, Pareto 
optimal, preserved under linear transformations, and independent of irrelevant 
alternatives (Nagarajan and Sosic, 2008); the solution is obtained by solving:  
arg max
X=(x1, x2)ϵF,   x≥d
(x1 − d1)(x2 − d2).  
But, with the existence of negotiation weights, the Generalised Nash Bargaining 
solution can be used by ignoring the axiom of symmetry in the Nash Bargaining 
game. That is, if  α is the first player’s bargaining weight, and β is the second 
player’s bargaining weight and the sum of the two weights are equal to one (α + β =
1), it can be shown (Roth, 1979) that the solution solves: 
arg  max
x≥d
(x1 − d1)
α(x2 − d2)
β.  
In contrast, within the framework of the strategic approach, the bargaining game of 
alternating offers of Rubinstein is one in which two players take turns in proposing 
the offers. Player 1 makes an offer which player 2 can accept or reject; if the offer is 
rejected, player 2 makes another offer which player 1 can accept or reject, and so on; 
but since time elapses between every offer and counteroffer, both players have an 
incentive to reach an agreement. In equilibrium, if a solution exists and is offered by 
player 1, player 2 must be indifferent between accepting and rejecting it (see, 
Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). In this bargaining game, the degree of impatience is 
a key element in determining the shares they get from the overall surplus; thus where 
r1 and r2 are the discount rates of player 1 and player 2 respectively, the solution 
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agreed upon with an infinite number of potential rounds gives each player i (i=1,2) a 
proportion σi of the overall surplus as follows (Muthoo, 1999): 
 σ1 =
r2
r1+r2
 = 
1
r1
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
)⁄ ;  σ2 =
r1
r1+r2
 = 
1
r2
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
)⁄ .    
 Therefore,   
σ1
σ2
=
r2
r1
, and so  σ2 =
σ1r1
r2
 . 
The alternating offers bargain of Rubinstein and the Nash axiomatic approach end up 
with the same results when there is infinite number of potential rounds, and the time 
between successive offers is vanishingly small (Muthoo, 1999; Osborne and 
Rubinstein, 1990); accordingly, in equilibrium, player 1 and 2 receive the 
proportions: 
  α =
r2
r1+r2
 , and  β =
r1
r1+r2
. 
Rubinstein’s alternating offers bargain does not have a straightforward formulation 
for the n-player game. However, Krishna and Serrano (1996) introduced the “the exit 
option” according to which the players in the n-person game can exit the game with 
partial agreements and so obtain a unique equilibrium. From this perspective, it can 
be shown that Nash’s axiomatic theory of bargaining extends to n-person games - 
given that the sum of bargaining weights is equal to 1- by assuming that the relative 
weights of any two players in the n-person bargaining game are always the same as 
in a bilateral bargain between these two players; thus the form of the two players 
solution extends to the n-player case, and it extends to the n-player Nash bargain in 
the limit. 
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Accordingly, if  n ≥ 2 , then the bargaining weight for player 𝑖 is σi =
σqrq
ri
  ∀q, but 
we need ∑ σq
n
q=1 = 1. Therefore, we find each player’s bargaining weight as 
follows: 
σ1 +  
σ1r1
r2
+ 
σ1r1
r3
 + ⋯+ 
σ1r1
rn
 =1 ⇒     σ1 =
1
r1
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3
+⋯+
1
rn
)⁄    
σnrn
r1
 + 
σnrn
r2
 +
σnrn
r3
 +⋯+ σn  =1 ⇒     σn =
1
rn
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3
+⋯+
1
rn
)⁄   
Thus, the bargaining weight for player 𝑖 in the n- player bargain is:  
σi = 
1
ri
∑  
1
rq
n
q=1  ⁄                                                                                                      (2.1)  
2.4.2. The BTC oil pipeline bargaining model 
In this section, we model the bargaining process for the host countries and the MNC 
using the Nash/Rubinstein approach. First we assume that the players all bargain 
simultaneously, and then we assume that the three countries bargain sequentially 
with the MNC. In the simultaneous case there are four players and so the Krishna-
Serrano formulation can be used. However, we are able to simplify the calculations 
by assuming that three simultaneous two-player bargains taking place - between the 
MNC and each of the host countries. We show that the overall solution that is then 
obtained is identical to the solution that would be found by solving the four-player 
game using Eq (2.1). We can therefore interpret the solution we obtain as the four-
player Nash/Rubinstein solution using the Krishna-Serrano assumption. 
In the sequential case, there are two players in each Nash bargain and so the 
‘textbook’ Nash /Rubinstein interpretation can be made. (This can be interpreted as a 
special case of Eq (2.1)). 
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We start by setting out our assumptions on the project, then we find the net payoffs 
of the parties with both simultaneous and sequential bargaining, and then we show 
bargainers’ preferences over the two bargaining scenarios with different assumptions 
on players’ discount rates.  
2.4.2.1. Assumptions 
Consider a multinational corporation (MNC) - the Baku, Tbilisi Ceyhan Company - 
and three countries: Azerbaijan (A), Turkey (T) and Georgia (G). 
Assume that the agreement of the BTC oil pipeline project was signed in year t=0, 
that the construction phase lasted from year t = η to  t = τ − 1, and that operations 
started in year  t = τ. 𝑟𝑖 is the discount rate of player 𝑖 (i.e., i=A, T, G, or MNC), and 
annual costs and revenues are discounted by the discount factor 
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝑡 . 
If the participants agree and the project is constructed, the MNC receives revenues 
from operating the oil pipeline, and incurs construction and operating costs besides 
the payments to the host countries, where the sizes of these payments are determined 
by bargaining between the four players. In contrast, each host country receives the 
payment from the MNC and the wages paid to workers by the MNC over the periods 
of construction and operations. In addition, there are the net indirect effects to the 
host countries of the project which could be a positive or negative value. These 
include benefits, such as the acquisition of skills by local workers, and costs, such as 
environmental damage. However, in the case of disagreement, each concerned party 
gets its outside option which is the income that would have been generated by 
engaging in another project if the BTC project had not been constructed. 
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Assuming that the initial costs are spent evenly over the construction phase, and 
annual revenues and costs do not change over the operational phase - with all values 
specified in real terms - the net payoffs, which represent the differences between 
what the players receive with and without the agreement are given by: 
𝜋𝑀𝑁𝐶 = 𝜛𝑀𝑁𝐶 − 𝑂𝑀𝑁𝐶  
          = [𝜁𝑀𝑁𝐶(𝑣 − 𝑝 − 𝑤) − 𝑧𝑀𝑁𝐶𝑐] − [(𝑧𝑀𝑁𝐶+𝜁𝑀𝑁𝐶)𝑜𝑀𝑁𝐶]                         (2.2) 
𝜋𝑗 = 𝜛𝑗 − 𝑂𝑗 = [𝜁𝑗(𝑝𝑗 + 𝑤𝑗 − 𝑒𝑗) + 𝑧𝑗𝑐𝑗] − 𝜁𝑗𝑜𝑗                                             (2.3) 
That is, with the agreement, the pipeline project produces  ϖ𝑀𝑁𝐶 = ζMNC(v − p −
w) − 𝓏MNCc for the MNC, and ϖ𝑗 = ζj(pj +wj − ej) + 𝓏jcj  for each host country, 
but if the parties do not agree, the MNC gets OMNC = (𝓏MNC+ζMNC)oMNC, while 
each host country gets  Oj = ζjoj; where the following notations are used: 
𝑟𝐴, 𝑟𝑇 , , 𝑟𝐺 : the discount rates of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia respectively;  
𝑟𝑀𝑁𝐶:  the Company’s discount rate; 
𝑣:  Annual revenue from operations from  t = τ → ∞; 
For any player 𝑖 (𝑀𝑁𝐶, 𝐴, 𝑇, 𝑜𝑟 𝐺), ζi = ∑
1
(1+ri)
t =
∞
t=τ
1
ri(1+ri)
τ−1
 7
, and 𝓏i =
∑
1
(1+ri)
t
t=τ−1
t=η ;  
pA,  pT, pG: annual payments to Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia respectively 
from t = τ → ∞ - the sum of the annual payments  pA + pT + pG = p; 
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 The sum of an infinite geometric series = 
𝑎
1−ℓ
     (ℓ:the common ratio, 𝑎: the first term of the series). 
Applying to    ∑
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝑡
∞
𝑡=𝜏 =
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝜏 +
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝜏+1 +
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝜏+2 +⋯∞       we find: 
𝑎 =
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝜏 , while ℓ =
1
1+𝑟𝑖
  ⟹  ∑
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝑡
∞
𝑡=𝜏 =  [
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝜏] [1 −
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
]⁄ =
1
𝑟𝑖(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝜏−1 .   
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w: annual running costs in Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia from  t = τ → ∞; 
wA, wT, wG: running incomes received by Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia (wj > 0) 
from wages over the operation period, which are costs for MNC included in 
the overall operational costs (w) - i.e., wj ∈ w, (wA + wT +wG) < 𝑤; 
c: investment costs in Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia from t = η → τ − 1; 
cA , cT, cG: incomes received by Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia (cj > 0) from wages 
paid during the construction period from t = η → τ − 1, which are costs for 
MNC included in the overall investment costs (c) - i.e., cj ∈ c, (cA + cT +
cG) < 𝑐; 
eA, eT, eG: net indirect effects of the project on Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia 
annually from t = τ → ∞, which could be positive or negative (i.e., ej ⋚ 0); 
oMNC: the annual net income associated with exercising MNC’s outside option 
from  t = η → ∞;  
oA, oT, oG: annual net incomes associated with exercising the outside options of 
Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia from t = τ → ∞.  
To simplify the net payoff formulae, they can be rewritten,  
πMNC = ζMNC(v − p − w−oMNC) − 𝓏MNC(c + oMNC)  
         = ζMNC [v − p − w−oMNC −
1
ζMNC
𝓏MNC(c + oMNC)];                               (2.4) 
πj = ζj(pj +wj − ej − oj) + 𝓏jcj  
34 
     = ζj (pj +
1
ζj
𝓏jcj +wj − ej − oj).                                                                   (2.5) 
Now let    
1
ζi
(𝓏i) = Ωi, so substituting this in Eq (2.4) and Eq (2.5) the net payoffs for 
the MNC and each of the three countries will be:  
πMNC = ζMNC[v − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC − p − w−oMNC]                                       (2.6) 
πj = ζj(pj + cj Ωj +wj − ej − oj)                                                                       (2.7) 
Information on the financial agreement between the participants is not available. 
Therefore, using Eq (2.6) and (2.7), in the next section we find the net payoffs of the 
MNC, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia, assuming that the bargaining occurred 
simultaneously, and then in section (2.4.2.3), we find the parties’ net payoffs 
assuming that MNC bargained sequentially with the three countries. Given the lack 
of information, we assume that the MNC bargains with the parties in order of their 
significance for the project. Therefore, we assume that it first bargains with 
Azerbaijan as it owns the oil fields, then with Turkey, since the Turkish section of 
the pipeline is the longest (61% of the pipeline) and where the pipeline terminates at 
the Ceyhan marine terminal. Finally, it bargains with Georgia through which only 
14% of the pipeline passes.
8
  
 
  
                                                          
8
 The fact that Azerbaijan owns 80% of the consortium that accesses the oilfield does not affect the 
bargaining solution, assuming that there will be potential alternative ways of transporting the oil.  This 
consortium pays BTC a price to transport the oil and, out of BTC's profits, a portion comes back to 
Azerbaijan, and this is reflected in our bargaining solution. 
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2.4.2.2. Simultaneous bargaining 
In this case, we find bargaining outcomes of the four parties assuming that MNC 
undertakes simultaneous bilateral bargains with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia.  
Let μA,  μ T,  μ G denote MNC’s bargaining weights with Azerbaijan, Turkey and 
Georgia respectively, so the bargaining weight of each host country will be  1 − μj 
(j=A, T, or G). Using Eq (2.6) and (2.7), the Nash bargaining solution with any of the 
three host countries (j) is found by solving: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝𝑗
[𝜁𝑀𝑁𝐶(𝑣 − 𝑝 −𝑤−𝑜𝑀𝑁𝐶 − (𝑐 + 𝑜𝑀𝑁𝐶)𝛺𝑀𝑁𝐶)]
𝜇𝑗[𝜁𝑗(𝑝𝑗 + 𝑐𝑗𝛺𝑗 +𝑤𝑗 − 𝑒𝑗 − 𝑜𝑗)]
1−𝜇𝑗
.    
Accordingly, the annual payment (pj) to country j over the operation phase of the 
project will be:
9
  
pj = (1 − μj)(v − (p − pj) − w−oMNC − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC + ciΩi +wj − ej −
oj) − cjΩj −wj + ej + oj                                                                                     (2.8) 
For each bilateral bargain we use the Rubinstein foundation of Nash bargaining when 
the time between successive offers is very small. Each country’s bargaining weight 
with the MNC is thus 1 − μj =
rMNC
rMNC+rj
 . Substituting this into Eq (2.8) for each of the 
three countries, we find: 
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  For example, the Nash bargaining solution with Azerbaijan is found in the following way: 
  max
pA
[𝜁𝑀𝑁𝐶(v-pA-pG-pT-w-oMNC-(c+oMNC)ΩMNC)]
μA[𝜁𝐴(pA+cAΩA+wA-eA-oA)]
1-μA
                          ⇒  
-μ
A
𝜁𝑀𝑁𝐶[𝜁𝐴(pA+cAΩA+wA-eA-oA)]+(1 − 𝜇𝐴)𝜁𝐴[𝜁𝑀𝑁𝐶(v-pA-pG-pT-w-oMNC-(c+oMNC)ΩMNC)]=0  ⇒ 
    p
A
=-μ
A
(cAΩA+wA-eA-oA)+(1-μA)[v-(pG+pT)-(c+oMNC)ΩMNC-w-oMNC]   
         =(1-μ
A
)[v-p
G
-p
T
-(c+oMNC)ΩMNC-w-oMNC]-μA(cAΩA+wA-eA-oA)  
       = (1-μ
A
)[v-p
G
-p
T
-w-o
MNC
-(c+oMNC)ΩMNC+cAΩA+wA-eA-oA]-cAΩA-wA+eA+oA  
36 
pA = (
rMNC
rMNC+rA
) [v − pT − pG −w−oMNC − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC + cAΩA +wA −
eA − oA] − cAΩA −wA + eA + oA                                                                   (2.9) 
pT = (
rMNC
rMNC+rT
) [v − pA − pG −w−oMNC − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC + cTΩT +wT −
eT − oT] − cTΩT −wT + eT + oT                                                                   (2.10) 
pG = (
rMNC
rMNC+rG
) [v − pA − pT −w−oMNC − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC + cGΩG +wG −
eG − oG] − cGΩG −wG + eG + oG                                                                 (2.11) 
By solving Eq (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11) together, we find that   
𝑝𝑗 = [
1
𝑟𝑗
(
1
𝑟𝑀𝑁𝐶
+
1
𝑟𝐴
+
1
𝑟𝑇
+
1
𝑟𝐺
)⁄ ] [𝑣 − (𝑐 + 𝑜𝑀𝑁𝐶)𝛺𝑀𝑁𝐶 −𝑤−𝑜𝑀𝑁𝐶 + 𝑐𝐴𝛺𝐴 +
 𝑤𝐴 − 𝑒𝐴 − 𝑜𝐴 + 𝑐𝑇𝛺𝑇 + 𝑤𝑇 − 𝑒𝑇 − 𝑜𝑇 + 𝑐𝐺𝛺𝐺 + 𝑤𝐺 − 𝑒𝐺 − 𝑜𝐺] − 𝑐𝑗𝛺𝑗 −
𝑤𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗 + 𝑜𝑗.                                                                                                   (2.12)  
Now, let  
𝑣 − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC + cAΩA +wA − eA − oA + cTΩT +wT − eT −
oT + cGΩG +wG − eG − oG = s ,  
Substituting  s into (2.12) we find: 
pj = [
1
rj
(
1
rMNC
+
1
rA
+
1
rT
+
1
rG
)⁄ ] s − cjΩj −wj + ej + oj                               (2.13)        
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Substituting (2.13) into (2.6) and (2.7), we find that the net payoff received by player 
𝑖 is: 10 
πi = [ 
1
ri
(
1
rMNC
+
1
rA
+
1
rT
+
1
rG
)⁄ ] ζis                                                                (2.14) 
Consequently, the outcome found using bilateral bargaining between MNC and each 
host country is identical to that reached in Eq (2.1) - using the formulation proposed 
by Krishna and Serrano (1996) for the n-person game. 
Thus, if the participants agree, the project produces for each player: 
   ϖi = [ 
1
ri
(
1
rMNC
+
1
rA
+
1
rT
+
1
rG
)⁄ ] ζis + Oi                                                     (2.15) 
2.4.2.3. Sequential Bargaining  
In this case, alternative orders of the sequential bargains could be assumed. But we 
assume that the MNC bargains with countries in order of their practical significance 
to the project. Thus we assume that the MNC first bargains bilaterally with 
Azerbaijan as it owns the oil field. Then it bargains with Turkey, the larger of the 
two transit countries, and the one in which the terminal is built. Finally it bargains 
with Georgia. Using backward induction, we find the Nash bargaining solution with 
Georgia, then with Turkey, and then with Azerbaijan.  
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 For example, for Azerbaijan , by substituting  𝑝𝐴 into Eq (2.7) for j=A, i.e.,  𝜋𝐴 = 𝜁𝐴(𝑝𝐴 + 𝑐𝐴𝛺𝐴 +
𝑤𝐴 − 𝑒𝐴 − 𝑜𝐴) we find:  
  𝜋𝐴 = 𝜁𝐴([
1
𝑟𝐴
(
1
𝑟𝑀𝑁𝐶
+
1
𝑟𝐴
+
1
𝑟𝑇
+
1
𝑟𝐺
)⁄ ] 𝑠 − 𝑐𝐴𝛺𝐴 − 𝑤𝐴 + 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑜𝐴⏟                                  
𝑝𝐴
+ 𝑐𝐴𝛺𝐴 + 𝑤𝐴 − 𝑒𝐴 − 𝑜𝐴) 
        = [ 
1
𝑟𝐴
(
1
𝑟𝑀𝑁𝐶
+
1
𝑟𝐴
+
1
𝑟𝑇
+
1
𝑟𝐺
)⁄ ] 𝜁𝐴𝑠    
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First, using Eq (2.6) and (2.7) - for j=G - we find the annual payment (pG) paid by 
MNC to Georgia by solving: 
max
pG
[ζMNC(v − p − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC)]
 μG[ζG(pG + cGΩG +wG − eG − oG)]
1− μG   
 ⇒ pG = (1 −  μG)[v − pA − pT − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC + cGΩG +wG − eG − oG] 
−cGΩG −wG + eG + oG.   But 1 −  μG =
rMNC
rMNC+rG
 ; therefore,    
pG = (
rMNC
rMNC+rG
) [v − pA − pT − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC + cGΩG +wG − eG −
oG] − cGΩG −wG + eG + oG                                                                     (2.16) 
Substituting from Eq (2.16) into (2.6) for pG we find: 
πMNC = (
rG
rMNC+rG
) (ζMNC)[v − pA − pT − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC + cGΩG +
wG − eG − oG]                                                                                    (2.17) 
Then, using Eq (2.17) and (2.7) - for j=T - we find the annual payment (pT) paid by 
MNC to Turkey, given that the payment to Azerbaijan was agreed upon, so the Nash 
bargaining solution results in the following outcome: 
pT = (1 −  μ T)[v − pA − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC + cGΩG +wG − eG − oG +
cTΩT +wT − eT − oT] − cTΩT −wT + eT + oT, but  1 −  μ T =
rMNC
rMNC+rT
 . Therefore, 
pT = (
rMNC
rMNC+rT
) [v − pA − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC + cGΩG +wG − eG − oG +
cTΩT +wT − eT − oT] − cTΩT −wT + eT + oT .                                              (2.18) 
Substituting from Eq (2.18) into (2.17) for pT we find: 
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πMNC = (
rG
rMNC+rG
) (
rT
rMNC+rT
) (ζMNC)[v − pA − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC +
cGΩG +wG − eG − oG + cTΩT +wT − eT − oT].                                               (2.19) 
Finally, using Eq (2.19) and (2.7) - for j=A - we find the Nash bargaining solution 
with Azerbaijan. Thus, we find that the annual payment to Azerbaijan is: 
⇒  pA = (1 − μA)[v − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC + cGΩG +wG − eG − oG +
cTΩT +wT − eT − oT + cAΩA +wA − eA − oA] − cAΩA −wA + eA + oA     (2.20)       
Now, in order to simplify the formulae, let  v − (c + oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC +
cGΩG +wG − eG − oG + cTΩT +wT − eT − oT + cAΩA +wA − eA − oA = s.   
By substituting  s, and  1 − μA =
rMNC
rMNC+rA
  into Eq (2.20), we find that the annual 
payment to Azerbaijan is: 
 pA = (
rMNC
rMNC+rA
) s − cAΩA −wA + eA + oA.                                                      (2.21) 
Substituting (2.21) into (2.18), we find the annual payment to Turkey: 
pT = (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rMNC
rMNC+rT
) s − cTΩT −wT + eT + oT.                                        (2.22) 
Substituting (2.21) and (2.22) into (2.16), we find the annual payment to Georgia: 
pG = (
rMNC
rMNC+rG
) (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rT
rMNC+rT
)  s − cGΩG −wG + eG + oG.                      (2.23) 
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Now we find the four parties’ net payoffs by substituting the annual payments to the 
host counties (pA, pT, and pG) from Eq (2.21), (2.22) and (2.23) into Eq (2.6), and Eq 
(2.7) for j=A, T, and G:
11
 
πA = (
rMNC
rMNC+rA
) sζA                                                                                              (2.24) 
πT = (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rMNC
rMNC+rT
) sζT                                                                             (2.25) 
πG = (
rMNC
rMNC+rG
) (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rT
rMNC+rT
) sζG                                                            (2.26) 
πMNC = (
rG
rMNC+rG
) (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rT
rMNC+rT
) sζMNC                                                   (2.27) 
As a result, sequential bargaining generates outcomes different from that of 
simultaneous bargaining, and we discuss the differences in the next section.   
2.4.2.4. Simultaneous verses sequential bargaining  
This section provides a comparison between the outcomes of simultaneous and 
sequential bargaining found in sections 2.4.2.2 and 2.4.2.3;  the outcomes are 
summarized in the table below, denoting the shares resulting from bargaining 
simultaneously and sequentially by αi and βi, respectively. 
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 For example, for Azerbaijan (j=A), by substituting 𝑝𝐴 from Eq (2.21) into Eq (2.7) we find that 
Azerbaijan receives the following net payoff: 
  𝜋𝐴 = 𝜁𝐴 ((
𝑟𝑀𝑁𝐶
𝑟𝑀𝑁𝐶+𝑟𝐴
)  𝑠 − 𝑐𝐴𝛺𝐴 − 𝑤𝐴 + 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑜𝐴⏟                        
𝑝𝐴 from Eq (2.21)
+ 𝑐𝐴𝛺𝐴 + 𝑤𝐴 − 𝑒𝐴 − 𝑜𝐴) = (
𝑟𝑀𝑁𝐶
𝑟𝑀𝑁𝐶+𝑟𝐴
) 𝑠 𝜁𝐴.   
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Table 2.2. The outcomes of simultaneous and sequential bargaining between the 
concerned parties in the BTC project 
 𝒑𝒋 𝝕𝒊 𝝅𝒊 
S
im
u
lt
an
eo
u
s 
(𝛼𝑗𝑠 − 𝑐𝑗𝛺𝑗 −𝑤𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗) + 𝑜𝑗 𝜁𝑖𝛼𝑖𝑠 + 𝑂𝑖 𝜁𝑖𝛼𝑖𝑠 
S
eq
u
en
ti
al
 
(𝛽𝑗𝑠 − 𝑐𝑗𝛺𝑗 −𝑤𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗) + 𝑜𝑗 𝜁𝑖𝛽𝑖𝑠 + 𝑂𝑖 𝜁𝑖𝛽𝑖𝑠 
Where 
𝑠 = [𝑣 − (c +  oMNC)ΩMNC −w−oMNC] + [cAΩA+wA−eA−oA] + [cTΩT+wT−eT−oT] 
        +[cGΩG +wG −  eG − oG]; 
𝑖 = Any player, i. e.  A, T, G, or MNC;   
𝑗 = Any host country, i. e.  A, T, or G;  
ζi = ∑
1
(1+ri)t
=∞t=τ
1
ri(1+ri)τ−1
 ;  
Ωi = ∑
1
(1+ri)t
t=τ−1
t=η  ri(1 + ri)
τ−1;  
α𝑖 =
1
ri
(
1
rMNC
+
1
rA
+
1
rT
+
1
rG
)⁄  for any player 𝑖;  
βA = (
rMNC
rMNC+rA
);                                                                         
βT = (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rMNC
rMNC+rT
);                                                           
βG = (
rMNC
rMNC+rG
) (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rT
rMNC+rT
) ;  
βMNC = (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rT
rMNC+rT
) (
rG
rMNC+rG
).  
The difference between the resulting outcomes with the two bargaining scenarios in 
Table 2.2 is attributed to the bargaining order, and the impatience degree of each 
player (i.e., the player’s discount rate which defines its bargaining weight and its 
discount factor used to discount annual cash flows).  
When the MNC negotiates with the host countries simultaneously, the net payoff 
obtained by each player is determined by its bargaining weight, and by its discount 
factor by which costs and revenues are discounted over the life of the project. 
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However, the net payoff of each host country in the case of sequential bargaining is 
determined not only by the impatience degree of each country relative to the others, 
but also by its bargaining order. This results from the property of Nash bargaining 
that the participants in the first bargain (MNC, Azerbaijan) receive half of the surplus 
each. This leaves the MNC with only half the surplus with which it bargains with the 
second country (Turkey), so each participant in the second bargain receives a quarter 
of the surplus leaving the MNC with only a quarter of the surplus with which it 
bargains with the third country (Georgia). Thus, the country which bargains first with 
the MNC acquires a higher net payoff, but the MNC gets the same net payoff 
regardless the bargaining order. 
In order to examine the impact of the discount rates, assume first that all the players 
have the same discount rate (𝑟). Accordingly, substituting 𝑟 into the bargaining 
outcomes in Table 2.2, we find the following results: 
Table 2.3. The net payoffs of the participants in the BTC project 
 when they all have equal discount rates  
Net payoffs Simultaneous bargaining Sequential bargaining 
𝛑𝐀 
1
4
 ζs 
1
2
ζ s 
𝛑𝐓 
1
4
 ζs 
1
4
 ζs 
𝛑𝐆 
1
4
 ζs 
1
8
 ζs 
𝛑𝐌𝐍𝐂 
1
4
 ζs 
1
8
 ζs 
Sum ζs ζs 
Table 2.3 shows that the parties receive the same net payoff (1 4⁄  ζs) with 
simultaneous bargaining, but with sequential bargaining Azerbaijan gets 1 2⁄  ζs 
which is half of the overall surplus, while Turkey gets 1 4⁄  ζs (half of the remaining 
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surplus after MNC-Azerbaijan bargaining), and Georgia gets 1 8⁄  ζs (half of the 
remaining surplus after MNC-Azerbaijan, and MNC-Turkey negotiating).  
Furthermore, it can be seen from Table 2.3 that the overall surplus - the sum of the 
net payoffs - with simultaneous bargaining is identical to that with sequential 
bargaining (ζs) because the players have the same discount rate (𝑟), so costs and 
revenues are discounted by the same discount factor.  
However, when the players have different discount rates, the bargaining outcomes 
will be as in Table 2.4: 
Table 2.4. The net payoffs of the participants in the BTC project when they 
have different discount rates 
Net 
payoffs 
Simultaneous bargaining Sequential bargaining 
𝛑𝐀 ζAαAs ζAβAs 
𝛑𝐓 ζTαTs ζTβTs 
𝛑𝐆 ζGαGs ζGβGs 
𝛑𝐌𝐍𝐂 ζMNCαMNCs ζMNCβMNC 
Sum (ζAαA + ζTαT + ζGαG + ζMNCαMNC)s (ζAβA + ζTβT + ζGβG + ζMNCβMNC)s 
It can be seen from the table that the overall surplus resulting from simultaneous 
bargaining is different from that of sequential bargaining, so if the players have 
different discount rates, portions of the surplus have different values, depending on 
who receives them due to the different discount rates by which flows discounted over 
the life of the project. For example, the overall payment to Azerbaijan is ζMNCpA 
from the MNC’s perspective, while it is ζApA for Azerbaijan. This implies 
that (ζAαA + ζTαT + ζGαG + ζMNCαMNC)s ≠ (ζAβA + ζTβT + ζGβG + ζMNCβMNC)s  
because  rMNC ≠ rA ≠ rT ≠ rG and  ζMNC ≠ ζA ≠ ζT ≠ ζG.  
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In the next section we apply the bargaining outcomes on the BTC oil pipeline project 
to find participants’ net payoffs using available information on the project. 
2.5. An application of the bargaining problem - a case study 
2.5.1. An empirical example on the BTC pipeline project 
This section illustrates the results of the Nash bargain solution - shown previously in 
Table 2.2 - assuming that bargaining between the concerned parties (MNC, 
Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia) in the actual project occurred simultaneously, and 
in order to show the impact of the bargaining order on the surplus distribution, the 
results are also found with sequential bargaining.  
Each concerned party in the project receives revenues from operating the oil pipeline, 
but it also incurs costs, so to examine the viability of the project for each player we 
need to find the payments to the host countries (pj), the returns (ϖi) from the project, 
and the net payoffs (πi) resulting from bargaining. Hence, we need to estimate the 
parameters’ values in Eq (2.6) and (2.7) by 
the time when the agreement was signed 
assuming that all the values are in their real 
terms. 
As was shown previously in Table 2.1, 
Azerbaijan and Turkey hold together 
31.5% of the equity in the BTC Company (i.e., MNC), which is less than one third of 
the total equity. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume that the behaviour of the 
company is not affected by the proportions of the equity held by the two countries 
when the company negotiates with the host countries. 
25% 
6.5% 68.5% 
Figure 2.3. Equity holders in the 
BTC Company 
Azerbaijan Turkey Others
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The Host Government Agreement was signed in 2000 (t = 0), and construction work 
was carried out within three years, from 2003 to 2005 (t = 3 →  5), while operations 
started in 2006 (τ = 6). Therefore, in the utility functions - Eq (2.6) and (2.7) - 
where  Ωi =  
1
ζi
(𝓏i), we find ζi = ∑
1
(1+ri)
t
∞
t=6 =
1
ri(1+ri)
5  and  𝓏i = ∑
1
(1+ri)
t
5
3  . 
The revenue of the BTC pipeline (𝑣) depends on the tariff charge per barrel. In this 
example, the tariff charge at which the overall surplus of the project is zero is 
examined (i.e., the Breakeven Point - BEP - is found), and then expected benefits to 
the stakeholders with tariff charges above BEP are found. 
With regard to the pipeline’s costs, investment costs (c) were expected to be $3.6 
billion (Mansley, 2003), and BP’s expected operational costs to be $70-90 million a 
year in Turkey, and around $30 million a year in both Georgia and Azerbaijan 
(Mansley, 2003). Furthermore, some other costs including insurance and 
management charges were estimated at $20 million a year in the three countries 
together (Mansley, 2003). Accordingly, annual operational costs (w) are assumed to 
be  w = 2 × $30 m + ($70m + $90m) 2⁄ + $20 m = $160 million. 
In order to find wages (cj, wj) received by the host countries over the construction 
and operation phases, the number of employees and the annual wage per worker in 
the three countries - by the time of the agreement - are required. Hence, we use 
employees’ numbers indicated by CSR Network (2003): the pipeline construction 
created about 2,300, 2,500, and 5,000 jobs in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 
respectively, while operations created 250, 250, and 350 jobs.  
Due to the lack of data on wages in the host countries in 2000 (the year in which the 
agreement was acknowledged), wages were estimated using data from the 
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International Labour Organization (ILO) database for Azerbaijan and Georgia, where 
data are available in 2005 (in local currency). But for Turkey, wages in 2010 (in local 
currency) were taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) - the results of 
structure and earnings survey (2010). Then, wages were turned into US$ using 
official exchange rates available at the World Bank database. In order to estimate 
wages in 2000, we used per capita GDP growth as a proxy of wages’ growth - from 
2000 to 2005 for Azerbaijan and Georgia, and from 2000 to 2010 for Turkey - to 
estimate wages in 2000. Finally, the impact of US$ inflation over the mentioned 
periods was removed using the US GDP deflator taken from the World Bank 
database. Accordingly, total annual wages were computed by multiplying the per 
capital annual wage in 2000 in each of the three countries by the number of workers 
for both construction and operational phases as follows: 
Table 2.5. Total annual wages paid to the workers in the three countries during 
the construction and operational phases in US$ 
Country 
Per 
capita 
annual 
wage in 
2000 
(1) 
The Number 
of workers 
during 
Construction 
(2) 
The 
Number of 
workers 
during 
Operation 
(3) 
𝐜𝐣 (Annual wages 
paid during the 
construction 
Phase) 
(1)* (2) 
𝐰𝐣 (Annual  wages 
paid during the 
operational phase) 
(1)* (3) 
A 1549 2300 250 3,562,558 387,235 
T 5053 5000 350 25,267,442 1,768,721 
G 1214 2500 250 3,035,841 303,584 
sum 31,865,841 2,459,540 
Source of the employees’ numbers is CSR Network (2003). Total wages have been 
estimated using the International Labour Organization database, the Turkish Statistical 
Institute (TurkStat), and the World Bank database. 
It can be seen from Table 2.5 that total wages paid to the employees in the three 
countries are estimated to have reached to $31,865,841 during the construction 
period (2003- 2005) and $2,459,540 annually since 2006 onwards.  
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Besides the direct benefits of the project to the host countries, the pipeline project 
involves different indirect benefits such as developing skills of local businesses, 
enhancing recruitment and contracting practices, and developing local infrastructure 
(CSR Network, 2003). However, the project involves also many indirect costs such 
as security costs, legal liabilities for human rights abuses, and the environmental 
costs (FFM, 2003). Accordingly, FFM (2003) suggested that the indirect costs cancel 
out the indirect benefits; therefore, for simplicity, the indirect effects (ej) of the 
project on each host country are assumed to be zero in this example. 
Costs and revenues in this example are discounted using stakeholders discount rates 
(ri) in 2000 - the year in which the agreement was signed. Thus, the real interest rates 
6.4%, 20%, and 26.8% are used as discount rates for Azerbaijan, Turkey, and 
Georgia respectively. For Azerbaijan and Georgia, the rates in 2000 were taken from 
the World Bank database, but for Turkey the real interest rate is not available at the 
World Bank database, therefore we considered the rate cited by Kannan (2008). For 
the MNC, the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC= 10%)
12
 is used as a 
discount rate.  
After estimating the parameters, we need to find the bargaining outcomes (shown 
previously in Table 2.2). Using the discount rates of the parties, we find the shares 
resulting from bargaining (αi, βi) as follows: 
 
 
                                                          
12
 This rate represents an industry average WACC, the most accurate for BP Global over the long 
term. (Source: http://www.wikiwealth.com/wacc-analysis:bp ) 
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Table 2.6. The shares of the surplus which the participants in the BTC project 
receive with both simultaneous and sequential bargaining 
Simultaneous bargaining Sequential bargaining 
αA =
1
rA
(
1
rMNC
+
1
rA
+
1
rT
+
1
rG
)⁄ = 0.45  βA =
rMNC
rMNC+rA
= 0.61  
αT =
1
rT
(
1
rMNC
+
1
rA
+
1
rT
+
1
rG
)⁄ = 0.15  βT = (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rMNC
rMNC+rT
) = 0.13  
αG =
1
rG
(
1
rMNC
+
1
rA
+
1
rT
+
1
rG
)⁄ = 0.11   βG = (
rMNC
rMNC+rG
) (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rT
rMNC+rT
) = 0.07  
 αMNC =
1
rMNC
(
1
rMNC
+
1
rA
+
1
rT
+
1
rG
) = 0.29⁄   βMNC = (
rG
rMNC+rG
) (
rA
rMNC+rA
) (
rT
rMNC+rT
) = 0.19  
Now, we find  𝛺𝑖 = ∑
1
(1+𝑟𝑖)
𝑡
𝑡=5
𝑡=3  𝑟𝑖(1 + 𝑟𝑖)
5 using the parties’ discount rates. Thus, 
we find that  𝛺𝐴=0.20 , 𝛺𝑇=0.73, 𝛺𝐺=1.04, and Ω𝑀𝑁𝐶=0.33. 
Then, multiplying Ωj by wages paid to each of the three countries over the 
construction period - 2003 to 2005 - we find  Ωjcj:  
Table 2.7. Wages paid to the three countries during the  
three years construction phase  
Country 
𝐜𝐣 (Annual wages paid 
during the construction 
Phase in US$) 
 𝐫𝐣 
(Discount 
rates)         
 𝛀𝐣 
[∑
𝟏
(𝟏+𝒓𝒋)
𝒕
𝒕=𝟓
𝒕=𝟑  𝒓𝒋(𝟏 + 𝒓𝒋)
𝟓
] 
𝛀𝐣 ∗ 𝐜𝐣 
A 3,562,558 6.4% 0.20 712,512 
T 25,267,442 20 % 0.73 18,445,233 
G 3,035,841 26.8 % 1.04 3,157,274 
sum 22,315,018 
Finally, we need to estimate the bargainers’ outside options (oA,  oT,  oG,  oMNC). 
Therefore we consider the incomes which would have been obtained by the players if 
an alternative route to the BTC pipeline had been constructed. Since transporting the 
oil via Russia or Iran is assumed politically infeasible, we assume that the alternative 
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Figure 2.4. The assumed alternative route to the BTC 
pipeline 
route crosses Azerbaijan and Georgia and Turkey, but via the Black Sea - as shown in 
Figure 2.4. 
To estimate the profits from such a project, we consider the Baku-Supsa pipeline, 
which transports oil from Azerbaijan to the Georgian port of Supsa on the Black Sea 
with a capacity of almost 150,000 
barrels a day. We calculate the 
expected net profits for the four 
participants in the potential 
alternative project by assuming its 
revenues are analogous to that of 
the Baku-Supsa pipeline but with a 
capacity of one million barrels a day. Georgia did not share in the costs of this 
pipeline, but according to Billmeier et al. (2004) received transit revenues of about 
$9b per annum in the early 2000s, and so we take this is the annual net profit for 
Georgia from the Baku-Supsa pipeline. Thus, for the potential alternative to the BTC 
pipeline, with its larger capacity, we scale up Georgia's annual net profit from the 
Baku-Supsa pipeline by (1,000,000/150,000). Assuming that the net profits for the 
participants in the alternative pipeline are in the same proportion as in the BTC 
pipeline, we therefore obtain an estimate of their outside options.  
Using the shares (α𝑖) calculated previously in Table 2.6 (α𝐴 = 45%, α𝑇 = 15%,
α𝐺 = 11%, α𝑀𝑁𝐶 = 29%), the overall transit revenue will be  $60 𝑚 × (100 11⁄ ) ≈
$545 𝑚. Hence, the players would have received the following annual revenues from 
the assumed project - which we use as outside options for the BTC project: oA =
$545 𝑚 × 45% ≈ $245 𝑚, oT = $545 𝑚 × 15% ≈ $82 𝑚, oG = $60 𝑚, and 
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oMNC = $545 𝑚 × 29% ≈ $158 𝑚.
13
 Thus, the sum of the annual outside options of 
the MNC and the three countries is  𝑜𝑀𝑁𝐶+ 𝑜𝐴+𝑜𝑇 + 𝑜𝐺 = $158𝑚 + $245𝑚 +
$82𝑚 + $60𝑚 = $545𝑚. By discounting the annual outside options using the 
players’ discount rates and assuming that the annual flows would have started by year 
6 (the year when the pipeline starts to operate) we find the values of the outside 
options over the life of the project. 
Now we find the BEP (the tariff charge per barrel at which  s = 0, and therefore  πi =
0) using the previous estimates as follows:  
𝑠 =  𝑣⏟
𝐵𝐸𝑃×365×1𝑚 
− 𝑜𝐴−𝑜𝑇 − 𝑜𝐺−𝑜𝑀𝑁𝐶 − 𝑐𝛺𝑀𝑁𝐶 − 𝑤 + 𝑐𝐴𝛺𝐴+𝑐𝑇𝛺𝑇 + 𝑐𝐺𝛺𝐺 +
𝑤𝐴 + 𝑤𝑇 + 𝑤𝐺 = 0.  
Therefore, BEP =
−[−cΩMNC−oA−oT−oG−oMNC−w+ cAΩA+cTΩT+cGΩG+wA +wT +wG]
365×1,000,000
  
                          =
397,200,000+545,000,000+160,000,000−22,315,018−2,459,540
365×1,000,000
= $3  
Thus, with the tariff charge equal to $3/barrel, which is within the range $2.58 to 
$3.30/barrel quoted by some figures, according to Mansley (2003, p.11), the project 
produces for each player only an income equal to its outside option over the life of 
the project - i.e., ϖi = ζiαis + Oi = 0 + Oi = ζioi. Thus, Azerbaijan receives  ϖA =
11.46 × $254m = $2807m; likewise, the MNC, Turkey, and Georgia receive only 
$981m, $165m, and $68m, respectively, over the life of the project. Hence, the total 
surplus is equal to zero, and the parties are indifferent between signing the agreement 
or not.   
                                                          
13
 This assumes that, in the alternative project, the bargaining between the parties occurs 
simultaneously, and players have zero outside options, so that their revenues are equal to the 
proportions of the surplus they receive starting from 2006 (i.e., τ = 6). 
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For the pipeline project to be profitable, the tariff charge is required to be higher than 
$3/barrel; therefore, the payments to the host countries and the net payoffs are 
examined using the tariff charge $3.5/barrel, which is higher than the BEP, but lower 
than the charge $5.5 that actually obtained in 2012 (Interfax, 2012)
14
. Accordingly, 
the total revenues from the project will be   𝑣 = $3.5 × 365 day × 1m barrel ≈
$1,277m, whereas  s ≈ $188 m.  
By using all the previous estimates and bargaining outcomes in Table 2.2, we find 
now the annual payments received by the three countries (i.e., 𝑝𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗𝑠−𝑐𝑗𝛺𝑗 −
𝑤𝑗 + 𝑜𝑗) as follows: 
Table 2.8. The payments to Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia  
 when the tariff charge is $3.5/barrel 
 𝒋 
Shares of the surplus 
(𝒔 = $𝟏𝟖𝟖𝒎) 
𝒑𝒋 
(millions of $) 
S
im
u
lt
an
eo
u
s A 
𝜶
𝒋 
45% 
𝜶
𝒋𝒔
 
85 329 
T 15% 28 90 
G 11% 21 78 
Sum (total payments) 𝑝 =497 
S
eq
u
en
ti
al
 A 
𝜷
𝒋 
61% 
𝜷
𝒋𝒔
 
115 359 
T 13% 24 86 
G 07% 13 70 
Sum (total payments) 𝑝 =515 
The simultaneous bargaining outcomes in Table 2.8 suggest that the MNC pays 
annually 𝑝 = 𝑝𝐴 + 𝑝𝑇 + 𝑝𝐺 = $497 million to the three host countries, so it is left 
with  𝑣 − 𝑝 = $1277m − $497m = $780m annually and so ζMNC(𝑣 − 𝑝) =
$4,844 million  over the life of the project which should be greater than the MNC’s 
                                                          
14
 With regard to transporting Kazakhstan’s oil via BTC pipeline, the head of Kazakhstan's national 
welfare fund said that “Transportation has fallen off in recent years for sure, but that is due to the tariff 
for BTC transportation rising. It was $4, now it is $5.5 per barrel” (Interfax, 2012). 
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outside option (𝑂𝑀𝑁𝐶) after subtracting its construction and operating costs (𝜁𝑀𝑁𝐶  
(𝑐𝛺𝑀𝑁𝐶 + 𝑤)) in order to achieve a net positive payoff (𝜋𝑀𝑁𝐶 > 0). 
Elkind (2005, p.49) indicated that the transit fees will produce approximately $200 
million annually for Turkey in initial years of operations with a possibility to 
increase after year 17 up to $290 million. For Georgia, the pipeline will produce 
$62.5 million annually from transit revenues (Papava, 2005, p. 87). 
In contrast, our results in Table 2.8, with simultaneous bargaining, show that 
Azerbaijan receives the highest annual payments, 66% of  the total payments (𝑝) - as 
is clarified in Figure 2.5 - attributed to owning the oil fields and thus having the 
greatest outside option, as well as to its low discount rate comparing to that of the 
other players. In contrast, Turkey receives only $90 million per year (18% of the 
total payments), while Georgia which has the highest discount rate and the smallest 
outside option receives $78 million annually (16% of the total payments), but, each 
host country receives also the incomes from the wages paid to the workers over the 
construction and operating periods.  
Figure 2.5. The payments to the host countries 
(% the annual total payments) 
 
Azerbaijan
Turkey
Georgia
66% 18% 
16% 
70% 17% 14% 
Sequential Simultaneous
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Finally, we find the returns from the project (ϖi), and then the net payoff (πi) for 
each player which is the difference between ϖi and Oi over the life of the project as 
follows: 
15
 
Table 2.9. The participants’ gross and net payoffs from the BTC project        
when the tariff charge is $3.5/barrel 
 𝒊 𝜻𝒊 
𝒔 ∗ 𝜻𝒊 
(𝒔 = $𝟏𝟖𝟖𝒎)  
Shares of 
the surplus 
Net payoffs (𝛑𝐢) 
(millions of $) 
Gross payoffs (𝛡𝐢) 
(millions of $) 
S
im
u
lt
a
n
eo
u
s A 11.46 2,154 
𝜶
𝒊 
45% 
𝜻
𝒊𝜶
𝒊𝒔
 
969 
𝜻
𝒊𝜶
𝒊𝒔
+
𝑶
𝒊 
3,776 
T 2.01 378 15% 57 222 
G 1.14 214 11% 24 92 
MNC 6.21 1167 29% 339 1,320 
sum 1 1,389 5,410 
S
eq
u
en
ti
a
l 
A 11.46 2,154 
𝜷
𝒊 
61% 
𝜻
𝒊𝜷
𝒊𝒔
 
1,314 
𝜻
𝒊𝜷
𝒊𝒔
+
𝑶
𝒊 
4,121 
T 2.01 378 13% 49 214 
G 1.14 214 07% 15 83 
MNC 6.21 1,167 19% 222 1,203 
sum 1 1,600 5,621 
Figure 2.6. Gross payoffs (𝝕𝒊) versus the outside options (𝐎𝐢)  
when the tariff charge is $3.5/barrel 
 
                                                          
15
 For simplicity, we have not taken into account that Azerbaijan owns 25% of BTC and Turkey 
6.53%. Given the different discount rates of the players, the relative values of these ownership shares 
would depend on the timing of the profit distributions. However, if, to get an idea of the broad orders 
of magnitude, we simply reallocate these percentages of the yield and net payoffs from the BTC 
project to these two countries, our general conclusions still hold. 
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Table 2.9 shows that the project is viable for the four participants when the tariff 
price is higher than $3/barrel - $3.5/barrel in this case - since each of them earns a 
payoff (ϖi) greater than the income from his outside option (Oi) over the life of the 
project - as it shown in Figure 2.6.  That is, ϖi  > Oi therefore πi > 0.  
With both bargaining scenarios, Azerbaijan receives the highest return (ϖA) over the 
life of the project followed by the MNC then by Turkey and then by Georgia. 
However, sequential bargaining is more profitable for Azerbaijan with which it 
would earn extra 9% of the profits produced with simultaneous bargaining, but for 
Turkey, Georgia and the MNC, simultaneous bargaining produces extra 4%, 11%, 
and 10%, respectively, of the profits that would be produced with sequential 
bargaining.  
Since Azerbaijan and Turkey are shareholders in the BTC Company (MNC) - as was 
shown in Table 2.1 - they also earn 25% and 6.5%, respectively, of the MNC’s 
profits (ϖMNC). Azerbaijan, therefore, acquires  $1,320 million × 25% =
$330 million, whereas Turkey gets $1,320 million × 6.5% = $86 million over the 
life of the project.  
Consequently, the less the discount rate is, and the greater the outside option is, the 
higher the player’s bargaining power is and therefore the more benefits he can obtain 
from negotiation.  
With regard to the surplus distribution, simultaneous bargaining outcomes in Table 
2.9 and Figure 2.7 indicate that Azerbaijan receives the highest net payoff (70% of 
the total surplus), followed by the MNC with 24% of the total surplus, while the 
other two transit countries (Turkey and Georgia) get only 4% and 2%, respectively. 
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However, if the discount rates were identical, the overall surplus would have been 
distributed evenly between the four players, so each player would receive 25% of the 
surplus. As a result, when the players bargain simultaneously, their discount rates, 
and thus their bargaining weights are the determinants in distributing the overall 
surplus resulting from cooperation.  
Figure 2.7. Players’ proportions of the total surplus with 
simultaneous and sequential bargaining 
 
In contrast, if the MNC undertakes a sequential bargain with the host countries - 
Table 2.9 - besides the impact of bargaining weights, the bargaining order affects the 
distribution of the total surplus between the players. Thus, Azerbaijan gains the 
greatest net payoff (82% of the overall surplus), while the MNC receives 14%, but 
Turkey and Georgia gets only 3% and 1%, respectively. Even if the discount rates 
were identical, the bargainers would not receive equal net payoffs. This implies that 
the player’s impatience and his bargaining order determine the size of the surplus 
allocated to that player. 
Furthermore, it can be noticed that the total surplus with sequential bargaining is 
greater than with simultaneous bargaining by 15% - see Figure 2.8. The difference, 
Azerbaijan Turkey Georgia MNC
70% 4% 2% 24% 
82% 3% 1% 14% 
Sequential Simultaneous
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as was shown in section 2.4.2.4, is attributed to discounting players’ revenues and 
costs (flows) over the years using different discount rates. Hence, if the players had 
identical discount rates, the total surplus would be identical with the two bargaining 
scenarios. 
Figure 2.8. The total surplus with both simultaneous and                          
sequential bargaining  
 
Overall, the bargaining results suggest that the BTC pipeline produces positive net 
payoffs for the MNC and the three host countries when a tariff charge is higher than 
$3 per barrel, but the size of each player’s net payoff is determined by the 
bargainer’s degree of impatience, and his bargaining order. 
In the case of the BTC project, Azerbaijan which bargains first with the MNC - when 
we the bargaining is sequential - has the lowest discount rate, and Georgia which 
bargains last with the MNC has the highest discount rate. This raises a question as to 
how the bargaining outcomes would have changed if the parties have had different 
discount rates. Therefore, the next section attempts to answer this question based on 
different assumptions on participants’ discount rates.   
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2.5.2. Sensitivity analysis of bargainers’ discount rates  
The effects of different possible discount rate configurations on players’ net payoffs 
are demonstrated in this section. The bargainers’ preferences for simultaneous or 
sequential bargaining with different assumptions on their discount rates are shown 
theoretically, and then bargaining outcomes are illustrated numerically.  
Let Turkey, Georgia, and MNC have the same discount rate but different (≶) from 
that of Azerbaijan, i.e.,  rT = rG = rMNC ≡ r ≠ rA. Allowing for this in the 
bargaining outcomes in Table 2.2, it can be seen that Azerbaijan’s net payoff (πA) 
with sequential bargaining will be greater than that with simultaneous bargaining, 
i.e.
r
r+3rA
ζAs⏟    
simultaneous
< 
r
r+rA
ζAs⏟    
sequential
, because for
r
r+3rA
ζAs⏟    
simultaneous
≥  
r
r+rA
ζAs⏟    
sequential
 it would be 
necessary that rA ≤ 0, which we rule out by assumption. Therefore, sequential 
bargaining is the better bargaining scenario for Azerbaijan in this case.  
If  rA = rT ≠ rG = rMNC = r, Azerbaijan’s net payoffs (πA) will be greater with 
sequential bargaining - i.e., 
r
2(r+rA)
ζAs⏟      
simultaneous
  <   
r
(r+rA)
ζAs⏟    
sequential
. Therefore, sequential 
bargaining is better than simultaneous bargaining for Azerbaijan, and the same result 
will be obtained when rA = rG ≠  rT = rMNC = r. 
If  rA = rMNC ≠   rT = rG = r, the bargaining outcomes for Azerbaijan will be: 
r
2(r+rA)
ζA𝑠⏟      
simultaneous
<
1
2
ζAs⏟
sequential
, therefore sequential bargaining is better for Azerbaijan 
because for 
r
2(r+rA)
ζAs⏟      
simultaneous
 ≥
1
2
ζA⏟s
sequential
it would be necessary that rA ≤ 0, which we rule 
out by assumption. 
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Following a similar procedure, it can be shown the bargaining preferences of the 
other parties using different assumptions on their discount rates (see Appendix B2). 
Numerically, the impacts of different configurations of participants’ discount rates on 
the Break Even Point (BEP), on participants’ net payoffs, and thus on their 
bargaining preferences for simultaneous or sequential bargaining are shown using 
different assumptions in Table 2.10.  
In each case in the table, the BEP - Column 1 - at which the project produces a zero 
total surplus is found, and then a tariff price higher than the BEP, by $0.5/barrel, is 
set - Column 2 - to find the associated revenues (𝑣), and 𝑠 =  𝑣 − 𝑜𝐴−𝑜𝑇 −
𝑜𝐺−𝑜𝑀𝑁𝐶 − 𝑐𝛺𝑀𝑁𝐶 −𝑤 + 𝑐𝐴𝛺𝐴+𝑐𝑇𝛺𝑇 + 𝑐𝐺𝛺𝐺 +𝑤𝐴 + 𝑤𝑇 + 𝑤𝐺, and finally the 
participants’ net payoffs (πi) with both simultaneous and sequential bargaining.  
Case 1 presents the net payoffs using the original real discount rates of the 
participants - the same as those used in the case study to allow comparison with the 
following cases in the table. 
Contrary to the real discount rates by the time the agreement was made (see Case 1), 
in Case 2 the first bargainer with the MNC (Azerbaijan) is assumed to have the 
highest interest rate while the last bargainer (Georgia) has the lowest one, to show 
how this affects their net payoffs.  
As Turkey and Georgia have high discount rates (20% and 26.8%, respectively) in 
Case 1, in Case 3 the two countries’ discount rates are reduced by 0.15, each, to 
examine how that might affect the BEP. However, the total construction costs are 
discounted by the MNC’s discount rate; therefore, in Case 4, only the MNC’s 
discount rate is reduced to show how it affects the BEP.  
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In Case 5, the bargainers’ discount rates are assumed to be identical in order to 
compare the net payoffs resulting from simultaneous bargaining - where the players 
obtain equal net payoffs - with those resulting from sequential bargaining.  
Cases 6 to 21 present several other possible assumptions when two or more players 
have identical discount rates, but different from the others, to show how the partners’ 
net payoffs are affected in each bargaining scenario.   
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Table 2.10. Net payoffs the bargainers receive with different possible 
configurations of discount rates 
Case Party 
(%) $/barrel Millions of US $ 
Discount 
rate 
Shares of the 
surplus 
 (1)   (2)   
R
ev
en
u
es
 
Net payoffs 
S=$188m 
B
E
P
 
T
a
ri
ff
 
Sim Seq Sim Seq 
1 
 
A 6.4 45 61 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
7
7
 
969 1,314 
T 20 15 13 57 49 
G 26.8 11 7 24 15 
MNC 10 29 19 339 222 
2 
 
A 13 18 43 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
7
6
 
142 341 
T 11 21 27 217 272 
G 6.4 37 18 792 388 
MNC 10 24 12 275 135 
3 
 
A 6.4 29 61 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
8
1
 
621 1,311 
T 5 37 26 1,087 765 
G 11.8 16 6 143 54 
MNC 10 18 7 215 82 
4 
 
A 6.4 35 44 
2
.4
 
2
.9
 
1
,0
5
7
 
757 943 
T 20 11 11 42 42 
G 26.8 8 7 18 15 
MNC 5 45 38 1,326 1,113 
5 
 
A 6.4 25 50 
2
.6
 
3
.1
 
1
,1
2
9
 
537 1,075 
T 6.4 25 25 537 537 
G 6.4 25 13 537 269 
MNC 6.4 25 13 537 269 
6 
 
A 6.4 30 50 
2
.6
 
3
.1
 
1
,1
2
6
 
655 1,075 
T 10 20 20 227 227 
G 10 20 12 227 139 
MNC 6.4 30 19 655 400 
7 
 
A 6.4 30 61 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
7
8
 
655 1,311 
T 10 20 20 227 227 
G 6.4 30 12 655 256 
MNC 10 20 8 227 89 
8   
A 6.4 33 50 
2
.6
 
3
.1
 
1
,1
2
1
 
701 1,075 
T 15 14 15 87 93 
G 10 21 14 243 159 
MNC 6.4 33 21 701 459 
9   
A 6.4 33 50 
2
.6
 
3
.1
 
1
,1
2
5
 
701 1,075 
T 10 21 20 243 227 
G 15 14 9 87 57 
MNC 6.4 33 21 701 459 
10   
A 6.4 30 61 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
8
0
 
655 1,311 
T 6.4 30 24 655 512 
G 10 20 8 227 89 
MNC 10 20 8 227 89 
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Case Party 
(%) $/barrel Millions of US $ 
Discount 
rate 
Shares of  
the surplus  
 (1)   (2)   
R
ev
en
u
es
 Net payoffs 
S=$188m 
B
E
P
 
T
a
ri
ff
 
Sim  Seq  Sim  Seq  
11 
 
A 6.4 27 61 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
8
1
 
591 1,311 
T 6.4 27 24 591 512 
G 6.4 27 9 591 200 
MNC 10 18 6 205 69 
12 
 
A 6.4 34 61 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
7
7
 
736 1,311 
T 10 22 20 255 227 
G 10 22 10 255 114 
MNC 10 22 10 255 114 
13   
A 6.4 31 50 
2
.6
 
3
.1
 
1
,1
2
7
 
664 1,075 
T 6.4 31 25 664 537 
G 26.8 7 5 16 10 
MNC 6.4 31 20 664 434 
14   
A 6.4 27 50 
2
.6
 
3
.1
 
1
,1
2
6
 
591 1,075 
T 10 18 20 205 227 
G 6.4 27 15 591 328 
MNC 6.4 27 15 591 328 
15   
A 10 22 50 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
8
0
 
255 582 
T 6.4 34 30 736 655 
G 10 22 10 255 114 
MNC 10 22 10 255 114 
16   
A 6.4 27 61 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
8
1
 
591 1,311 
T 6.4 27 24 591 512 
G 6.4 27 9 591 200 
MNC 10 18 6 205 69 
17 
 
A 10 22 39 
2
.6
 
3
.1
 
1
,1
2
5
 
255 455 
T 10 22 24 255 277 
G 10 22 15 255 169 
MNC 6.4 34 23 736 487 
18   
A 6.4 27 50 
2
.6
 
3
.1
 
1
,1
2
9
 
591 1,075 
T 6.4 27 25 591 537 
G 10 18 10 205 114 
MNC 6.4 27 15 591 328 
19 
 
A 10 22 50 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
7
7
 
255 582 
T 10 22 25 255 291 
G 6.4 34 15 736 328 
MNC 10 22 10 255 114 
20   
A 6.4 34 61 
3
.0
 
3
.5
 
1
,2
7
7
 
736 1,311 
T 10 22 20 255 227 
G 10 22 10 255 114 
MNC 10 22 10 255 114 
21   
A 10 18 39 
2
.6
 
3
.1
 
1
,1
2
9
 
205 455 
T 6.4 27 30 591 655 
G 6.4 27 15 591 328 
MNC 6.4 27 15 591 328 
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Consequently, we find that:  
 In all examined cases, the first player that negotiates with the MNC 
(Azerbaijan) gets a higher net payoff with sequential bargaining than what it 
would earn with simultaneous bargaining. But, the third player that negotiates 
with the MNC (Georgia) gets a lower net payoff than it would earn with 
simultaneous bargaining. However, for the second player (Turkey), the 
bargaining process with which it gets a higher net payoff depends on 
bargainers’ discount rates.   
 In order to get the BEP down, the discount rates, particularly for the MNC, 
have to be reduced substantially (and maybe unrealistically), as the total 
construction costs are discounted using rMNC. For example, in Case 3, reducing 
the discount rates of Turkey and Georgia by 15% (rT = 5%, and rG = 11.8%), 
without changing rMNC, does not get the BEP down. However, reducing rMNC 
from 10% to 5% in Case 4, brings the level of the BEP down to become 
$2.4/barrel.  
 Turkey is indifferent between simultaneous and sequential bargaining in Cases 
5, 6, 7. However its preference is different in the other cases. For example, in 
Case 14, sequential bargaining is better than simultaneous bargaining for 
Turkey when rT > r, while simultaneous bargaining is preferred to sequential 
bargaining, in Case 15, when rT < r. 
 Although Azerbaijan is the first country which negotiates with the MNC, it 
could obtain a lower net payoff than that of another country bargaining later 
with the MNC when Azerbaijan’s discount rate is higher than that of the other 
bargainer. For example, Azerbaijan gets a lower net payoff than Turkey in 
Case 15 as rA > rT.  
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2.7. Conclusions 
This chapter aims at evaluating the BTC oil pipeline project - the first direct 
transportation pipeline linking between the Caspian and the Mediterranean seas - by 
employing bargaining theory (the Nash bargaining solution, and the alternating offer 
bargain of Rubinstein). We evah examined the viability of the project for the 
concerned parties (the MNC, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia) by verifying the 
profitability of the project for each party, assuming certainty, with two different 
bargaining formulations (simultaneous and sequential bargaining).  
The findings suggest that the project is feasible for the MNC and the three host 
countries when the transit charge is greater than the BEP ($3 per barrel) at which the 
project produces a zero total surplus; thus, for a tariff charge higher than this rate, the 
project generates returns for each participant greater than his outside option.  
With both bargaining scenarios, we find that Azerbaijan, which has the lowest 
discount rate, and the biggest outside option, obtains the highest proportion of the 
total surplus, followed by the MNC, then by Turkey, and finally by Georgia which 
has the highest discount rate and the smallest outside option. But, sequential 
bargaining is more profitable for Azerbaijan, which bargains first with the MNC, 
than simultaneous bargaining; whereas for the MNC and the other two transit 
countries simultaneous bargaining is more beneficial. This suggests that the 
participants’ discount rates, their bargaining orders, and their outside options are the 
determinants of the gross payoffs they receive over the life of the project.  
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Furthermore, the outcomes indicate that with bargaining over discounted flows, each 
bargaining process results in a different total surplus attributed to players’ different 
discount rates by which revenues and costs are discounted over the life of the project. 
The results suggest that the payoffs for the two transit countries, Turkey and Georgia, 
would have appeared relatively small at the time the agreement was made. Given that 
any major project is undertaken in a context of considerable uncertainty, and that this 
would have been recognized at the time, it therefore seems possible that other 
factors, such as political concerns, or other economic agreements not directly part of 
this project, may have played a role in their participation. 
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Appendix A2  
BTC milestones
16
 
 20 Sep 1994:   BP, Statoil, Amoco and other Oil companies sign “the Contract of 
the Century” (Production Sharing Agreement)  
 1998-1999: US government (backed by Turkey and Azerbaijan) puts heavy 
pressure on BP and AIOC to support Baku-Ceyhan pipeline 
 November 18, 1999: Intergovernmental agreement on oil transportation via BTC 
pipeline signed among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey 
 October 2000: Host Government agreements and BTC turnkey lump-sum 
agreement signed 
 November, 2000: BTC Basic Design commences 
 May 21, 2001: BTC Detailed Engineering Phase contract awarded 
 August 1, 2002: BTC Pipeline Company formed 
 September 12, 2002: BTC construction project sanctioned 
 December 4, 2002: All BTC Environmental and Social Impact Assessments 
approved 
 January 23, 2003: First BTC pipe arrives in Azerbaijan 
 May 23, 2003: BTC pipeline pump station construction starts 
 July 30, 2003: BTC pipe lay commences in Azerbaijan 
 November 11, 2003: IFC and EBRD approve BTC pipeline loans 
 February 3, 2004: BTC signs Project Finance agreements 
                                                          
16
 See, BP. Project timeline: Get familiar with the major milestones in the history of Azeri-Chirag-
Gunashli development. Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/ACG/projecthistory.html.  
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 May 10, 2005: BTC line fill starts 
 May 25, 2005: Azerbaijan section of BTC inaugurated 
 August 11, 2005: Oil crosses the Azerbaijan-Georgian border via BTC 
 October 12, 2005: Georgian section of BTC inaugurated 
 June 4, 2006: BTC lifts First Oil onto the tanker British Hawthorn from Ceyhan 
 July 13, 2006: Turkish section of BTC inaugurated 
 April 15, 2007: BTC exports its 100 millionth barrel 
 November 6, 2008: First volumes of Kazakhstan oil enter the BTC pipeline 
Appendix B2  
Bargaining preferences of Turkey, Georgia, and the MNC 
By substituting different assumptions on discount rates in the bargaining outcomes - 
Table 2.2 - we can find players’ preferences as follows:  
Turkey 
If bargainers have the same discount rate (rA = rT = rG = rMNC ≡ r), the net payoff 
(πT) received by Turkey with simultaneous bargaining is equal to that with 
sequential bargaining:  
 
1
4
sζT⏟
simultaneous
 =   
1
4
sζT⏟
sequential
      
Therefore, Turkey, in this case, is indifferent between bargaining sequentially or 
simultaneously.  
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However, when  rA = rG = rMNC ≡ r > rT, then 
r
(r+3rT)
sζT⏟    
simultaneous
  >   
r
2(r+rT)
sζT ⏟      
sequential
 
therefore simultaneous bargaining is better for Turkey in this case, but if  rA = rG =
rMNC ≡ r < rT , then 
r
(r+3rT)
sζT⏟    
simultaneous
  <   
r
2(r+rT)
sζT⏟    
sequential
 , so sequential bargaining is better 
for Turkey in this case. 
If rT = rA  <   rG = rMNC = r, simultaneous bargaining is better for Turkey, in this 
case, because 
r
2(r+rT)
sζT⏟    
simultaneous
 >   
rrT
(r+rT)2
sζT ⏟      
sequential
. 
But, when  rT = rA  >   rG = rMNC = r, then 
r
2(r+rT)
sζT⏟    
simultaneous
 <   
rrT
(r+rT)2
sζT ⏟      
sequential
sequential 
bargaining is better for Turkey. 
When rT = rG ≠ rA = rMNC = r then the outcomes for Turkey (πT) will be: 
r
2(r+rT)
sζT⏟    
simultaneous
 =   
r
2(r+rT)
sζT  ⏟      
 
sequential
, so Turkey, in this case, is indifferent between 
bargaining simultaneously or sequentially, and the same result will be obtained when  
rT = rMNC  ≠  rA = rG = r   
Georgia  
If the bargainers have identical discount rates (rA = rT = rG = rMNC ≡ r), Georgia 
prefers bargaining simultaneously through which it receives a greater net payoff 
(πG):  
1
4
sζG⏟
simultaneous
 >   
1
8
sζG⏟
sequential
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If rA = rT = rMNC ≡ r ≠ rG, simultaneous bargaining is also better for Georgia. That 
is, 
r
(r+3rG)
sζG⏟     
simultaneous
>
r
4(r+rG)
sζG⏟     
sequential
 because for 
r
(r+3rG)
sζG⏟     
simultaneous
≤
r
4(r+rG)
sζG⏟     
sequential
 it would be necessary 
that rG ≤ −3r, but according to our assumptions r , rG > 0, therefore rG ≰ −3r, and 
so  
r
(r+3rG)⏟  
sζG
simultaneous
≰
r
4(r+rG)
sζG⏟     
sequential
 
If  rG = rT  ≠  rA = rMNC = r, Georgia prefers simultaneous bargaining: 
r
2(r+rG)⏟  
sζG
simultaneous
>
rrG
2(r+rG)2
sζG⏟      
sequential
 because for  
r
2(r+rG)⏟  
sζG
simultaneous
≤
rrG
2(r+rG)2
sζG⏟      
sequential
 it would be 
necessary that r ≤ 0 which we rule out in our assumptions. The same result will be 
obtained when rG = rA  ≠   rT = rMNC = r 
If  rG = rMNC  ≠   rA = rT = r then simultaneous bargaining is better in this case, as 
the net payoff with simultaneous bargaining is greater than that with sequential 
bargaining: 
r
2(r+rG)⏟  
sζG
simultaneous
>
r2
2(r+rG)2
sζG⏟      
sequential
 because 
r
2(r+rG)⏟  
sζG
simultaneous
≤
r2
2(r+rG)2
sζG⏟      
sequential
   only 
when rG ≤ 0 which we rule out in our assumptions.  
MNC   
If the four parties have the same discount rate (rA = rT = rG = rMNC ≡ r), MNC 
prefers simultaneous bargaining through which it receives greater net payoff 
(πMNC): 
1
4
sζMNC⏟    
simultaneous
 >   
1
8
sζMNC⏟    
sequential
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If MNC have a discount rate, but different (≷) from that of the host countries 
(rA = rT = rG ≡ r ≠ rMNC), simultaneous bargaining is also better for MNC because 
it results in higher net payoff than that of sequential bargaining: 
r
(r+3rMNC)
sζMNC⏟          
simultaneous
>
r3
(rMNC+r)3
sζMNC⏟          
sequential
, because  
r
(r+3rMNC)
sζMNC⏟          
simultaneous
≤
r3
(rMNC+r)3
sζMNC⏟          
sequential
 only 
when  rMNC ≤ −3r which is not possible under our assumptions (rMNC, r > 0). 
If rMNC = rG ≠  rA = rT = r , simultaneous bargaining is better for MNC as it 
results in a greater net payoff:  
 
r
2(r+rMNC)
sζMNC⏟          
simultaneous
>
r2
2(r+rMNC)2
sζMNC⏟          
sequential
, because 
r
2(r+rMNC)
sζMNC⏟          
simultaneous
≤
r2
2(r+rMNC)2
sζMNC⏟          
sequential
 
implies that rMNC ≤ 0 which we rule out in our assumptions. The same result will be 
obtained when  rMNC = rA ≠ rG = rT = r , or  rMNC = rT ≠ rA = rG = r .    
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF OIL ON 
DOMESTIC FIXED INVESTMENT IN NON-
OECD OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
3.1. Introduction  
Oil proceeds might be a productive source of funding in oil-rich developing countries 
if they are used carefully and directed towards enhancing capital assets, and 
constructing infrastructure projects such as railways, roads, schools, hospitals, 
residential dwellings, and water and power projects. This in turn has the potential to 
generate job opportunities, raise living standards, and create a platform for 
sustainable economic growth in these countries.  
It has been argued that oil-rich countries can base their development on oil and 
thereby promote economic growth, create jobs, and increase government revenues 
and thus enhance poverty alleviation programs. However, the experience of many 
oil-rich developing countries illustrates negative consequences of oil-led 
development such as slower than expected economic growth, corruption, poor 
governance, inequality, and barriers to economic diversification (Karl, 2007).   
Within this framework, a wide body of the literature has examined implications of 
natural resources on economic growth. The findings of several empirical studies 
indicate that a natural resource boom affects economic growth positively, but some 
other studies show adverse effects of natural resources on economic activities in 
resource rich developing economies.  
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Although many scholars have investigated the determinants of gross domestic 
investment, or the linkage between domestic investment and financial development, 
capital flows, political stability, and institutional quality, fewer studies have paid 
attention to the relationship between gross domestic investment and resource 
abundance, especifically the effect of oil abundance on domestic investment in oil-
exporting developing countries.  
Therefore, this chapter attempts to fill this gap and examines the impact of oil 
abundance on domestic investment in 22 oil-exporting non-OECD countries over the 
period 1996-2010. We emphasize domestic investment in this study to examine 
whether the contribution of oil revenues to economic growth works via physical 
capital accumulation.    
This chapter is structured as follows: The first section reviews the work of scholars 
who documented the relationship between gross domestic investment and factors 
affecting it, among which are: output growth, gross domestic savings, financial 
development, capital flows, and trade openness. It also reviews studies which 
explored the impact of natural resources on economic activities, and channels 
through which natural wealth might cause the resource curse in developing countries. 
The second section presents an overview of the study sample by throwing light on 
the association between oil rents and economic growth in oil-exporting economies 
included in our sample. It also pays attention to several options through which oil 
revenues can be used to maximize the oil benefit for the overall economy, and 
highlights the experience of several countries in the sample in using and managing 
oil proceeds. The third section introduces the investment model with both static and 
dynamic specifications, and presents the econometric method used in estimation; it 
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also provides description of data and variables employed in the study. Finally, the 
fourth section illustrates estimation results of the investment equation and presents a 
discussion in light of related previous studies.  
3.2. Literature review 
Since this study aims at examining the oil effect on gross domestic investment in 
light of other determinants of domestic investment, this section throws light on the 
work of scholars who addressed the factors affecting domestic investment, and the 
work of those who documented the association between natural resource abundance 
and economic activities in oil-rich economies.    
Figure 3.1. Factors affecting gross domestic investment 
 
3.2.1. Investment-related literature 
A large body of the literature has addressed investment-related aspects ranging from 
examining the determinants of domestic investment in a specific country or in a set 
of countries, to focusing on the relationship between domestic investment and a 
specific factor. 
Gross 
domestic 
Investment 
Financial factors 
Domestic saving 
Trade openness 
Capital controls 
Natural resources 
73 
The pre-Keynesian orthodoxy viewed the saving rate as the fundamental determinant 
of the rate of capital accumulation because it determines the interest rate at which 
funds will be advanced to finance investment (Pollin, 1997). 
Many scholars documented the linkage between domestic investment and domestic 
saving in both developed and developing economies suggesting a positive significant 
relationship between the two variables. On the assumption of perfect capital 
mobility, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) presented an empirical test using data of 
developed countries. They found that the cross-section saving-investment correlation 
is quite high suggesting imperfection in the international capital market, and that a 
large share of domestic savings tends to remain in home countries. In contrast, 
scholars who used a sample of developing countries found that the estimated 
coefficient of saving on investment is low or close to zero (Vamvakidis and 
Wacziarg, 1998; Wong, 1990; Bayoumi, 1990; Dooley et al., 1987; Feldstein and 
Horioka, 1980) attributed to the inefficient institutions and financial systems which 
fail in channeling saving into domestic investment in these countries.  
The association between domestic investment and financial development was also 
tackled by many researchers. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) presented a 
theoretical and empirical foundation for the relationship between investment and 
monetary factors. Their hypothesis is based on the assumption that limited access to 
credit in developing countries forces investors to accumulate enough real balances 
before they can initiate investment projects. According to Ndikumana (2000) who 
found a positive relationship between domestic investment and financial 
development, financial development can stimulate economic growth through capital 
accumulation. Furthermore, Huang (2009) investigated the causality between private 
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investment and financial development and showed a positive causal effects going in 
both directions.    
Many studies addressed the interaction between domestic investment and FDI. Mody 
and Murshid (2005), for example, showed that countries with better policies have 
achieved greater success in absorbing foreign inflows. In contrast, Kim (2013) 
suggested that the extent to which FDI augments economic growth depends upon the 
degree of complementarity and substitutability between domestic investment and 
FDI. His findings indicate that FDI is beneficial for domestic investment in countries 
starting with low human capital, less-developed financial system, or high corruption. 
Luca and Spatafora (2012), also, showed that investment is affected positively by net 
capital inflows, but according to him greater institutional quality does not increase 
the extent to which capital inflows translate into domestic investment.  The findings 
of empirical analysis conducted by Tang et al. (2008) on China indicate that FDI has 
a complementary relationship with domestic investment since FDI helps in 
overcoming the shortages of capital; it, therefore, simulates economic growth.  
Several studies examined how trade openness influences domestic investment. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) suggest that a positive relationship between investment and 
trade holds whether trade flows are measured by imports, exports or total  trade 
(imports plus exports). Furthermore, Eicher (1999) indicated that openness to trade 
stimulates domestic investment by encouraging competition in domestic and 
international markets and generating higher returns on investment through economies 
of scale. The findings of Bond and Malik (2009), also, showed that countries more 
open to trade tend to have higher private investment.  
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In contrast, Kim et al. (2013) suggest that trade appears to have adverse impacts on 
domestic investment in economies which start with low human capital, low financial 
development, or high corruption, but positive effects in countries beginning with 
high human capital, better financial sectors, or low corruption. Thus, if market or 
institutional imperfection exists, trade openness can lead to under-utilization of 
human and capital resources, concentration in extractive economic activities, or 
specialization away from technologically advanced, increasing-return sectors. 
3.2.2. Natural resource abundance, economic growth, and investment 
Different studies examined the implications of natural resource abundance (oil, gas, 
minerals and other non-renewable resources) on economic growth and development 
in the resource-rich developing countries. Some of these studies show that the 
performance of these countries is poor comparing to other countries which are not 
endowed with such resources - the problem which is, therefore, called “the resource 
curse”. Within this framework, channels through which natural resource abundance 
influences economic growth was investigated by many researchers.  
A number of studies focused on the “Dutch disease” phenomenon which results in 
real exchange rate appreciation due to an unexpected increase in foreign exchange 
revenues from resources, which in turn affects adversely on the non-resource traded 
sector, mainly manufacturing, making it less competitive.   
Ades and Di Tella (1999) suggested that natural rents, such as oil rents, and rents 
induced by the lack of product market competition foster corruption. Torvik (2002) 
presented a model of rent-seeking where an increase in resource endowment shifts 
entrepreneurs from the productive sector to the rent-seeking sector. Karl (2007) 
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argued that countries dependent on oil are often characterized by corruption, poor 
governance, a culture of rent-seeking, and high incidences of civil conflict and inter-
state war. Arezki and Bruckner (2011) found that there is a significant effect of oil 
rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil 
production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil 
production is low.  
Models linking economic growth to natural resources via human capital established 
contradictory consequences. Gylfason (2001), for example, showed that natural 
resource abundance crowds out human capital investment affecting adversely on the 
pace of economic activity; however, Stijns (2006) found a positive correlation 
between human capital accumulation and natural resource rents per capita. 
According to Lowi (2004), in countries where oil is the most important source of 
state revenue, oil structures political, as well as economic, outcomes. The overall 
impact of a resource boom on economies depends on the quality of the institutions; 
the resource curse, therefore, applies only to countries with bad institutions, but 
countries with good institutions tend to benefit from resource booms (Mehlum et al., 
2006; Robinson et al., 2006). Some oil rich developing countries, such as Nigeria and 
Angola, have mismanaged their oil fortune resulting in damaging effects on economy 
and politics in these countries (Ovadia, 2013). In contrast, Norway has been 
successful in efficiently managing its oil revenues and channeling them towards 
long-term objectives and stabilization goals attributed to the capacity of state 
institutions to handle the risk of oil price fluctuation. In order to reconcile competing 
claims for oil revenues, Norway has used its highly consensus-oriented and 
parliamentary institutions, and has involved interest groups which represent business 
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and labor (Eifert et al., 2003). Furthermore, it has made institutional choices to bring 
oil wealth under political control, such as strong government involvement in oil 
production, and a tax regime that guarantees considerable returns to the state from oil 
production, and the establishment of an oil fund invested abroad (Listhaug, 2005).  
Bond and Malik (2009) provided cross-country empirical evidence on the role of 
natural resources on domestic investment. Different determinants of investment were 
considered in their study - the quality of political institutions, ethnic diversity, trade 
openness, political instability, financial development, and macroeconomic volatility. 
Their results suggest differences between fossil fuels and non-fuel resources; fuel 
exports tend to increase private investment, but there is also a robust negative effect 
from a measure of export concentration.  
On the other hand, several studies provided evidence that oil boom affects positively 
on economic activities in oil-exporting countries. Yang and Lam (2008), for 
example, examines the relationship between oil prices and economic activities for 17 
oil-rich developing countries using time series dynamics and employing 
cointegration analysis and Granger causality models. Their findings indicate that, in 
the majority of cases, oil booms are followed by increases in both investment and 
GDP per capita.  
Berument et al. (2010) examined the effects of oil price shocks on a number of 
selected Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries that are net exporters or 
importers of oil using a structural vector autoregressive model. Their results indicate 
that the effects of higher oil prices on GDP of most oil producing countries are 
positive. 
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Cavalcanti et al. (2010) used a sample including both developed and developing 
economies to investigate the oil impact on economic growth. Their results show that 
oil abundance by itself doesn’t seem to be a curse since they found that oil 
abundance enhances growth in the short-run, and it has a positive impact on the level 
real income. They suggest the existence of a “volatility curse” rather than a “natural 
resource curse” since volatility of oil prices and, therefore, that of oil revenues is the 
reason which might dampen growth and development. 
Thus, the effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth, and factors 
affecting domestic investment were widely analyzed in the literature, but limited 
attention was paid to the association between domestic investment and natural 
resource abundance, in general, and oil, in particular, in developing countries which 
suffer from underinvestment and poor provision of infrastructure. Therefore, this 
chapter attempts to examine the oil impact on gross domestic investment using a 
panel data set of 22 non-OECD economies on which we throw light in the next 
section.   
3.3. Overview on Non-OECD oil-exporting economies 
The sample employed in this study includes oil-exporting non-OECD countries. 
Although some oil-exporting countries, such as Nigeria, are excluded due to the lack 
of data over several years for a number of the variables needed to run the required 
investment model, other major oil-exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, 
Angola, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are considered, and the robustness of the results 
is checked using different estimators. Thus, 22 oil-exporting countries
17
 are included, 
                                                          
17 The sample includes: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Congo 
Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Yemen Rep.  
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among which are some of the independent states of the former Soviet Union which 
took their independence in 1991, and so the time period is limited to 15 years (1996-
2010).  
Our sample includes developing and less developed countries with different types of 
economies, such as transitional economies and emerging economies. They all 
produce and export oil, though they have differences in oil reserves, production 
capacities, and extraction costs.  
These countries differ, also, in the share of state participation in oil production, 
which might influence the degree of association between oil rents and corruption as 
was indicated by Arezki and Bruckner (2011). For example, the state-run Rosneft is 
the largest oil producer in Russia; and Algeria's national oil and gas company 
(Sonatrach) owns the majority of oil and gas projects in Algeria; however, in 
Azerbaijan, for instance, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) 
produces only about 20 percent of Azerbaijan's total oil output, with the rest 
produced by international oil companies (EIA, 2014b).  
3.3.1. Oil rents versus output growth 
This section throws light on the association between oil rents and output growth in 
oil-exporting countries included in the sample.  
The following table presents the growth rate of real GDP, the ratio of gross domestic 
fixed investment to GDP, and the ratio of oil rents (the difference between the value 
of crude oil production and total costs of production) to GDP. Variables, for all the 
22 countries, were averaged over the last four years (2007-2010) of our study period.   
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Table 3.1. GDP growth, investment, saving, and oil rents (average over            
the last four years) for each country in the study sample 
Country 
Output 
growth (%) 
Gross 
domestic 
investment        
(% GDP) 
Gross 
domestic 
saving               
(% GDP) 
Oil rents           
(% GDP) 
Algeria 2.77 30.42 54.04 19.38 
Angola 10.56 14.41 34.13 55.07 
Argentina 6.36 22.6 26.79 4.86 
Azerbaijan 12.54 18.87 55.3 47.2 
Brazil 4.62 18.52 19.4 2.62 
Cameroon 2.71 16.16 14.1 8.74 
Colombia 4.03 22.49 20.25 6.36 
Congo, Rep. 5.05 20.48 46.74 61.39 
Ecuador 3.31 23.92 23.58 23.56 
Egypt 5.15 20.16 14.11 6.3 
Equatorial Guinea 9.05 51.28 73.59 53.87 
Indonesia 5.8 28.96 31.47 3.82 
Kazakhstan 5.17 27.24 41.9 28.65 
Kuwait 1.9 18.79 53.74 51.53 
Malaysia 4.19 21.8 41.37 7.28 
Russia 2.58 21.76 31.24 14.76 
Saudi Arabia 2.75 21.07 45.11 52.64 
Syria 4.85 18.47 26.75 18.14 
Tunisia 4.25 23.81 22.04 4.69 
Venezuela 2.34 22.33 32.34 24.49 
Vietnam 6.72 35.74 27.04 8.74 
Yemen, Rep. 4.64 14.46 7.32 26.69 
Source: Annual data over 2007-2010 were obtained from the World Development 
Indicators, and then we found the average values of each variable over the last four years.  
It can be seen from Table 3.1 that several countries attained considerable output 
growth, but Azerbaijan - the largest producer of oil after Russia and Kazakhstan in 
the former Soviet countries - realized the highest average rate (12.54%) over the last 
four years of the study period among the countries included in our sample.  
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In fact, constructing the Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project was among the 
factors which, substantially, affected Azerbaijan’s oil industry, in particular, and its 
overall economic activities, in general. The pipeline connects Baku - Azerbaijan’s 
capital from which the first 
oil was pumped in May 
2005 - with the Turkish 
port of Ceyhan at the 
Mediterranean Sea.  
Producing more oil in 
Azerbaijan was often 
associated with increases 
in the real GDP growth 
rate, Figure 3.2; the 
Russian-Georgian conflict over 2008-2009, however, affected the functioning of the 
transit energy corridor in the Caucasus region adversely, so Azerbaijan’s GDP 
growth declined after hitting its highest level in 2006.  
Also, Angola, the second-largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria - 
according to EIA (US Energy Information Administration), witnessed a relatively 
high average real growth rate (10.56%) in the last four years of the sample period. 
Equatorial Guinea, whose economy relies on its natural resources (oil and gas) also 
recorded considerable real growth rate (9.05%).   
In contrast, several countries in the sample achieved relatively low real GDP growth 
rates, though oil production in each of them constitutes a substantial portion of 
worldwide oil supply. For example, the average real GDP growth of Kuwait was the 
Figure 3.2. Azerbaijan’s oil supply and GDP growth from 1993 to 2010 
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lowest (1.90%) in the sample, though it is one of the top oil producers in the world 
and it holds the world's sixth largest oil reserves.  
Similarly, the average real GDP growth of Saudi Arabia (2.75%), the world largest 
oil producer, lagged behind other oil-exporting economies. Russia, also, realized 
only 2.58% real GDP growth rate, although it is among the top oil producers and it 
holds the world's largest natural gas reserves, and the second-largest coal reserves. 
Likewise, Venezuela’s average annual real GDP growth was only 2.34%, though it is 
among the largest owners of oil and natural gas reserves in the world. It was the 
world's eighth-largest net oil exporter in 2010, according to EIA. 
Although oil represents wealth it also exposes exporting countries to great 
uncertainty due to fluctuations in oil prices causing positive or negative shocks. This 
raises a question on using and managing oil income in oil-rich developing countries, 
the problem on which we throw light in the next section. 
3.3.2. Using oil rents  
The broad consensus which research on the oil curse reached suggests that oil wealth 
is likely to be a useful factor in economies of oil-exporters when these countries have 
good governance, and efficient human capital. Thus, oil money can, if managed 
accountably and effectively, stimulate economic development. However, weak 
institutions, mismanagement of oil revenues, and corruption hinder this path.  
There are different options to use oil revenues in oil-exporting countries. Revenues 
can be transferred to citizens in several ways, such as reducing non-oil taxes or 
providing subsidies or grants, employment or investment subsidies, such options 
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involve tradeoffs among possible objectives: efficiency, equity, and sustainability 
(Gelb and Grasmann, 2010). 
A low-tax environment is likely to encourage business climate and investments to 
diversify the non-oil economy by compensating the adverse effect of exchange rate 
appreciation caused by oil exports.  However, it is argued that the need for a state to 
tax its citizens has been essential for developing state capabilities and for 
encouraging the demand for public accountability (Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 
2008). 
Another widely-used approach is to subsidize domestic prices for petroleum 
derivatives, other energy, and other essentials below world market levels. This 
option, however, does not provide for a transparent linkage between the levels of 
rents and transfers.   
The approach which is more widely used in the Middle East than elsewhere involves 
expanded levels of public employment for nationals. In Kuwait, for example, 
employment for nationals is virtually guaranteed, as well as a wide range of benefits 
including housing loans, marriage bonuses and retirement income (Gelb and 
Grasmann, 2010).  
Fewer developing economy oil exporters look to direct distribution. Direct transfers 
to citizens, or citizen groups, can be provided in different ways.  Community-based 
programs can offer one way to distribute oil rents effectively and create a 
constituency with an interest in their effective management (Moreen 2007). Such 
programs have been used effectively on a large scale in Indonesia via INPRES
18
 
                                                          
18
 INPRES denotes the presidential instruction - in Indonesian instruksi presiden (Azis, 1992). 
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which is among the most important central-regional transfers in Indonesia, triggered 
primarily by the unprecedented surplus of oil revenues flowing into Indonesia 
following the oil boom of the mid-1970s (Azis, 1992). INPRES has probably been 
the main centrally controlled fiscal mechanism determining spatial distribution of the 
aggregate gains to Indonesia from the oil boom. The scheme is regarded as the most 
important fiscal instrument capable of achieving a more equitable regional 
distribution of income in Indonesia (Azis, 1992). 
Direct transfer programs can also be used to distribute rents on an individual basis. 
Some developing countries, such as Brazil, implement conditional cash transfer 
schemes by providing payments to poor families conditional on specified child 
behavior, for example, attending school or receiving essential health services, 
including vaccinations.  Although the design of such systems and country conditions 
might affect the outcomes, impact evaluations suggest that they can be an effective 
way to improve living conditions and widen access to a range of services (Behrman, 
Sengupta and Todd, 2005; Soares, Ribas and Osório, 2007). 
Some scholars argue that wealth distribution should not be targeted or conditional, 
but direct since resource rents are considered to be the property of all citizens (e.g. 
Sandbu 2006, Moss and Young 2009). Direct transfers might increase government 
accountability since it gives citizens a direct interest in the amount of oil revenues 
channeled into the budget. However, direct transfers might discourage labor supply 
and reduce the incentive to enhance skills.    
Diversifying the non-oil economy has been the objective for many oil exporters. 
Malaysia and Indonesia are among the countries which diversified their economies 
towards manufactured exports (Coxhead, 2007). Malaysia sustained a high and 
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relatively stable savings rate, and implemented land development and replanting 
schemes to expand and modernize the production of rubber and palm oil.  It also 
undertook investments in technology and infrastructure, particularly energy, 
communications and transport, leading to rapid industrial transformation. Indonesia 
has also exerted considerable efforts to use its hydrocarbon resources in order to 
support agriculture. This is attributed to government policies including using oil 
income to develop natural gas resources, both for export to Japan and as an input to 
fertilizer production; and then fertilizer was distributed at subsidized prices (Gelb 
and Grasmann, 2010). 
While Malaysia and Indonesia provide good examples in employing prudent policies 
in using oil money, most countries in our sample may be seen as rife with corruption 
- as it can be seen from Figure 3.3 - which is one of the factors that can seriously 
distort economic development, and cause, besides other factors, the resource-curse in 
oil-rich developing economies, as has been established by several researchers.  
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Figure 3.3. Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 for the                              
countries included in our sample 
 
 Source: Transparency International (2011)  
Figure 3.3 shows the corruption perceptions index for the countries in the sample 
according to The Transparency International (2011) which ranks 182 developed and 
developing countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. The 
score points to the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 10, 
where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt while 10 means that a 
country is perceived as very clean. 8% of the 182 countries recorded scores from 8-
10, while the scores for 26% of the countries were over 5. However, the economies 
included in our sample were among the countries which recorded below 5 as it 
shown in the figure.  
Most of the countries in the sample were scored below 4 in clean government 
practices. Rather, Equatorial Guinea and Venezuela, recorded the lowest scores in 
the sample, are among the worst 12 countries in the world that scored less than 2. 
Also, the corruption levels in the former Soviet states are considerably high, while 
only the scores of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia are over 4 - being among 10% 
of the countries which recorded between 4 and 5. 
4.6 4.4 4.3 
3.8 3.8 
3.4 
3 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.1 2 1.9 1.9 
K
u
w
ai
t
Sa
u
d
i A
ra
b
ia
M
al
ay
si
a
B
ra
zi
l
Tu
n
is
ia
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
A
rg
en
ti
n
a
In
d
o
n
es
ia
A
lg
er
ia
Eg
yp
t
V
ie
tn
am
Ec
u
ad
o
r
K
az
ak
h
st
an
Sy
ri
a
C
am
er
o
o
n
A
ze
rb
ai
ja
n
R
u
ss
ia
C
o
n
go
, R
e
p
.
Ye
m
en
, R
ep
.
A
n
go
la
Eq
u
at
o
ri
al
…
V
en
e
zu
el
a
87 
From the countries with high levels in corruption in our sample, we throw light on 
the experience of Azerbaijan and Angola, which heavily rely on oil income, in 
managing and using oil revenues.  
Angola suffers from persistent poverty and under-development. The 2013 Human 
Development Report ranked Angola at 148th out of 187 countries - in the low human 
development category. This is attributed, other than the influence of the civil war that 
ended in 2002, to corruption and rent-seeking encouraged by the large oil revenues. 
Corruption and the lack of transparency in government management of oil revenues 
have resulted in wasting these revenues that could have been used to reduce poverty 
and promote development (Global Witness, OSISA Angola, 2011).   
Although the government responded to the concerns about the lack of transparency 
by publishing official data on oil production and exports and oil revenues flowing to 
the state since 2004, transparency is not only about the publication of raw data, but it 
is also about the publication of reliable, comprehensive, and timely data accessible 
by the public in a way that enables concerned citizens to monitor oil proceeds and 
urge the government to account for oil management (Global Witness, OSISA 
Angola, 2011).  
Another example of misusing oil income is Azerbaijan, a former state of Soviet 
Union, where the state budget is substantially based on the oil sector. Hence, sharp 
changes in oil prices and oil revenues due to fluctuating supply and non-flexible 
demand for oil have caused Azerbaijan’s economic situation to remain dependent on 
global oil market stability (CESD, 2010).  
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Although Azerbaijan created the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) in 
December 1999 in order to accumulate revenues from oil and preserve it for current 
and future generations, transparency and accountability in the oil sector and public 
financial management has fallen in comparison with other sectors of the economy. 
According to a report prepared by Center for Economic and Social Development 
(CESD) in Azerbaijan (2010), the money is being spent from the Fund with no clear 
criteria measuring the effectiveness of the spending decisions against alternative 
ways of using the Fund. This implies the need for clearer resource management 
principles to ensure that the Fund is operated transparently.  
Thus, the poor practice in managing and using oil proceeds in many oil-exporting 
economies in our sample suggests the need of these countries for effective regulative, 
legal and financial procedures which would enable them to use their oil money 
rationally in a way that maximizes the benefit to the overall economy, promote 
structural change, and shift the distribution away from political elite of resource 
appropriators towards entrepreneurs.  
After having a look at some possible options in deploying oil income, and 
highlighting the experiences of some countries in managing oil money, the next 
section examines whether oil proceeds enhance aggregate domestic fixed investment 
in oil-exporting countries in our sample. It introduces the methodology of the study 
and provides descriptions of regressors involved in the model and data sources.   
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3.4. Model specification, methodology and data 
3.4.1. Model specification 
This study aims at investigating whether oil revenues are channeled into 
infrastructure and other investment projects, and since the participation of the private 
sector in infrastructure projects is limited in oil-exporting developing countries, we 
examine the oil-effect on the aggregate domestic fixed investment without separation 
between private and public fixed investment.  
A number of studies have provided considerable insights into the factors that 
influence capital formation in developing countries, such as the tax system, foreign 
exchange, informational constraints, and the internal flow of funds. The theoretical 
framework adopted was a combination of neoclassical and flexible accelerator 
models with additional variables to capture the effects of government policies. In line 
with these studies, domestic fixed investment is modelled as a function of output 
growth, and other factors expected to affect capital formation in these countries.  
We argue that oil rents are among determinants which might have a significant 
influence on aggregate fixed investment in oil-exporting non-OECD countries. Thus, 
we specify an investment model in which a proxy for oil abundance is included as an 
explanatory variable in the estimation equation, controlling for other factors that 
determine domestic investment including output growth, the exchange rate, inflation, 
trade openness, and financial development. 
Oil rents are employed in this study to account not only for oil prices but also for 
production costs which differ from country to another depending on the geographical 
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location of the oil field from where oil is extracted; but in order to check the 
robustness of the outcomes, the effect of crude oil exports is also examined. 
Thus, the empirical investment model can be written in its static form as follows:  
  𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                                                         (3.1) 
Where 
𝛼 is the intercept; 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 denotes the ratio of domestic investment to GDP in country 𝑖 in year  𝑡; 
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 is a measure of oil abundance using two proxies: 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 denotes the 
lagged ratio of oil rents to GDP, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 refers to the lagged ratio of oil exports to 
GDP;   
Matrix (𝑍𝑖,𝑡) includes the following determinants of domestic investment, as was 
established by previous studies, though the choice of variables is constrained by data 
availability: 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑟𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡,  𝐶𝑟𝑑𝑃𝑣𝑡𝑖,𝑡, 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖,𝑡, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡,  𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡. 
In this section we explain what these variables are and discuss their roles in the 
analyses, leaving more precise definitions to section 3.4.3. 
 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is real output growth which reflects changes in the aggregate demand for 
output that investors seek to meet. Ratios of domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector to GDP (𝐶𝑟𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡), and domestic credit provided to the private sector to 
GDP (𝐶𝑟𝑑𝑃𝑣𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ) are indicators of financial factors. 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the change in the 
exchange rate which might have a significant influence on investment. In theory, 
exchange rate changes might have two opposite effects on domestic investment. On 
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one side, when the domestic currency depreciates, the marginal profit of investing an 
additional unit of capital is expected to increase due to higher revenues from both 
domestic and foreign sales, but on the other side the prices of the imported capital 
assets would get higher. Hence, theoretical models provide no clear indication as to 
which effect is dominant (Harchaoui, et al., 2005). 
The real interest rate is, also, among the variables which have considerable impacts 
on investment, but we do not include it due to the missing data in many countries in 
our sample. We use inflation (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖,𝑡) since high inflation rates increase the degree of 
uncertainty about the macroeconomic environment (Bond and Malik, 2009), making 
calculating the rate of return on new fixed investments uncertain. Thus, inflation is 
expected to have a negative impact on domestic investment. 
Exports are a source of foreign exchange necessary for purchasing capital goods; 
meanwhile imports can simulate investment if they imply greater access to 
investment goods in the international markets, but when imports mainly consist of 
consumer goods, the effect could be negative on investment. Accordingly, trade 
might be a significant determinant of domestic investment. We, therefore, estimate 
the investment model controlling for trade openness, represented, in our model, by 
the ratio of trade to GDP (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡) which refers to the sum of exports and imports 
as a percentage of GDP.  
Furthermore, FDI might simulate domestic investment, or might substitute for it, so 
the ratio of net inflows of foreign direct investment to GDP (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) is considered in 
the estimation equation. 
92 
𝜆 and 𝛽 are the coefficients of 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1, and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡, respectively; while 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the error 
term: 𝑢𝑖,𝑡= 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where 𝛿𝑖  denotes the group fixed effect, while  𝜗𝑡  is the 
time fixed effect, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the random disturbance.  
We, also, consider a dynamic investment model, in accordance with the studies, such 
as Mileva, 2008; and Mody and Murshid, 2005, by supplementing the estimation 
equation by the ratio of lagged domestic investment to GDP (𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1) which can, 
therefore, be written as follows:   
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                                                   (3.2) 
Where δ is the coefficient on  𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1, while the rest of the regressors are as specified 
in Eq (3.1). 
Estimating Eq (3.2) is associated with the endogeneity problem associated with some 
explanatory variables might be correlated with the error term including 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡, and 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1.  
Endogeneity could result from a two-way causation between the dependent and the 
explanatory variable in the estimation model, but it also can be caused with the 
existence of unobserved common factors that affect both the dependent variable and 
the endogenous explanatory variable. 
FDI might be an endogenous variable because the causality between domestic 
investment and FDI can run in both directions, as was shown in several studies 
(Lautier and Moreaub, 2012; Mody and Murshid, 2005; Ndikumana and Verick, 
2008). Many studies showed how domestic investment could affect FDI positively. 
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For example, Lautier and Moreaub (2012) and Loree and Guisinger (1995) showed 
that countries with more developed infrastructure stimulate and attract more FDI.  
Likewise, domestic investment is an essential determinant in the macro production 
function and fluctuations in investment have substantial impacts on economic 
activities and long-term economic growth (Kim et al. 2013). Therefore, GDP growth 
is assumed to be an endogenous variable in our estimation.   
3.4.2. Methodology 
Although the specified investment model includes a proxy of oil abundance in 
addition to several macroeconomic determinants of domestic investment (output 
growth, inflation, openness and financial factors), there might be other time invariant 
factors affecting domestic investment in each country, as well as time-specific effects 
which are invariant among countries. Country-specific effects include different 
factors, among which are demographic and geographic factors, the level of 
institutional development, natural resources (other than oil), and particular domestic 
political factors, while time-specific effects include factors such as the transition 
effect in some countries, and the volatility of oil-price. 
The static model - Eq (3.1) - can be estimated using static panel estimators such as 
the Random or/and the Fixed Effects estimators. This depends on the structure of the 
error term. Under the random effects assumption individual specific effects are 
uncorrelated with the regressors, unlike the fixed effects assumption with which 
there is correlation between the effects and independent variables. 
In order to estimate the model using an appropriate estimator, we employ the 
Hausman test designed to measure the difference between the Fixed and the Random 
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Effects estimators. The null hypothesis of the test suggests that there is no significant 
difference between the two estimators, but rejecting the null hypothesis implies that 
only the Fixed Effects estimator is the consistent and efficient.  
Concerning the dynamic model - Eq (3.2) - estimators used to estimate coefficients 
in the static model are inefficient in estimating the dynamic specification because the 
lagged dependent variable is one of the regressors, so static panel estimators might 
result in biased estimates of the parameters.  
Therefore, in order to cope with the endogeneity problem in the dynamic investment 
equation in this study we use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) which is 
a statistical method for estimating the parameters in the model correcting the bias 
caused by endogenous explanatory variables.  
The Arellano-Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) 
dynamic panel estimators are designed for panel data with fixed individual effects; 
and with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within cross sections. These 
estimators are relevant for panel data with a single dependent variable that depends 
on its own past realizations, and explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous 
- i.e., correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error (Roodman, 
2006). 
We can distinguish between the Difference GMM (Arellano-Bond estimation), and 
the System GMM (Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator). The Arellano-Bond 
difference GMM estimator uses first differences for estimating the dynamic model, 
so Eq (3.2) is transformed into  
Δ𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿Δ𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆Δ𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽Δ𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + Δ𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                                      (3.3) 
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Thus, the fixed country effect is removed by differencing the regressors.  
Meanwhile, in the System GMM an additional assumption is made according to 
which first differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects 
which allows the introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically improve 
efficiency. It is based on building a system of two equations - the original equation as 
well as the transformed one (Roodman, 2006). 
3.4.3. Data 
We estimate the static and the dynamic models using both total and domestic fixed 
investment as a dependent variable since there is a considerable difference between 
the values of the two variables in some countries. Domestic fixed investment (gross 
domestic fixed formation) represents the outlays on additions to the fixed assets of 
the economy includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and 
the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and 
commercial and industrial buildings. Total domestic investment (gross capital 
formation) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus 
net changes in the level of inventories. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms 
to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and “work in 
progress”. According to the 1993 SNA (the System of National Accounts), net 
acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation (see World 
Development Indicators, 2013). 
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The explanatory variables for investment in our estimation equations are the 
following (for detailed definitions of all regressors, except for oil exports, see World 
Development Indicators, 2013):  
 Oil exports (% GDP): Oil exports were found by multiplying the crude oil price 
by the annual quantities of crude oil exports. 
 Oil rents (% GDP): Oil rents refer to the difference between the value of crude oil 
production at world prices and total costs of production
19
.  
 Real GDP growth: refers to the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market 
prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 
US dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value 
of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
 Foreign direct investment20 (% GDP): Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to 
net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting interest in or management control 
                                                          
19
 “This definition of economic rent differs from that used in the System of National Accounts, where 
rents are a form of property income, consisting of payments to landowners by a tenant for the use of 
the land or payments to the owners of subsoil assets by institutional units permitting them to extract 
subsoil deposits” (World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2013). 
“The estimates of natural resources rents are calculated as the difference between the price of a 
commodity and the average cost of producing it. This is done by estimating the world price of units of 
specific commodities and subtracting estimates of average unit costs of extraction or harvesting costs 
(including a normal return on capital). These unit rents are then multiplied by the physical quantities 
countries extract or harvest to determine the rents for each commodity as a share of gross domestic 
product” (World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2013).  
20
 Gross capital formation consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net 
changes in the level of inventories, while foreign direct investment (FDI) relates to financing – i.e., the 
purchase of shares in foreign companies where the buyer has a lasting interest (10 percent or more of 
voting stock). FDI can be used to finance fixed capital formation, however it can also be used to cover 
a deficit in the company or paying off a loan. Thus, it cannot be presumed that FDI is always included 
in gross fixed capital formation (World Bank. Is foreign direct investment (FDI) included in gross 
fixed capital formation? Available at:  
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/195312-is-foreign-direct-investment-fdi-
included-in-gro). 
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over an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the 
sum of equity capital, reinvested earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term 
capital, as shown in the balance of payments. We use net inflows in this study, 
i.e., the new investment inflows less disinvestment
21
. 
 Trade openness (% GDP): Trade represents the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services produced in the economy.  
 Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% GDP): Domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross 
basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The 
banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as 
other banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do 
not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings 
deposits). Examples of other banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan 
institutions and building and loan associations. 
 Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP):  Refers to financial resources provided 
to the private sector (through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade 
credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment) as a 
share of GDP. 
 Inflation: Inflation is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit 
deflator. It shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole, whereas the 
GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in 
constant local currency.  
                                                          
21
 Direct investments may take the form of greenfield investment, where the investor starts a new 
venture in a foreign country by constructing new operational facilities; joint venture, where the 
investor enters into a partnership agreement with a company abroad to establish a new enterprise; or 
merger and acquisition, where the investor acquires an existing enterprise abroad. The IMF suggests 
that investments should account for at least 10 percent of voting stock to be counted as FDI. In 
practice many countries set a higher threshold (see World Development Indicators, 2013). 
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 Liquidity - proxied by M2 (% GDP). M2 refers to money and quasi money 
comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of 
the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of 
resident sectors other than the central government.  
 The change in the official exchange rate: The official exchange rate refers to the 
exchange rate determined by national authorities or to the rate determined in the 
legally sanctioned exchange market. It is calculated as an annual average based on 
monthly averages (local currency units relative to the US dollar).  
Data for gross domestic investment, oil rents, output growth, financial and openness 
factors were obtained from the database of the World Bank Development Indicators, 
while data for the quantities of crude oil exports were derived from the database of 
EIA, and the crude oil price is the price of Brent crude, obtained from the British 
Petroleum (BP) database, Statistical Review of World Energy 2014. 
The following table throws light on the main statistics of the explanatory variables 
used in estimation including the mean, minimum, and maximum values of the 
variables used in estimation over the period 1996-2010.   
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Table 3.2. Main statistics about the variables used in the investment model 
Variable Symbol Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximu
m 
Total investment (lag, % GDP) GCF_1 24.32 11.39 8.79 113.58 
Fixed investment (lag, % GDP) I_1 23.30 11.25 8.79 113.58 
GDP growth GDP 5.65 7.74 -16.20 71.19 
Inflation Inf 14.70 41.30 -29.99 556.94 
Exchange rate  Exch 11.33 48.81 -99.98 610.42 
Credit by banking  (%GDP) CrdBank 39.06 35.41 -24.37 163.36 
Credit to private sector (%GDP) CrdPvt 29.85 29.38 1.17 158.51 
Liquidity (%GDP) Liq 43.44 29.62 4.83 139.17 
FDI (%GDP) FDI 6.00 14.94 -4.31 145.20 
Trade (%GDP) Trade 82.94 46.43 14.93 275.23 
Oil rents (%GDP, lagged) Rent_1 24.55 26.01 0.34 209.48 
Oil exports (%GDP, lagged) X_1 21.82 25.25 0.00 138.92 
It can be seen from the table that there are considerable differences between the 
minimum and the maximum values for most variables. The maximum inflation rate 
over the period, for example, was in Angola where it reached to 556.93% in 1999, 
while the minimum rate (-29.99%) was in Equatorial Guinea in 1999. The exchange 
rate is also among the variables which witnessed remarkable changes over time and 
between countries which use different types of exchange rate regimes, such as fixed, 
floating exchange rates (Brazil), or managed floating exchange rate (Malaysia, 
Angola, Indonesia, Algeria, Egypt). Although oil rents differ between countries 
depending on oil abundance, the mean value of oil rents (24.55%) indicates that oil 
proceeds constitute a considerable source of funds which might have a significant 
influence on domestic investment of these countries.  
Total investment - including the change in inventory - was considerably higher than 
fixed investment in some countries, while the two where equal or with small 
differences in some other economies, so the table reports identical maximum and 
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minimum values of the two variables, but the mean value of total investment was 
24.32 (% of GDP) while it was 23.30 (% of GDP) for fixed investment over the 
period.  
In order to include the appropriate regressors in the estimation equation, we check 
the correlation between each two explanatory variables to avoid the 
multicollinearity
22
 problem. 
Table 3.3. Correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables used in the 
investment model 
Variable GCF_1 I_1 GDP Inf Exch CrdBank CrdPvt LIQ FDI Trade Rent_1 X_1 
GCF_1 1.00            
I_1 0.98*** 1.00 
          
GDP 0.56*** 0.58*** 1.00 
         
Inf 0.07 0.08 -0.00 1.00 
        
Exch -0.01 -0.00 -0.15*** 0.83*** 1.00 
       
CrdBank -0.14** -0.14** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.09 1.00 
      
CrdPvt -0.03 -0.03 -0.12** -0.15** -0.11* 0.88*** 1.00 
     
LIQ -0.12** -0.14** -0.18*** -0.14** -0.11** 0.86*** 0.84*** 1.00 
    
FDI 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.28*** 0.45*** 0.39*** -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.20*** 1.00 
   
Trade 0.50*** 0.53*** 0.40*** 0.16*** 0.11** 0.13** 0.34*** 0.24*** 0.40*** 1.00 
  
Rent_1 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.56*** 0.41*** -0.47*** -0.33*** -0.32*** 0.52*** 0.47*** 1.00 
 
X_1 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.18*** 0.09* -0.52*** -0.36*** -0.40*** 0.38*** 0.53*** 0.85*** 1.00 
Note: ***, **, * denote estimation is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, 
respectively.   
The table shows that, in few cases, the bivariate correlation coefficients are relatively 
high, such as that between each pair of the financial indicators (𝐶𝑟𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘, 𝐿𝑖𝑞 
                                                          
22
 Multicollinearity refers to the case in which the explanatory variables are highly correlated so one 
variable can be predicted from the other, which might make the statistical inference made about the 
data unreliable. 
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and 𝐶𝑟𝑑𝑃𝑣𝑡) where the coefficients are more than 0.80, and between the lagged oil 
rents (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡_1) and the lagged oil exports (𝑋_1) which is 0.85, as well as that 
between the exchange rate (𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ) and inflation (𝐼𝑛𝑓) which is 0.83. Hence, in order 
to avoid multicollinearity, we do not include the mentioned highly correlated 
variables in the same estimation equation. Rather, we run the regression several 
times and consider the highly correlated explanatory variables separately in different 
estimations.   
It can also be seen from the table that the correlations, in most cases, are significant 
but the coefficients are less than 0.60, so including the variables which are not highly 
correlated in the same regression is not expected to result in biased estimations. 
Although Trade includes all traded goods and services, among which are oil exports, 
the correlation coefficient between trade and oil exports is 0.53, so it is still 
acceptable to be included in the same estimation equation. We avoid subtracting oil 
exports from trade since the crude oil price we used in finding oil exports might not 
be identical to prices of the exported goods and services according to the World 
Development Indicators from which data on trade were obtained.   
The next section presents the outcomes of estimating the static model of domestic 
investment using static panel estimators (Random and Fixed Effects estimators), and 
the dynamic investment model employing the Arellano-Bond difference GMM 
estimator. 
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3.5. Estimation results 
3.5.1. Outcomes of the static specification  
We start by running the static regression (Eq 3.1) using the two-way Random Effects 
estimator since the Hausman test for random effects is automatically generated, and 
then if the test refers to a significant difference between the Fixed and the Random 
Effects estimators, we re-estimate the investment model using the fixed effects 
estimator with which the F-test for no fixed time and cross sectional effects is 
generated.  
The results are illustrated in Table 3.4 where the effect of oil abundance on both 
fixed and total investment was examined controlling for other determinants of 
investment, as was indicated by previous studies. The regression is run four times 
including the lagged oil rents or the lagged oil exports, while other regressors are real 
output growth, inflation, domestic credit provided to the private sector, FDI, and 
trade openness.  
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 3.4 report the effect of the lagged oil rents on total and 
fixed investment, respectively, while Columns 2 and 4 show the impact of the lagged 
crude oil exports on total and fixed investment, respectively. For the explanatory 
variables, the upper value in each cell refers to the coefficient, while the value in the 
parentheses is the standard error. For the test, the upper value in each sell refers to 
the test statistic, while the lower value in the square bracket is the p-value showing 
whether the null hypothesis of the test is rejected or not.  
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Table 3.4. The effect of oil and other control variables on gross domestic 
 investment using Random Two-Way Estimates 
Number of cross sections= 22 
Time series length= 15 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variable: Total 
investment (% GDP) 
Dependent variable: Fixed 
investment (% GDP) 
1 2 3 4 
Intercept  
10.42088*** 
(2.4358) 
9.733856*** 
(2.4497) 
11.143*** 
(2.365) 
10.18953*** 
(2.3498) 
Output growth  
0.172371*** 
(0.0453) 
0.184298*** 
(0.0462) 
0.0770* 
(0.042) 
0.08965** 
(0.0433) 
Inflation 
-0.02123* 
(0.0115) 
-0.0486*** 
(0.00858) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.04855*** 
(0.00806) 
Credit provided to the private 
sector (% GDP) 
0.084044*** 
(0.0245) 
0.080205*** 
(0.0247) 
0.0738*** 
(0.023) 
0.068518*** 
(0.0233) 
FDI  (% GDP) 
0.309428*** 
(0.0250) 
0.293001*** 
(0.0249) 
0.3015*** 
(0.023) 
0.283181*** 
(0.0234) 
Trade (% GDP) 
0.139688*** 
(0.0198) 
0.137412*** 
(0.0200) 
0.1334*** 
(0.019) 
0.130934*** 
(0.0188) 
Oil rents  (lag, % GDP) 
-0.11313*** 
(0.0333) 
- 
-0.128*** 
(0.032) 
- 
Oil exports (lag, % GDP) - 
-0.06157* 
(0.0356) 
- 
-0.06081* 
(0.0339) 
Hausman Test for Random 
Effects 
13.24 
[0.039] 
11.88 
[0.065] 
13.49 
[0.036] 
11.82 
[0.066] 
R
2
 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 
Note: ***, **, * denote estimation is significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. For the explanatory 
variables, the values in parentheses refer to the standard errors. The values in square brackets refer to 
the p-values of the Hausman test. 
The values of R
2 in Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Table 3.4 indicate that the fits explain 
55-57% of the variations of data about the average..  
The outcomes indicate that both oil rents and oil exports exert significant negative 
effects on domestic investment, but the effect of oil rents is highly significant (at a 
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1% significance level) on both total and domestic fixed investment in Columns 1 and 
3, while oil exports are significant at a 10% level in Columns 2 and 4.  
The table also shows that domestic investment (total and fixed) is significantly and 
positively affected by trade openness, FDI, output growth, and domestic credit 
provided to the private sector. Inflation, however, affects domestic investment 
negatively in Column1, 2, and 4, while the effect seems insignificant in Column 3.  
The Hausman test in Table 3.4 indicates that the null hypothesis of random effects is 
rejected at a 5% significance level in Columns 1 and 3 and at a 10% level in 
Columns 2 and 4 suggesting that the Fixed Effects estimator might be preferred over 
the Random Effects estimator.  
Therefore, we re-estimate the four equations employing the two-way Fixed Effects 
estimator to account for both time and country specific fixed effects, so we obtain the 
following results: 
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Table 3.5. The effect of oil and other control variables on gross domestic 
 investment using Fixed Two-Way Estimates 
Number of cross sections= 22 
Time series length= 15 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variable: Total 
investment (% GDP) 
Dependent variable: Fixed 
investment (% GDP) 
1 2 3 4 
Intercept  
9.387765*** 
(2.3335) 
8.52044*** 
(2.4411) 
9.399*** 
(2.160) 
8.330472*** 
(2.2776) 
Output growth  
0.165087*** 
(0.0468) 
0.1764*** 
(0.0478) 
0.074* 
(0.043) 
0.085136* 
(0.0446) 
Inflation 
-0.01124 
(0.0136) 
-0.04696*** 
(0.00890) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.04694*** 
(0.00830) 
Credit provided to the 
private sector (% GDP) 
0.099642*** 
(0.0272) 
0.096507*** 
(0.0277) 
0.090*** 
(0.025) 
0.086116*** 
(0.0259) 
FDI  (% GDP) 
0.296625*** 
(0.0261) 
0.276397*** 
(0.0258) 
0.291*** 
(0.024) 
0.267997*** 
(0.0241) 
Trade (% GDP) 
0.156916*** 
(0.0218) 
0.157277*** 
(0.0221) 
0.144*** 
(0.020) 
0.144837*** 
(0.0207) 
Oil rents  (lag, % GDP) 
-0.13938*** 
(0.0413) 
- 
-0.157*** 
(0.038) 
- 
Oil exports (lag, % GDP) - 
-0.06675 
(0.0437) 
- 
-0.07043* 
(0.0407) 
F Test for no fixed effects 
15.54 
[<.0001] 
15.97 
[<.0001] 
17.68 
[0.000] 
17.75 
[<.000] 
R
2
 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.86 
Note: ***, **, * denote estimation is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For the 
explanatory variables, the values in parentheses refer to the standard errors. The values in square 
brackets refer to the p-values of the F-test.  
It can be seen from Table 3.5 that the values of R
2 
increased to greater than 84% in 
the four equations using the Fixed Effects estimator, comparing to 55-57% with the 
Random Effects estimator.  
The table also reports the results of the F test designed to check the significance of 
time and country specific effects under a null hypothesis of no fixed time and cross 
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sectional effects. The test results in the four columns indicate that both time and 
cross sectional fixed effects are highly significant (at a significance level of 1%), so 
the null hypothesis of poolability is rejected the four regressions. 
With regard to the effect of oil abundance, Table 3.5 shows that the coefficients on 
oil rents in Columns 1 and 3 are negative and significant at the 1% significance level. 
Although the effect of oil exports on total domestic investment seems insignificant in 
Column 2, but it is negative and significant at the 10% significance level in Column 
4 using fixed investment as dependent variable.  
The outcomes in Table 3.5 also indicate that domestic investment (total and fixed) is 
enhanced by openness factors including trade and FDI, and by output growth and by 
credit provided to the private sector, while the effect of inflation seems to be 
significant and negative in Columns 2 and 4 and insignificant in Columns 1 and 3.  
Thus, both static panel estimators used in estimation (the Random and Fixed Effects 
estimators) report similar results for most regressors in terms of the coefficients’ 
signs and the significance of the variables, though the values of coefficients are 
slightly different using the two estimators. 
Although the results of the Hausman Test and the F test reported in Tables 3.4 and 
3.5, respectively, and the relatively high values of R
2 
in Table 3.5 indicate that the 
Fixed Effects estimator is an efficient and consistent method for estimating the static 
model of investment, the Fixed Effects estimator does not take into account that 
some regressors can be correlated with the error term, which might turn the estimator 
to be biased. 
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Previous research establishes that output growth and FDI are endogenous 
determinants of domestic investment, as was clarified in section 3-1. Furthermore, 
the values of domestic investment are probably affected by their past realizations. 
We, therefore, estimate the dynamic investment model in which the lagged 
dependent variable is added as one of the regressors using the two-step difference 
GMM estimation method. 
3.5.2. Outcomes of the dynamic specification  
In order to estimate the dynamic model we instrument the third period lagged values 
of output growth and FDI. These instruments are believed to be valid and 
informative
23
 since each of them affects the regressor for which it has been 
instrumented, but it is not correlated with the error term. For the lagged dependent 
variable which is expected to be correlated with the error term we use the 
DEPVAR
24
 option which specifies that a dependent variable be used at an 
appropriate lag as an instrument. 
In order to check the validity of the instruments employed in estimation, the GMM 
estimator generates the Sargan test under which the null hypothesis indicates that 
over-identifying restrictions are valid.   
First, we examine the effect of oil rents on domestic investment (total and fixed) in 
light of other macroeconomic determinants of domestic investment (Table 3.6), then, 
in order to check the robustness of the oil-impact we examine, in Table 3.7, the 
impact of crude oil exports on gross domestic investment (total and fixed).  
                                                          
23
 The instrumental variable should be valid (uncorrelated with the error term), and informative 
(correlated with the endogenous regressor).  
24 
DEPVAR, is an option that can be used with the INSTRUMENT statement in SAS (software).  
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To check whether the effect of oil rents on total investment is influenced by adding 
different regressors, we estimate the investment model four times. We first estimate 
the dynamic investment model by running a regression which comprises the lagged 
dependent variable, the lagged oil rents, output growth, and inflation in Column 
1/Table 3.6. Beside the lagged dependent variable, output growth, and oil rents, 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector and FDI are added to the model in 
Column 2, and inflation, liquidity, trade and FDI in Column 3, while the exchange 
rate, and domestic credit provided to the private sector are added in Column 4.  
In Columns 5-8, we re-estimate the four regressions (Columns 1-4) using domestic 
fixed investment as a dependent variable instead of total investment. Thus, the 
outcomes in Table 3.6 are obtained where - as in the previous two tables - the upper 
value in each cell refers to the coefficient of the concerned regressor, while the value 
in the parentheses is the standard error. For the tests, the upper value in each cell 
refers to the test statistic, while the lower value in the square bracket is the p-value.  
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Table 3.6. The effect of oil rents on gross domestic investment controlling for 
other explanatory variables using the GMM estimation method 
Number of cross sections= 22 
Time series length= 15 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable: Total investment Dependent variable: Fixed investment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Total 
investment 
(lag, % GDP) 
0.100*** 
(0.0144) 
0.199*** 
(0.00960) 
0.150*** 
(0.0311) 
0.037 
(0.0341) 
- - - - 
 Fixed 
investment 
(lag, % GDP) 
- - - 
 
- 
0.114*** 
(0.0213) 
0.168*** 
(0.00742) 
0.267*** 
(0.0508) 
0.086* 
(0.0513) 
 GDP growth 
0.094*** 
(0.0111) 
0.088*** 
(0.0141) 
0.047*** 
(0.0171) 
0.148*** 
(0.0208) 
0.048*** 
(0.00172) 
0.092*** 
(0.0152) 
-0.031 
(0.0216) 
0.109*** 
(0.0390) 
 Inflation 
-0.026*** 
(0.00176) 
- 
0.003 
(0.0151) 
- 
-0.043*** 
(0.00407) 
- 
-0.028* 
(0.0164) 
- 
 Exchange 
rate 
- - - 
0.052*** 
(0.0161) 
- - - 
0.060*** 
(0.00888) 
 Credit by 
banking  
(%GDP) 
 
0.029** 
(0.0129) 
- - - 
0.135*** 
(0.0164) 
- - 
 Credit to 
private sector 
(%GDP) 
- - - 
0.152*** 
(0.0490) 
- - - 
0.311*** 
(0.0457) 
 Liquidity 
(%GDP) 
- - 
0.150*** 
(0.0541) 
- - - 
0.091 
(0.0588) 
- 
 FDI (%GDP) - 
0.3858*** 
(0.00435) 
0.271*** 
(0.0716) 
0.272*** 
(0.0158) 
- 
0.380*** 
(0.0143) 
0.326*** 
(0.0491) 
0.321*** 
(0.0266) 
 Trade 
(%GDP) 
- - 
0.252*** 
(0.0499) 
0.220*** 
(0.0235) 
- - 
0.125** 
(0.0551) 
0.117*** 
(0.0329) 
 Oil rents 
(%GDP, 
lagged) 
-0.239*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.084*** 
(0.00726) 
-0.166*** 
(0.0180) 
-0.140*** 
(0.0147) 
-0.280*** 
(0.0152) 
-0.076*** 
(0.0141) 
-0.131*** 
(0.0203) 
-0.124*** 
(0.0262) 
 Test for 1st  
order serial 
correlation 
-0.95 
[0.8281] 
-1.42 
[0.9227] 
-1.63 
[0.9481] 
-1.83 
[0.9663] 
-0.93 
[0.8234] 
-1.25 
[0.8943] 
-1.47 
[0.9287] 
-1.75 
[0.9604] 
 Test for 2nd  
order serial 
correlation 
0.21 
[0.4179] 
-0.73 
[0.7663] 
-0.95 
[0.8295] 
-2.61 
[0.9954] 
0.09 
[0.4654] 
-0.72 
[0.7644] 
0.19 
[0.4259] 
-1.63 
[0.9482] 
 Sargan Test 
20.43 
[0.4941] 
21.60 
[0.9362] 
20.20 
[0.9315] 
18.67 
[0.9602] 
19.66 
[0.5428] 
20.27 
[0.9596] 
12.56 
[0.9987] 
12.41 
[0.9988] 
Note: ***, **, * denote estimation is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For the 
explanatory variables, the values in parentheses refer to the standard errors. The values in square 
brackets refer to the p-values of the tests. Regressions 1-4 were estimated using the Arellano–Bond 
two-step first-difference GMM estimator. 
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Estimation outcomes in Table 3.6 indicate that the null hypothesis of the Arellano-
Bond test of no first and second order serial correlation in the residuals cannot be 
rejected in the four columns since all p-values of the test are greater than a 1% 
significance level. The table also reports the results of the Sargan test suggesting that 
the null hypothesis of the test cannot be rejected in all the columns (1-8), so the 
instrumental variables used in estimations are valid.  
Concerning the significance of the regressors in estimation, the outcomes in Table 
3.6 indicate that domestic investment depends on its past realizations. Although the 
coefficient of lagged total investment is insignificant in Column 4, estimating the 
same equation using fixed investment as a dependent variable, in Column 8, shows 
that fixed investment is affected positively and significantly by its past values.  
Similar to what was found in the static specification, the coefficients of lagged oil 
rents in Columns 1-8/ Table 3.6 are negative and significant at a 1% significance 
level. Thus, oil rents exert an adverse effect on domestic investment (total and fixed), 
and supplementing the investment model with the exchange rate, and different 
financial and openness indicators, does not change the negative influence of oil rents.  
Furthermore, the table shows that domestic investment is augmented by output 
growth, FDI, trade openness, domestic credit provided by banking, and domestic 
credit provided to the private sector. In contrast, inflation has a negative effect on 
domestic investment, so an increase in the inflation rate is associated with less 
domestic investment. The impact of the exchange rate is significant and positive 
indicating that the exchange rate appreciation affects domestic investment 
negatively. Such consequence is expected in oil-exporting economies prone to 
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domestic currency appreciation, resulting in an adverse impact on the manufacturing 
sector since the sector becomes less competitive.  
Thus, explanatory variables used in Table 3.6 in the eight equations (Column 1-8) are 
significant determinants of domestic investment in oil-exporting countries. Although 
the effects of output growth and liquidity on fixed investment are insignificant in 
Column 7, their effects are positive and highly significant on total investment in 
Column 3. Likewise, the coefficient of inflation in Column 3 is insignificant, but it is 
negative and significant in Column 7. 
In order to check the robustness of the negative oil effect on domestic investment, we 
re-estimate the previous eight equations, but using crude oil-exports instead of oil-
rents and the results are reported in Table 3.7. 
In Columns 1 and 5 / Table 3.7 the lagged dependent variable, the lagged crude oil-
exports, output growth, and inflation are included. Other regressors are included in 
the remaining columns to examine how different specifications might alter the effect 
of crude oil-exports.  
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Table 3.7. The effect of oil exports on gross domestic investment controlling for 
other explanatory variables using the GMM estimation method 
Number of cross sections= 22 
Time series length= 15 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable: Total investment Dependent variable: Fixed investment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Total 
investment 
(lag, % GDP) 
0.092*** 
(0.0159) 
0.154*** 
(0.0160) 
0.152*** 
(0.0394) 
0.152*** 
(0.0551) 
- - - - 
 Fixed 
investment 
(lag, % GDP) 
- - - - 
0.090*** 
(0.0112) 
0.111*** 
(0.0176) 
0.264*** 
(0.0762) 
0.011 
(0.0559) 
 GDP growth 
0.180*** 
(0.0193) 
0.155*** 
(0.0141) 
0.088*** 
(0.0194) 
0.143*** 
(0.0194) 
0.131*** 
(0.0102) 
0.132*** 
(0.0222) 
-0.003 
(0.0296) 
0.194*** 
(0.0329) 
 Inflation 
-0.043*** 
(0.00384) 
 
- 
-0.024*** 
(0.00353) 
- 
-0.060*** 
(0.00200) 
 
-0.032*** 
(0.00672) 
 
 Exchange rate - - - 
0.143 
(0.0194) 
- - - 
0.027*** 
(0.00617) 
 Credit by 
banking  
(%GDP) 
- 
0.1074*** 
(0.0138) 
- - - 
0.202*** 
(0.0142) 
- - 
 Credit to 
private sector 
(%GDP) 
- - - 
0.138*** 
(0.0523) 
- - - 
0.230*** 
(0.0497) 
 Liquidity 
(%GDP) 
- - 
0.131*** 
(0.0407) 
- - - 
0.198*** 
(0.0449) 
- 
 FDI (%GDP) - 
0.359*** 
(0.00714) 
0.291*** 
(0.0313) 
0.258*** 
(0.0223) 
- 
0.362*** 
(0.0181) 
0.242*** 
(0.0193) 
0.248*** 
(0.0268) 
 Trade 
(%GDP) 
- - 
0.194*** 
(0.0273) 
0.158*** 
(0.0314) 
- - 
0.256*** 
(0.0195) 
0.166*** 
(0.0189) 
 Oil exports 
(%GDP, 
lagged) 
-0.208*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.077*** 
(0.00989) 
-0.091*** 
(0.0272) 
-0.080*** 
(0.0283) 
-0.222*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.082*** 
(0.0231) 
-0.061* 
(0.0327) 
-0.151*** 
(0.0400) 
 Test for 1st  
order serial 
correlation 
-0.95 
[0.8301]  
-1.30 
[0.9037] 
-1.44 
[0.9253] 
-1.35 
[0.9111] 
-0.93 
[0.8239] 
-1.15 
[0.8744] 
-1.20 
[0.8854] 
-1.49 
[0.9322] 
 Test for 2nd  
order serial 
correlation 
0.64 
[0.2606] 
-0.42 
[0.6631] 
-0.21 
[0.5837] 
-0.16 
[0.5650] 
0.68 
[0.2484] 
-0.41 
[0.6584] 
0.69 
[0.2455] 
-0.37 
[0.6444] 
 Sargan Test 
20.98 
[0.4600] 
20.25 
[0.9598] 
14.12 
[0.9960] 
19.45 
[0.9470] 
19.05 
[0.5819] 
18.81 
[0.9774] 
18.29 
[0.9658] 
17.47 
[0.9758] 
Note: ***, **, * denote estimation is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For the 
explanatory variables, the values in parentheses refer to the standard errors. The values in square 
brackets refer to the p-values of the tests. Regressions 1-4 were estimated using the Arellano–Bond 
two-step first-difference GMM estimator.  
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The results of the Arellano-bond test in Table 3.7 suggest that the null hypothesis of 
no first and second order serial correlation in the residuals cannot be rejected in the 
four specifications. Also, the results of the Sargan Test indicate that the null 
hypothesis that over identifying restrictions is valid cannot be rejected in the eight 
columns suggesting the validity of the instruments employed in estimation.   
Similar to what was found with oil-rents, oil-exports exert an adverse effect on 
domestic investment in the countries included in our sample, and estimating the 
model including different determinants of domestic investment does not change the 
negative impact of oil-exports on domestic investment.  
The outcomes in Tables 3.7 indicate also that domestic investment is affected 
significantly and positively by its past values, suggesting that domestic investment is 
better specified by a dynamic model.  
In line with the previous literature, and similar to what was found in the static 
specifications (Tables 3.4, and 3.5) and in the dynamic specification including oil-
rents (Table 3.6) the outcomes suggest that domestic investment is augmented by 
output growth, and financial factors - domestic credit to the private sector, liquidity, 
and domestic credit by banking. It is also enhanced by FDI and trade openness. 
However, inflation has a negative impact on domestic investment, and exchange rate 
appreciation is accompanied by less investment.  
Overall, oil abundance appears to affect gross domestic investment adversely in oil-
exporting non-OECD countries. Although some researchers, such as Yang and Lam 
(2008), and Berument et al. (2010), showed a positive impact of the oil boom on 
economic activities in oil-exporting developing economies, our results with both the 
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static and the dynamic specifications of the investment model, and with the two 
variables used as measurements for oil abundance (oil rents, and oil exports) are 
consistent with the oil curse literature indicating that these countries fail in 
channeling oil proceeds into economic growth via capital accumulation. 
This suggests poor performance by governments with regard to resource 
management, and formulating rational economic and financial policies necessary to 
direct oil proceeds towards acquiring capital assets needed for production, and 
constructing feasible infrastructure projects that will improve domestic investment 
environment and create, thereby, a mechanism to promote sustained economic 
growth in these countries. Furthermore, oil companies, including state oil companies, 
should provide information about their operation to help in tackling corruption and 
improving accountability.  
Concerning the implications with regard to other macroeconomic variables included 
in our estimation equation on gross domestic investment, our results confirm the 
positive effect of output growth on domestic investment, which is consistent with 
both the neoclassical investment theory, and the empirical findings of many studies 
(e.g. Mileva, 2008; Fielding, 1997; Greene and Villanueva, 1991) since an increase 
in output growth represents an increase of the demand for produced goods and 
services which in turn stimulates investment to meet the required products.   
Furthermore, our findings indicate that FDI affects domestic investment positively in 
these countries, so FDI might stimulate new downstream or upstream investments 
that would not have taken place in their absence through externalities and spillovers 
of technology and management, improving the domestic investment environment, 
and creating channels for marketing products internationally. Thus, contrary to the 
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scholars who have argued that FDI crowds out domestic investment, our results are 
consistent with the findings of a number of studies which show that FDI 
complements domestic investment in host economies (Tang et al., 2008; Mileva, 
2008; Luca and Spatafora, 2012; Bosworth and Collins, 1999). 
The outcomes, also, indicate that domestic investment is positively influenced by 
trade openness, which is consistent with the findings of a number of studies 
(Wacziarg, 2001; Bond and Malik, 2009; Salahuddin and Islam, 2008; Harrison, 
1996; Levine and Renelt, 1992). Thus, trade might stimulate domestic investment by 
providing access to international markets to obtain capital goods necessary for 
production, and encourage competition in domestic and worldwide markets. 
Furthermore, consistent with the results of several studies (see, for example, Bond 
and Malik, 2009; Ndikumana, 2000) our results show that inflation affects domestic 
investment adversely since it increases the risks associated with investment planning 
which in turn discourage fixed investment spending. 
With regard to the exchange rate, the outcomes show that the coefficient of the 
exchange rate is positive and significant. This result agree with the oil-curse 
literature suggesting that the negative impact of oil abundance might be channeled 
into domestic investment in oil-rich developing economies via exchange rate 
appreciation affecting the manufacturing sector adversely since domestic products 
become more expensive in the foreign markets.      
Thus, the adverse oil effect on domestic investment is revealed directly through the 
negative impact of oil rents or oil exports, and indirectly via exchange rate 
appreciation which might be caused by increasing oil revenues (the Dutch disease).   
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3.6. Conclusions  
A wide literature has addressed investment-related aspects ranging from examining 
the determinants of domestic investment, to focusing on the relationship between 
domestic investment and capital controls, the financial system, institutional quality, 
and political stability. There is, also, a large literature on the effect of resource 
abundance on economic growth. However, limited attention has been paid to the 
association between domestic investment and natural resources in developing 
countries which suffer from underinvestment and poor provision of infrastructure. 
Therefore, this chapter pays attention to the impact of oil abundance on domestic 
investment in a group of oil-exporting developing economies (non-OECD countries) 
over 15 years (1996-2010) using static and dynamic specifications in which we 
included a proxy for oil abundance (oil rents, and oil exports) as an explanatory 
variable in addition to several other determinants of domestic investment in line with 
what has been established in the literature, including output growth, inflation, 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector, domestic credit provided to the 
private sector, liquidity, the exchange rate, FDI, and trade openness.  
In the static specification of the model, the Random and the Fixed Effects estimators 
were employed. Past realizations of domestic investment are expected to be a 
significant determinant of investment, but are likely to be to be correlated with the 
error term which static estimators do not take into account; the investment model was 
therefore re-estimated with dynamic specification by employing the Arellano-Bond 
difference GMM estimator. 
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In accordance with the resource curse literature, estimation results with both the 
static and the dynamic specifications indicate that gross domestic investment is 
affected adversely by oil abundance in the countries included in our sample. This 
suggests that improving resource management practices, institutional quality, and 
government accountability would better channel oil proceeds towards infrastructure 
and capital investment projects which would drive sustained economic growth in oil-
rich developing economies.  
The findings also show, similar to what was established by previous studies, that 
domestic investment in these countries is augmented by output growth, financial 
development, FDI and trade openness, but it is adversely affected by inflation. 
Furthermore, exchange rate appreciation, which might result from increasing oil 
revenues, affects domestic investment negatively.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OIL AND INVESTMENT IN OIL-IMPORTING 
OECD COUNTRIES 
4.1. Introduction 
Energy price fluctuations could be a source of instability in the global economy. The 
importance of energy costs to economic growth has motivated numerous researchers 
to document the implications of energy price changes on the economies of developed 
and developing countries.  
Crude oil is one of the most important natural sources of energy as its components 
are used for manufacturing, electric power generation, and fuelling vehicles and 
airplanes. Hence, changes in the price of crude oil may affect economies of both oil-
importing and exporting nations. While higher crude oil prices entail additional 
revenues for oil-exporting economies, they involve higher costs to oil-importing 
countries since oil price increases drive the prices of refined petroleum products, 
such as gasoline, heating oil, kerosene, and asphalt, upwards.  
Many studies have examined the impact of the oil price fluctuations on output 
growth using time series or panel data analysis. The results, however, are sensitive to 
the sample size, the model specification, and the employed methodology, but the 
conclusion upon which it has been agreed suggests that the impacts of oil price 
increases are more important than that of oil price decreases (Ashley and Tsang, 
2013).  
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Theoretical work suggests that oil market disturbances could affect adversely the 
macroeconomy not only because increases in the level of the oil price, but also 
because they result in raising oil price volatility (Ferderer, 1996). Thus, some 
researchers have documented the effects of oil price uncertainty on firm level 
investment. The results, however, are not conclusive. Early studies, within the 
framework of classical theory, pointed out that entrepreneurs could snatch 
investment opportunities in conditions of uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Other studies, 
such as Hartman (1972), Abel (1983), and Abel & Blanchard (1986) also showed 
that higher levels of uncertainty would boost the expected profit margin of capital 
and therefore increase investment. However, models specified by other researchers 
showed that large oil price changes involve uncertainty about future prices, which 
cause delays in business investments (see Pindyck, 1991).  
This study contributes to this literature by investigating the impact of oil price 
changes and oil price volatility on fixed investment, but from the macro level, an 
approach which has been ignored in the existing literature. We applied our study on a 
panel of 12 OECD oil-importing economies over the period 1970-2012 within the 
framework of the neoclassical production function by employing different 
econometric techniques (the Fixed and the Random Effects estimators, and the 
Generalized Method of Moments estimator). First, the investment model was 
estimated using differenced variables to examine the impact of oil price changes and 
oil price volatility on investment. Then, the panel unit root test and the panel 
cointegration tests were implemented. Finally, the long and short run effect of oil 
price was examined by estimating the Error Correction Model.  
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The chapter is organized as follows. The first section reviews literature related to the 
effect of oil prices on both macroeconomic activities and firm level investment. The 
second section specifies the investment model within the framework of the 
production function, and throws light on the study sample and data sources, and 
provides definitions of the study variables. The third section views the employed 
methodology used to examine the effect of the oil price on fixed investment 
including the panel unit root test, the panel cointegration test, the Error Correction 
Model. The fourth section provides conclusions about the estimation outcomes of the 
study. 
4.2. Literature review 
4.2.1. Oil prices and macro level economic activities 
A large body of literature has examined the macroeconomic effects of oil price 
fluctuations on oil-exporting and oil-importing economies. Many studies focussed on 
implications of oil price changes on US output growth, and several studies examined 
the interaction between oil price changes and macroeconomic and financial variables 
including output, unemployment, inflation, and share prices in different countries.    
In this context, Hamilton (1983) observed that all but one of the recessions in the 
United States between the end of the Second World War and 1973 were preceded by 
a dramatic rise in oil prices. His analysis showed that oil prices Granger-caused 
aggregate output. Hamilton (1988) provided a theoretical framework on the 
asymmetric relationship between oil prices and output. According to him, increasing 
the growth rate of oil prices reduces the durable consumption growth since 
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consumers postpone their purchases, but dropping oil prices is not necessarily 
associated with rising consumption growth.  
More recent empirical studies have shown that oil price changes have asymmetric 
effects on the macroeconomy. Mork (1989), for example, found that oil price 
increases had a significant negative impact on the growth of the Gross National 
Products in the US economy, but oil price decreases did not drive economic growth 
upwards. Furthermore, Mork et al., (1994) show that this asymmetry also exists in 
most other OECD countries.  
Hooker (1996) showed that lagged oil price changes do not explain current output 
growth after 1973. According to him, the 1973 oil price shock had a large and 
significant impact on the macro economy, while that of 1979 was significant but 
incomplete in explaining the dynamics of the recession over 1980-82. Analysis of the 
late 1980s indicates that the oil price-macroeconomy relationship has changed in a 
way not well represented by a simple price increase/price decrease asymmetry.  
The empirical findings of Ferderer (1996) showed oil price volatility helps to 
forecast the aggregate output movements in the US economy, and part of the 
asymmetric relationship between oil price changes and output growth can be 
explained by the response of the economy to oil price volatility. The interaction of oil 
price volatility and oil price changes may create offsetting effects. If negative oil 
price changes affect oil price volatility positively, and where oil price volatility has 
an adverse effect on the economy, the effects might be offsetting and thus create an 
asymmetric response to oil price changes.  
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Ashley and Tsang (2013) considered the persistence of changes in oil prices. They 
used quarterly data from 1976 – 2007 on each of six developed countries. They argue 
that the output growth rate responds differently to a temporary change in the growth 
rate of oil than to a relatively more persistent one. They found that changes in the 
growth rate of oil prices which persist for more than four years have a large and 
statistically significant impact on future output growth, whereas changes lasting more 
than one year but less than four years do not seem to affect output growth 
significantly. However, ‘temporary’ fluctuations in the oil price growth rate - 
persisting for only a year or less - have a statistically significant impact on output 
growth for most of these countries. 
Kilian (2009) used a structural VAR model to distinguish oil price movements that 
are induced by structural demand or supply shocks, arguing that these two shocks 
have different effects on income growth. Accordingly, during periods when the two 
types of shocks are present, it is problematic to treat oil price changes as exogenous 
and only consider one-directional causality from oil price to income. 
Kilian’s (2009) approach has been employed by several studies showing how oil 
price shocks influence stock markets and real economic activities. Thus, it has been 
shown that considering the origin of oil price shocks is important since different 
shocks in the oil market have diverse impacts on real economic activities and stock 
market returns (see, Kilian and Park, 2009; Apergis and Miller, 2009; Yoshizaki and 
Hamori, 2013). 
According to Blanchard and Gali (2009) large increases in the price of oil were 
associated with sharp decreases in output and large increases in inflation. In the 
2000s, even larger increases in the price of oil were associated with much milder 
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movements in output and inflation. Blanchard and Gali (2009) argued that this 
reflects a change in the causal relation from the price of oil to output and inflation. 
They then argued that this change could be due to a combination of three factors: a 
smaller share of oil in production and consumption, lower real wage rigidity, and 
better monetary policy. Their argument, based on simulations of a simple new-
Keynesian model, was informal. Thus by using a structural VAR approach and 
estimating impulse response functions for the United States, both for the pre-1984 
and the post-1984 periods, they concluded that the post-1984 effects of the price of 
oil on either output or the price level were almost equal to one-third of those for the 
pre-1984 period. 
Ghalayini (2011) investigated the relationship between the oil price changes and 
economic growth in both oil-exporting and oil-importing economies. For oil-
exporting countries, the outcomes show that oil price increases did not enhance 
economic growth since the inflows of oil returns after oil price increases find their 
way outside these countries, suggesting the need to develop institutions capable to 
drive oil returns towards profitable economic projects. For oil-importing countries, 
Ghalayini showed that oil price increases have a negative impact on output because 
of the negative effects on producers and consumers demand.  
Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) examined short-run and long-run interactions between 
oil prices and various macroeconomic and financial variables (output, the consumer 
price index, household consumption, the unemployment rate and share prices) for 
oil-exporting countries and oil-importing countries. Their results indicate that the 
causality runs from oil prices to the considered macroeconomic variables in the short 
run, especially for share prices. An oil price increase leads to a reduction of profits of 
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non-oil exporting firms leading to a decrease in share prices. Over the long run, the 
causality runs from oil prices to output and the other macroeconomic variables. 
Various other studies have examined the impact of oil price uncertainty. Jo (2012) 
looked at the effect of oil price uncertainty on global real economic activity using a 
VAR model with time-varying stochastic volatilely in mean. His findings indicate 
that oil price uncertainty affect industrial production adversely. Contrary to the 
earlier studies, high oil price uncertainty can reduce industrial production, 
independent of actual price level changes. Aizenman and Marion (1993) examined 
the relation between policy uncertainty and real per capita output in a group of 
developing countries over the period 1970-1985. Their results indicate that 
uncertainty could have a negative effect on economic growth via reduced investment. 
Elder and Serletis (2010) and Bredin et al. (2011), measured the effect of oil price 
uncertainty on economic activity for the United States and G-7 countries and found 
that an increase in oil price uncertainty decreases real economic activity, measured 
by output, investment, and consumption in the US and four G-7 countries. Their 
results indicate that the price surge has been rather steady and continuous, keeping 
oil price uncertainty at a very low level. Thus, the overall change in the price of oil 
was less disruptive than previous oil price disturbances and did not drive an 
immediate economic recession.   
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4.2.2. Oil prices and firm level investment 
Uncertainty which might result from economic or political shocks can affect the 
price of oil and therefore output growth and capital investment. Therefore, the 
relationship between firm level investment and uncertainty has been widely 
addressed in the literature. The results, however, are not conclusive; some 
researchers have argued that uncertainty would enhance investment, but others 
showed that investment is influenced adversely by uncertainty.  
The classical theory of Knight (1921) suggests that under uncertainty entrepreneurs 
have the ability to seize investment opportunities and make profits. Economic 
models developed by Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) suggest that a higher level of 
uncertainty would boost the expected profit margin of capital and therefore increase 
investment. Abel and Blanchard (1986) provided empirical evidence for this 
proposition.  
However, other researchers argue that investments drop with an increasing level of 
uncertainty. Kellogg (2010), for example, examined the responsiveness of 
investment decisions by firms to changes in uncertainty using Texas oil well drilling 
data and expectations of future oil price volatility. His findings indicate that firms 
decrease their drilling activity with rising the expected volatility. Similarly, several 
recent studies (Baker et al., 2013; Gulen and Ion, 2013; Julio and Yook, 2012) 
showed that uncertainty results in reduced corporate investment during the global 
financial crisis.      
Edo (2013) investigated the impact of oil booms on the manufacturing sector of 
Nigeria over the period 1970–2009 employing a vector autoregression model to show 
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the relationship between three sectors: the resource, manufacturing and the service 
sectors. His results suggest that oil booms led to significant stagnation in the 
manufacturing sector and a marginal decline in the service sector.  
Wang et al. (2014) examined the relationship between economic policy uncertainty 
and corporate investment at the firm level in China using a panel of Chinese publicly 
listed firms from 2003-2012. They found that uncertainty affects corporate 
investment in China in a different way. Policy-related economic uncertainty might 
reduce corporate investment, and firms with heterogeneous characteristics were 
found to respond differently towards policy uncertainty. Firms which enjoy a higher 
return on invested capital rely more on internal finance and are non-state-owned, are 
better positioned to mitigate the negative impact of uncertainty on corporate 
investments.  
Real options arguments also reached the same conclusion due to the irreversible 
nature of investment projects. That is, investors compare the expected profit from 
current and future investment, so the higher the degree of uncertainty, the higher is 
the value on the option of waiting. As a result, investors tend to reduce current the 
investment spending (see Caballero and Pindyck, 1996; Leahy and Whited, 1996; 
Bond and Cummins, 2004).    
Having reviewed the literature on the impact of oil prices on macroeconomic 
activities and firm level investment, in the next section we give some background on 
the pricing of crude oil and throw light on major oil disturbances since the 1970s.   
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4.3. Overview on oil shocks since the 1970s 
4.3.1. Pricing crude oils 
Although economic activities rely on different sources of energy, including oil, 
natural gas, coal, renewable energy sources, and nuclear power, oil remains the 
world’s dominant fuel (BP, 2014). Besides, the price of crude oil is the most 
significant factor that determines the prices of petroleum products; the price of 
gasoline, for example, is largely determined by the worldwide demand and supply of 
crude oil (Levine et al., 2014). 
Crude oil, as was defined by EIA (US Energy Information Administration)
25
, is a 
mixture of hydrocarbons
26
 that exists as a liquid in natural underground reservoirs 
and remains a liquid when brought to the surface. Crude oil is refined to produce 
various petroleum products, such as heating oils; gasoline, diesel, jet fuels; asphalt 
and many other products used for their energy or chemical content.  
Energy-intensive industries, such as food, bulk chemicals, glass, cement, iron and 
steel, and aluminum, use the largest amount of energy per unit of output, and thus are 
particularly sensitive to energy prices. Thus, analysis of the industrial sector shows 
links between energy prices and industrial production, with production declining 
when energy prices increase (EIA, 2014a). 
Oil prices, however, do not only affect industrial production, but also other sectors in 
the economy (for example, transportation, residential and commercial consumption, 
                                                          
25
 See EIA Energy Glossary. 
26
 A hydrocarbon is any organic chemical compound of hydrogen and carbon in the gaseous, liquid, or 
solid phase. The molecular structure of hydrocarbon compounds varies from the simplest (methane, a 
constituent of natural gas) to the very heavy and very complex (Levine et al., 2014). 
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and electric power generation). Furthermore, the price of oil is among the factors 
affecting the price of natural gas (EIA, 2014a). Hence, changes in the price of oil 
could have direct and indirect implications on the economy. 
Price differences between crude oils based on quality characteristics of the crude oil - 
i.e, the lightness of the crude oil measured in degrees of API
27
, and the percentage of 
sulphur content by weight. Lighter crudes produce a larger number of lighter 
products, such as gasoline, with a higher resale value. When other qualities are equal, 
lighter crudes are expected to be sold at a premium over heavier crudes. A high 
sulphur content affects adversely the value of the crude since it is entails higher 
operating costs for refineries, owing to special processing and maintenance 
requirements. Furthermore, new legislation in many countries mandates lower 
sulphur content for gasoline and diesel. Therefore, a high-sulfur crude (Sour crude) is 
expected to sell at a discount comparing to a low-sulfur (sweet crude) of the same 
API. Another key property is acidity measured by the total acid number (TAN), 
where above certain limit acidity has a corrosive impact on refineries, but blending a 
low TAN with a high TAN would deal with this problem, though it increases the 
related logistical costs. Crudes with a high TAN, are likely to command a discount 
(Bacon and Tordo, 2004). 
There are several benchmark crude oils with different quality characteristics - also 
known as “marker crude oils” - used as references for pricing oils (Levine et al., 
2014). Two of the most important benchmarks are West Texas Intermediate and 
Brent crude oil. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) consists of a blend of several US 
                                                          
27
 API indicates the American Petroleum Institute's scale for measuring the specific gravity of crude 
oil or condensate; the higher the API gravity, the lighter the petroleum (Levine et.al, 2014). 
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domestic streams
28
 of light sweet crude oil traded in the domestic spot market at 
Cushing, Oklahoma, a transshipment point with many pipelines, storage facilities and 
easy access to refiners and suppliers (CME group, 2013). Brent crude is a light sweet 
crude stream, though not as light and sweet as WTI, produced in the North Sea 
region, and it is typically refined in Northwest Europe. Brent crude price is 
considered as a reference or "marker" for pricing a number of other crude streams 
(EIA). 
Prices of Brent and WTI crude oil tracked closely before 2011, with Brent crude oil 
priced at a slight discount to WTI crude oil due to the quality characteristics and 
delivery costs to transport Brent crude oil into the US market. However, in early 
2011, WTI crude oil was priced at a discount to Brent crude oil, attributed, according 
to EIA, to the increased production of US light sweet crude oil, beside the limited 
pipeline capacity to move the crude from production fields and storage locations to 
refining centers. More recently, expansions in US crude oil infrastructure have 
reduced the downward pressure on the price of WTI making it possible to transport 
barrels from production areas, such as Texas and North Dakota, to refinery centers 
without passing through the hub (EIA, 2013). 
 
                                                          
28
 Crude oil stream: Crude oil produced in a particular field or a collection of crude oils with similar 
qualities from fields in close proximity, which the petroleum industry usually describes with a specific 
name, such as West Texas Intermediate or Saudi Light (EIA Energy Glossary). 
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Other well-known crude prices include OPEC Basket (a weighted average of prices 
for petroleum blends produced by OPEC
29
 countries), Dubai crude, and Urals crude 
(a reference for pricing the Russian oil).    
Crude oil can be traded in spot market or future markets. A spot market is more 
likely to develop at a location with many pipeline interconnections allowing for a 
large number of buyers and sellers. Crude oil and petroleum products are traded in 
the spot market for immediate or very near-term delivery - generally within or less 
than 30 days. Cushing Oklahoma is one important spot market for crude oil - 
specifically the WTI benchmark. Crude oil can be also traded via futures contracts. 
A futures contract is a binding, legal agreement between a buyer and a seller for 
delivery of a particular quantity of a commodity at a specified time, place, and price. 
These contracts are traded on regulated exchanges and are settled daily based on their 
current value in the marketplace. Many oil contracts traded on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and other exchanges end without actual physical 
delivery of the commodity (Levine, et.al, 2014). 
4.3.2. Oil shocks since the 1970s 
Crude oil is viewed as an essential input to the production function, but being a 
scarce commodity and a non-renewable source of energy makes its price prone to 
fluctuation as a response to political, economic, and financial turmoil. It can be seen 
                                                          
29
 OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries):  An intergovernmental organization 
whose stated objective is to "coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of member countries." It was 
created at the Baghdad Conference on September 10-14, 1960. Current members (with years of 
membership) include: Algeria (1969-present), Angola (2007-present), Ecuador (1973-1992 and 2007-
present), Iran (1960-present), Iraq (1960-present), Kuwait (1960-present), Libya (1962-present), 
Nigeria (1971-present), Qatar (1961-present), Saudi Arabia (1960-present), United Arab Emirates 
(1967-present), and Venezuela (1960-present). Countries no longer members of OPEC include: Gabon 
(1975-1994), and Indonesia (1962-2008) (IEA). 
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from Figures 4.1 and 4.2 how dramatic events took place in history from 1970 to 
2012 resulted in sharp changes in the price of oil and thus on economic activities.   
Figure 4.1. Crude oil spot prices 
 
Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 - Historical data workbook. 
1970-1983 The price of Arabian Light posted at Ras Tanura
30
 
1984-2012 The price of Brent crude 
 
                                                          
30
 Ras Tanura is a city in Saudi Arabia serves as a major oil port, and oil operations center for Saudi 
Aramco (the Arabian-American oil company). 
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Figure 4.2. Growth rates of global crude oil supply and demand                
between 1970 and 2012 
 
Source of oil demand and supply is BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 - Historical data 
workbook. Growth rates are computed by the researcher.  
Total World oil production: Includes crude oil, tight oil, oil sands and NGLs (the liquid content of 
natural gas where this is recovered separately). Excludes liquid fuels from other sources such as 
biomass and derivatives of coal and natural gas. 
Total World oil consumption: Inland demand plus international aviation and marine bunkers and 
refinery fuel and loss. Consumption of biogasoline (such as ethanol), biodiesel and derivatives of 
coal and natural gas are also included. 
During 1973-1974 the price of crude oil increased due to the Arab embargo more 
than four times (from $2.5/barrel in 1972 to about $12/barrel in 1974), with a 
negative average growth rate (-2.25%) of crude oil production between 1973 and 
1975.  
The Iranian revolution in 1979-1980 also resulted in reducing oil production by 4.8 
million barrel/day (7% of global production at the time) (Hamilton, 2011), where the 
growth rate of oil production was negative (-5%). Although Iranian production had 
returned to about half of its pre-revolutionary levels later in 1979, it fell again due to 
Iraqi-Iranian war in September 1980. Consequently, the price of oil increased from 
$14/barrel in 1978 to $37/barrel in 1980. 
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However, the price of oil dropped sharply from $28/barrel in 1985 to $14.4/barrel in 
1986 following the netback pricing
31
 adopted by Saudi Arabia (see Mabro, 1987). 
Also, in 1997-1998 the oil price witnessed another collapse where it dropped from 
$20.6/barrel in 1996 to $12.7/barrel by the end of 1998 due to the Asian crisis, which 
resulted in major financial and economic implications in a number of Asian 
countries. The Asian crisis did not continue for long time but back to grow soon. 
Thus, petroleum consumption returned to strong growth during 1999-2000, and the 
price of oil increased to $28.5/barrel in 2000.   
Over December 2002 and January 2003, the Venezuelan unrest resulted in reducing 
Venezuela’s oil production by around 2.1 million barrel/day due to the strike took 
place that time (Hamilton, 2011); the oil price thus increased from $24/barrel in 2001 
to $29/barrel in 2003.  
During 2007-2008, the demand for oil increased dramatically as the global economy 
witnessed a noticeable growth. Hence, the price of oil went upward from $65 in 2006 
to $97/barrel in 2008.  
The Arab Spring over 2010-2011 affected the oil price as it increased from 
$62/barrel in 2009 to about $111/barrel in 2011, marking the first time the global 
benchmark averaged more than $100 per barrel for a year (EIA, 2012).  
Having highlighted the oil-related disturbances since the 1970s, in the next section, 
we examine the effect of oil price changes on domestic fixed investment. We view 
                                                          
31 The netback price of a barrel of crude is “the gross product worth of the refined products at the 
refinery gate, minus the costs incurred in transporting the barrel from export terminal (or the oilfield 
in the case of domestic crude) to the refinery, and minus refining costs; the gross product worth is the 
sum of product prices weighted by refining yield” (Mabro, 1987, p. 6). 
 
134 
the investment model, define the variables, present the methodology and then find 
estimation results.  
4.4. Model specification and data 
4.4.1. The investment model 
Investment behaviour has been analysed in the literature using different approaches 
such as the Keynesian model, the cash flow model, and the neoclassical model (the 
Jorgenson model). In this study investment behaviour is modelled within the 
framework of the neoclassical approach according to which a firm produces output 𝑄 
with capital stock 𝐾 and labour, and energy consumption 𝐸𝐶. 
Before proceeding to the empirical specification of domestic investment, we 
highlight the theoretical relation between output and investment and therefore the 
justification of including energy prices which affect output, as was viewed by 
theories of energy economics. In this specification, the production function is 
aggregated over all firms to obtain macroeconomic variables.   
Let Kt be the aggregate capital stock at the end of period t which can be expressed as 
Kt = (1 − δ)Kt−1 + It where Kt−1 is the capital stock at the end of the previous 
period, δ is the rate of depreciation, and It is gross investment. δKt−1 is replacement 
investment. Net investment (Kt − Kt−1) equals to total investment minus 
replacement investment (It − δKt−1). Theories of investment behaviour view the 
demand for new investment, such as a plant and equipment, as the gap between the 
desired or optimal amount of capital (Kt
∗) and the actual amount of capital. Hence, 
gross investment can be written as follows: It = θt(Kt
∗ − Kt−1) + δKt−1 where θt is 
the speed of adjustment between Kt
∗ and Kt−1 (see Lensink et al., 2001).  
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Investment is viewed as a function of output (Y), and the user cost of capital (u). But 
since energy consumption and therefore energy prices (EP) affect output and thus 
capital stock, energy prices are expected to influence investment. When energy 
prices go upwards this increases production cost and might affect consumption 
adversely which in turn reduces the demand for produced goods and services in the 
economy.  Hence, the investment model can be written as follows: 
𝐼 = 𝑓(𝑌, 𝐸𝑃, 𝑢)                                                                                                       (4.1) 
In order to estimate the model the crude oil price is used as a proxy for energy prices. 
The data on the user cost of capital are, however, not available. In a few studies, 
which have considered firm level investment, the user cost of capital was computed 
by the researchers, or it was proxied by the real interest rates; whereas in other 
studies, the user cost of capital was considered as an unobserved variable which can 
be addressed employing appropriate econometric techniques. In our panel set, there 
is lack in data on real interest rates for some cross sections, and we do not have all 
the required information to compute the user cost of capital at the macro level. We, 
therefore, assume the user cost of capital as one of the unobservable variables in the 
investment model, and thus employ estimators which can capture the unobservable 
cross sectional effects.  
Since investment is affected also by other macroeconomic variables, Eq (4.1) can be 
supplemented by other determinants of investment which has been used in the 
literature as follows:  
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆4𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆5𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (4.2) 
Where 
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𝜆0: The intercept; 
𝐼𝑖𝑡: The logarithm of real fixed investment in country i in year t; 
𝑌𝑖𝑡: The logarithm of real gross domestic products (GDP); 
𝑃𝑖𝑡: The logarithm of real oil price (the nominal oil price deflated by the GDP 
deflator of each country); 
Other control variables include the real exchange rate (Exchit), Inflation measured as 
a GDP deflator (Infit), and trade (Tradeit) which is real exports plus real imports as a 
percentage of real GDP - all in their logarithmic form.  
λ1, λ2, . . , λ5 are the coefficients of the explanatory variables; 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡: The error term. 
The model was also estimated including the oil price uncertainty (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡).  
4.4.2. Data  
The sample of this study covers 12 OECD
32 
countries (Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea Rep., Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden). Major oil producers such as the United States and the United Kingdom 
were excluded. Small economies were also ruled out. Thus, the focus of this study is 
on larger oil-importing OECD economies. In order to capture the implications of the 
major oil crisis that took place in the 1970s and oil price shocks post 1970s on 
investment our study covers the period from 1970 to 2012.   
Studies related to oil prices have used a variety of oil prices, but mostly WTI and 
Brent prices.    
                                                          
32
 OECD (Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development) includes: Europe: Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Republic of Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Other member countries: Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, and US. 
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In this study, in order to cover the required period from 1970 to 2012, we use the 
crude price which is provided by the BP Historical Data Workbook - as shown in 
Figure 4.1 - where the price of Arabian Light posted at Ras Tanura covers the period 
1970-1983, while the Brent crude price covers the period 1984-2012. 
In order to avoid the impact of inflation, following some researchers, such as 
Robinson (2005), and Baumeister and Robays (2010), the nominal crude oil price 
was deflated by the GDP deflator of each country in our sample. The GDP deflator 
represents the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local 
currency (WDI, 2014). 
The rest of the variables used in estimation were derived from the World Bank 
database - World Development Indicators (WDI). Fixed investment, output, exports, 
and imports were used in their real prices while Trade represents the sum of real 
imports and real exports divided by real output.  
Regarding exchange rates, official exchange rates were deflated using the GDP 
deflator in each country since the data on real effective exchange rates are not 
available for some countries in different years.  
Inflation is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator and it 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole (WDI, 2014). 
Gross fixed capital formation (known as gross domestic fixed investment) includes 
land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and 
equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including 
schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings.  
138 
Since we have a multiple regression model, we check the correlation between the 
explanatory variables as we need to avoid multicollinearity. The following table 
reports the correlation coefficients. 
Table 4.1. The Correlation coefficients between the explanatory  
variables in the investment model 
 Variable 𝑷 𝒀 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒉 𝑰𝒏𝒇 𝑽𝒐𝒍 
𝑃  1 
-0.37179 
<.0001 
-0.35956 
<.0001 
0.40359 
<.0001 
0.57408 
<.0001 
0.15196 
0.0006 
𝑌   - 1 
-0.19275 
<.0001 
-0.09135 
0.0753 
-0.39822 
<.0001 
-0.04445 
0.3193 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒    - -  1 
-0.42174 
<.0001 
-0.48233 
<.0001 
-0.05189 
0.2449 
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ   -  -  - 1 
0.46418 
<.0001 
0.04279 
0.4055 
𝐼𝑛𝑓   -  -  - -  1 
0.07827 
0.0874 
𝑉𝑜𝑙  -   - -   - -  1 
Note: The upper value in each cell refers to the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, while the 
lower value is the probability where the null hypothesis indicates that the correlation is 
insignificant (Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0). 
It can be seen from Table 4.1 that the coefficient on the correlation between oil price 
and output, and that between oil price and trade is negative, while it is positive for 
that between oil price and each of the exchange rate, inflation, and volatility. 
Although most variables are significantly correlated, as shown in the table, the 
coefficients are less than 0.50, except that between oil price and inflation is 0.57. 
This suggests that the variables can be included in the model avoiding substantial 
multicollinearity.  
In order to find oil price volatility, autocorrelation (serial correlation) of the residuals 
in each country’s oil price series was checked. Since oil price series are non-
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stationary - as will be shown in the next section - the differenced oil price series was 
considered for each country: 
𝛥𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜎𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡                                                                                                  (4.3) 
Where 𝛥𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the differenced oil price for country 𝑖 in year  𝑡, 𝜎𝑖 is the coefficient of 
the time trend, and 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 refers to the residuals.  
Autocorrelation - the case in which the residuals are correlated with their past values 
- was tested using the Durbin Watson (DW) test which has a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation in the residuals, and the following results were obtained.  
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Table 4.2. Durbin-Watson Statistics to check the autocorrelation               
between the residuals of the differenced oil price series in                                 
each country in the sample 
Durbin-Watson Statistics 
Country Order DW Pr < DW Pr > DW 
Belgium 
1 2.0902 0.6157 0.3843 
2 2.1245 0.7151 0.2849 
Finland 
1 2.1008 0.6289 0.3711 
2 2.0996 0.6868 0.3132 
France 
1 2.0804 0.6035 0.3965 
2 2.0965 0.6832 0.3168 
Germany 
1 2.0795 0.6023 0.3977 
2 2.0939 0.6802 0.3198 
Greece 
1 1.8315 0.2909 0.7091 
2 1.8207 0.3355 0.6645 
Italy 
1 2.0243 0.5316 0.4684 
2 2.0311 0.6037 0.3963 
Japan 
1 2.1351 0.6705 0.3295 
2 2.1352 0.7268 0.2732 
Korea, Rep. 
1 2.1497 0.6876 0.3124 
2 2.1485 0.7411 0.2589 
Netherlands 
1 2.1497 0.6876 0.3124 
2 2.1905 0.7837 0.2163 
Portugal 
1 1.8599 0.3236 0.6764 
2 1.8902 0.4219 0.5781 
Spain 
1 2.0543 0.5703 0.4297 
2 2.0666 0.6476 0.3524 
Sweden 
1 2.0701 0.5905 0.4095 
2 2.0677 0.6490 0.3510 
Note 1: Pr<DW is the p-value for testing positive autocorrelation, and Pr>DW 
is the p-value for testing negative autocorrelation. 
The test results in Table 4.2 indicate that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals 
of the differenced oil price series in all countries since the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level in all cross sections.  
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We also checked the autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) effects in 
oil price’s series employing the ARCH test which has the null hypothesis of no 
ARCH effect. The results are reported in the following table. 
Table 4.3. Tests for ARCH disturbances based on OLS Residuals for the 
residuals of the differenced oil price series in each country in the sample 
Tests for ARCH Disturbances Based on OLS Residuals 
Country Order Q Pr > Q LM Pr > LM 
Belgium 
1 0.3866 0.5341 0.3241 0.5692 
2 1.0952 0.5783 0.9397 0.6251 
Finland 
1 0.5401 0.4624 0.4529 0.5010 
2 1.1120 0.5735 0.9581 0.6194 
France 
1 0.3261 0.5680 0.2707 0.6028 
2 0.9660 0.6169 0.8119 0.6663 
Germany 
1 0.4764 0.4901 0.4039 0.5251 
2 1.1428 0.5647 1.0069 0.6044 
Greece 
1 0.8339 0.3611 0.7291 0.3932 
2 1.3618 0.5062 1.2628 0.5318 
Italy 
1 0.3936 0.5304 0.3252 0.5685 
2 1.0362 0.5957 0.8626 0.6497 
Japan 
1 0.6138 0.4334 0.5175 0.4719 
2 1.3391 0.5119 1.1771 0.5551 
Korea, Rep. 
1 0.1666 0.6832 0.1213 0.7277 
2 0.9606 0.6186 0.7135 0.6999 
Netherlands 
1 0.3790 0.5382 0.3171 0.5733 
2 1.0421 0.5939 0.8953 0.6391 
Portugal 
1 0.3895 0.5325 0.3253 0.5684 
2 0.9214 0.6308 0.7683 0.6810 
Spain 
1 0.3346 0.5630 0.2771 0.5986 
2 0.9391 0.6253 0.7825 0.6762 
Sweden 
1 0.3409 0.5593 0.2840 0.5941 
2 0.9558 0.6201 0.8084 0.6675 
142 
The test results for all countries indicate that the null hypothesis of no ARCH effect 
cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level, with both Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
and the Ljung-Box Q statistics. Therefore, instead of considering volatility based on 
ARCH, we used the deviation from the trend. That is, the square root of the squared 
residuals saved from the differenced oil price series - Eq (4.3) - for each individual 
country.  
Thus, the oil price volatility in country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is given by   𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 = √𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
2 .  
4.5. Methodology  
4.5.1. Panel unit root tests 
The finding that many macro time series might contain a unit root has urged the 
development of the theory of non-stationary time series analysis.  
The first step in our analysis is to check the integration of the series in our dataset 
using panel unit root tests since panel based unit root tests have higher power than 
the tests which are based on individual time series (Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye, 
2007). There are several panel unit root tests including Breitung (2000), Hadri 
(2000), Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003).  
Consider the following autoregressive model (see Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye, 
2007) 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                      (4.4) 
where 𝑖=1, 2, …, N refer to the cross section over the periods 𝑡=1, 2, …, 𝑇, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 
includes the exogenous regressors, including any fixed effects or individual trend. 𝜌𝑖 
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is the autoregressive coefficient, while  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term which is a stationary 
process. If 𝜌𝑖 < 1 then 𝑥𝑖 is weakly trend-stationary. However, if 𝜌𝑖 = 1, then 𝑥𝑖 
contains a unit root.  
In this study we use both the Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC) and the Im, Pesaran test, 
and Shin (IPS) test. Before considering the results we highlight the differences 
between the panel unit root tests.   
The LLC, Breitung, and Hadri, panel unit root tests assume that 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is IID (0, 𝜎𝜀
2) - 
i.e., the error term is independent and identically distributed with a zero mean and 
variance 𝜎𝜀
2. They also assume that the autoregressive coefficient is identical among 
the cross sections, so 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌 for all 𝑖 which implies that the coefficient of  𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 is 
homogeneous among all cross sections.  
Compared to the LLC, Breitung and Hadri tests, the IPS panel unit root test allows 
for heterogeneous autoregressive coefficients which could be attributed to the 
different economic conditions and stages of economic development in each country. 
IPS propose averaging the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, so that 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =
∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑡−𝑘
𝑝𝑖
𝑘=1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, while allowing for different orders of serial correlation. By 
substituting this in Eq (4.4) the model can be written as follows: 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑡−𝑘
𝑝𝑖
𝑘=1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                               (4.5) 
Where 𝑝𝑖 refers to the number of lags in the ADF representation. The null hypothesis 
of the test is that each series in the panel contains a unit root. That is, 𝜌𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑖, 
while the alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the individual series in the 
panel is stationary. That is, 𝜌𝑖 < 1 for at least one 𝑖. IPS define 𝑡-bar statistics as the 
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average of the individual ADF statistics as follows: 𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑡𝜌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  where 𝑡𝜌𝑖 is the 
individual 𝑡-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that 𝜌𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑖. The 𝑡 statistic 
has been shown to be normally distributed under the null hypothesis and critical 
values for given values of N and T are given in Im et al. (2003).  
We employ the homogenous based panel test of LLC, and the heterogeneous panel 
test of IPS. Both tests (LLC and IPS) have been applied on Investment, Oil price, 
Output, and Trade. For Exchange rates and Inflation the data is not strongly balanced 
so the LLC test cannot be performed, and so only the IPS test is applied. For the rest 
of the variables both tests have been applied. The panel unit root test has been 
applied for three cases: cross section fixed effects (CS Fixed), cross section fixed 
effects with trend (CS Fixed, Time), and both cross section and time effects with 
trend (CS Fixed, Time). The outcomes of the two tests are reported in Tables 4.4 and 
4.5. 
Table 4.4. LLC panel unit root test of the variables in their level forms 
The 
variable 
CS Fixed CS Fixed, Time CS, TS Fixed, Time 
Adjusted t Pr < Adj t Adjusted t Pr < Adj t Adjusted t Pr < Adj t 
𝐼  -1.31 0.0944 2.24 0.9875 1.30 0.9027 
𝑃  -1.11 0.1330 8.16 1.0000 0.56 0.7108 
𝑌  -5.28 <.0001 3.17 0.9992 1.57 0.9416 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒  0.62 0.7320 0.37 0.6433 1.72 0.9570 
𝑉𝑜𝑙  -22.80 <.0001 -23.12 <.0001 -12.93 <.0001 
Note: ADF Lags is set to be MAIC (Modified Akaike Information Criteria). 
Kernel is not specified for LLC test. It is set to be Quadratic. 
Bandwidth Method is not specified for LLC test. It is set to be LLC Bandwidth. 
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Table 4.5. IPS panel unit root test of the variables in their level forms 
The 
variable 
CS Fixed CS Fixed, Time CS, TS Fixed, Time 
Zt-bar Pr < Zt-bar Zt-bar Pr < Zt-bar Zt-bar Pr < Zt-bar 
𝐼  2.40 0.9918 4.51 1.0000 3.93 1.0000 
𝑃  0.01 0.5058 8.23 1.0000 4.91 1.0000 
𝑌  -0.91 0.1825 6.45 1.0000 5.91 1.0000 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒  5.10 1.0000 1.58 0.9433 3.56 0.9998 
𝐼𝑛𝑓  4.60 1.0000 2.57 0.9950 2.27 0.9883 
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ  -0.64 0.2604 0.88 0.8109 1.45 0.9261 
𝑉𝑜𝑙  -19.21 <.0001 -19.53 <.0001 -9.49 <.0001 
Note: ADF Lags is set to be MAIC (Modified Akaike Information Criteria). 
The test results in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicate that the variables - except volatility - 
are non-stationary in their level form since the null hypotheses of the unit root cannot 
be rejected in the three cases (CS Fixed; CS Fixed, Time; and CS, TS Fixed, Time). 
Therefore, we need to take the first differences of the variables and then apply the 
test again. Although output (Y) seems stationary in one case (CS Fixed) according to 
the LLC test in Table 4.4, when the trend is added it turns out to be non-stationary. It 
is also non-stationary according to the IPS results.  
The next step is to check the stationarity of the variables in their differenced forms. 
As before, both the LLC and IPS tests were applied, and the outcomes are reported in 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
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Table 4.6. LLC unit root test for the differenced variables 
The 
variable 
CS Fixed CS Fixed, Time CS, TS Fixed, Time 
Adjusted t Pr < Adj t Adjusted t Pr < Adj t Adjusted t Pr < Adj t 
∆𝐼  -9.19 <.0001 -10.96 <.0001 -10.95 <.0001 
∆𝑃  -0.57 0.2855 -23.38 <.0001 -4.54 <.0001 
∆𝑌  -9.67 <.0001 -13.43 <.0001 -11.26 <.0001 
∆𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒  -11.92 <.0001 -13.39 <.0001 20.32 <.0001 
Note: ADF Lags is set to be MAIC (Modified Akaike Information Criteria). 
Kernel is not specified for LLC test. It is set to be Quadratic. 
Bandwidth Method is not specified for LLC test. It is set to be LLC Bandwidth. 
 
Table 4.7. IPS unit root test for the differenced variables 
The 
variable 
CS Fixed CS Fixed, Time CS, TS Fixed, Time 
Zt-bar Pr < Zt-bar Zt-bar Pr < Zt-bar Zt-bar Pr < Zt-bar 
∆𝐼  -5.77 <.0001 -6.03 <.0001 -6.86 <.0001 
∆𝑃  -0.64 0.2595 -19.54 <.0001 -4.50 <.0001 
∆𝑌  -6.33 <.0001 -9.43 <.0001 -7.81 <.0001 
∆𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒  -7.09 <.0001 -6.54 <.0001 -16.05 <.0001 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑓  -15.31 <.0001 -14.08 <.0001 -18.37 <.0001 
∆𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ  -9.39 <.0001 -8.86 <.0001 -11.54 <.0001 
Note: ADF Lags is set to be MAIC (Modified Akaike Information Criteria). 
It can be seen that the null hypothesis of both the LLC and IPS tests, which refers to 
the presence of the unit root, is strongly rejected for Investment, Output, Trade, 
Inflation, and Exchange rates. For the Oil price, although the differenced oil price is 
non-stationary in the case (CS Fixed), it is stationary with the two other cases (CS 
Fixed, Time), and (CS, TS Fixed, Time). This suggests that the variables are 
stationary in their differenced forms and so they are integrated of order one I(1) in 
their level forms. 
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4.5.2. Estimating the differenced investment model  
4.5.2.1. The static specification  
In this section we investigate whether investment changes as a response to the oil 
price change, controlling for other explanatory variables, by estimating the following 
investment model. 
𝛥𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2𝛥𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆3𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆4𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆5𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (4.6) 
All the variables in Eq (4.6) are the same as in Eq (4.2), but in their differenced 
forms (Δ). 
The appropriate method for estimating Eq (4.6) depends on the error structure, so in 
order to figure out whether unobservable effects are correlated with the explanatory 
variables the Hausman test was employed. This tests the null hypothesis of the non-
existence of correlation between individual and time specific effects and investment 
determinants, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of correlation. Rejecting 
the null hypothesis indicates that the panel Fixed Effects model is preferred for 
estimating the investment model.  
The Hausman test
33
 results, reported in Table 4.8, indicate that the model can be 
better estimated by employing the Fixed Effects estimator as the null hypothesis of 
random effects is rejected at the 1% significance level in Columns 1 and 2.  
Estimating results using the Fixed Effects estimator are shown in Table 4.8 / Column 
1 in which the dependent variable is the change in investment, while regressors 
                                                          
33
 The Hausman test can be generated automatically by estimating the model with the Random Effects 
estimator, but since the null hypothesis of the test is rejected, estimation results using Random effects 
estimator have not been reported, but the Hausman test statistic and p-value is reported.  
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include the change in each of the following regressors: oil price, output, trade, 
inflation, and the exchange rate. Then, we re-estimated the equation after 
supplementing the model with the volatility of oil prices over time (Table 4.8 / 
Column 2). 
Table 4.8. Fixed Two-Way Estimates of the static investment                                
model using differenced variables 
Variable 
1 2 
Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.010251 0.0280 0.7145 0.01102 0.0280 0.6947 
𝛥𝑃𝑡  -0.01351 0.0803 0.8666 -0.03512 0.0868 0.6862 
𝛥𝑌𝑡  2.339413 0.1138 <.0001 2.343255 0.1140 <.0001 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡  -0.19176 0.0385 <.0001 -0.1891 0.0387 <.0001 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡  0.006635 0.00549 0.2274 0.006666 0.00549 0.2257 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡  0.119652 0.0687 0.0827 0.116561 0.0689 0.0919 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡   - - - -0.05376 0.0816 0.5103 
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects 
m Value Pr > m m Value Pr > m 
36.53 <.0001 53.64 <.0001 
F Test for No Fixed 
Effects 
F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F 
3.15 <.0001 3.03 <.0001 
R
2
 0.7703 0.7707 
Estimation outcomes in Table 4.8 show that the null hypothesis of the F test of 
insignificant time and cross sectional effects is rejected at the 1% significance level 
in both columns, so both the time and cross sectional effects are significant. The 
value of R
2
 in both columns shows that the explanatory variables explain about 77% 
of the variation in investment. The results also show that the coefficients on both the 
oil price change and oil price volatility are negative but insignificant. These results 
could be attributed to using contemporaneous values of the variables, but the change 
in oil price in the previous period could influence investment in the current period. 
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Therefore, we re-estimate the investment model using lagged regressors instead of 
contemporaneous ones. The estimation outcomes are reported in the following table. 
Table 4.9. The Two-Way Random Effects estimates of the static investment 
model using lagged differenced variables 
Variable 
1 2 
Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.00984 0.00704 0.1630 0.007717 0.00891 0.3870 
𝛥𝑃𝑡−1  -0.03543 0.0192 0.0661 -0.03648 0.0182 0.0455 
𝛥𝑌𝑡−1  1.166489 0.1088 <.0001 1.182783 0.1083 <.0001 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−1   -0.01671 0.0400 0.6765 -0.02237 0.0394 0.5700 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−1  0.007537 0.00508 0.1384 0.007449 0.00505 0.1409 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−1  -0.06844 0.0776 0.3780 -0.06133 0.0768 0.4250 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡  - - - -0.08236 0.0276 0.0030 
R-Square 0.2060 0.2201 
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects 
m Value Pr > m m Value Pr > m 
5.26 0.3847 6.85 0.3350 
The null hypothesis of the Hausman test in Table 4.9 cannot be rejected, indicating 
that the unobservable country and time specific effects are not correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, the model can be estimated using the two-way 
Random Effects estimator. Estimation outcomes in the table indicate that the change 
in oil price in the previous period affects domestic investment significantly and 
negatively at the 10% significance level in Column 1 and at the 5% level in Column 
2. Furthermore, the coefficient on lagged oil price volatility is also negative and 
highly significant. The table also shows that the change of output in the last period 
affects investment significantly and positively.  
We check the robustness of the results by estimating the dynamic investment model 
using two panel estimators. 
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4.5.2.2. The dynamic specification of the investment model 
Fixed investment is expected to be significantly affected by its past realizations; 
therefore, in this section, we estimate the dynamic model where the lagged depended 
variable (ΔIit−1) is added as an explanatory variable as well as the other regressors 
which are specified in the static model. Thus, the investment model can be written as 
follows. 
𝛥𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝛥𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆3𝛥𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆4𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆5𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 +
             𝜆6𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                       (4.7) 
The model can be estimated using the Random Effects estimator if the null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test cannot be rejected, but the lagged dependent variable 
might be correlated with the error term making the estimator biased. We therefore 
check whether such bias is considerable by re-estimating the dynamic model using 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator based on instrumental 
variables.  
The Random Effects results are reported in Table 4.10, while the GMM estimating 
results are reported in Table 4.11.  
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Table 4.10. Random Effects estimates of the dynamic investment model 
 with lagged differenced explanatory variables 
Variable 
1 2 
Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.00541 0.00739 0.4643 0.011705 0.00910 0.1989 
𝛥𝐼𝑡−1  0.115458 0.0663 0.0822 0.11352 0.0659 0.0855 
𝛥𝑃𝑡−1  -0.03334 0.0190 0.0797 -0.03432 0.0180 0.0569 
𝛥𝑌𝑡−1  0.944651 0.1675 <.0001 0.965017 0.1666 <.0001 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−1  -0.00199 0.0407 0.9610 -0.00821 0.0400 0.8373 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−1  0.006571 0.00510 0.1978 0.006495 0.00507 0.2006 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−1  -0.07433 0.0774 0.3375 -0.06705 0.0767 0.3823 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡   - - - -0.08089 0.0272 0.0031 
R
2
 0.2109 0.2251 
Hausman Test for  
Random Effects 
m Value Pr > m m Value Pr > m 
8.90 0.1796 11.14 0.1327 
The null hypothesis of the Hausman test in Columns 1 and 2/ Table 4.10 cannot be 
rejected indicating that the Random Effects estimator is a more appropriate estimator 
than the Fixed Effects estimator. The outcomes in the table indicate that investment 
is boosted as a result of the oil price drop (at the 10% level), and the output increase 
(at the 1% level) in the previous period. However, changes in trade, inflation, and the 
exchange rate do not exert significant impacts on investment. The coefficient on the 
lagged investment is also positive and significant at the 10% level.  
Now we re-estimate the dynamic model employing the GMM estimator to cope with 
the endogeneity problem which could result from including the lagged dependent 
variable as an explanatory variable in the model. The following results were 
obtained: 
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Table 4.11. Parameters estimates of the investment model with lagged 
differenced explanatory variables using the two-step GMM estimator 
Variable Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| 
𝛥𝐼𝑡−1 0.232734 0.0799 0.0038 0.201535 0.1062 0.0584 
𝛥𝑃𝑡−1 -0.02522 0.0103 0.0150 -0.02827 0.0141 0.0461 
𝛥𝑌𝑡−1 0.782855 0.1577 <.0001 0.968585 0.2511 0.0001 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−1 0.043409 0.0400 0.2785 0.00353 0.0434 0.9352 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−1 -0.02646 0.00615 <.0001 -0.02702 0.00865 0.0019 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−1 -0.10631 0.0926 0.2516 -0.03193 0.1483 0.8296 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡 - - - -0.05258 0.0124 <.0001 
AR(m) test Statistic Pr > Statistic Statistic Pr > Statistic 
Lag 1 -2.31 0.9896 -2.39 0.9916 
Lag 2 -1.06 0.8560 -0.98 0.8362 
Sargan Test 
Statistic Prob > ChiSq Statistic Prob > ChiSq 
18.71 1.0000 22.26 1.0000 
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test in both columns cannot be rejected indicating 
that over identifying is acceptable. The coefficient on the lagged investment is also 
significant and positive, suggesting that the model can be better specified by 
including the lagged dependent variable. 
The outcomes also show that the change in the oil price affects investment adversely 
at the 5% significance level in both columns. Also, the change in output affects 
investment positively, while both volatility and inflation affect investment adversely.   
4.5.3. Panel cointegration test 
Engle and Granger (1987) found that if two or more time series are integrated of the 
same order and the linear combination between those series is stationary then these 
non-stationary time series are said to be cointegrated, and so there is a long run 
equilibrium relationship between these series. This long run relationship is the 
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equilibrium which the system converges to over time. Thus, the residuals from 
regressing one variable on the other represent the deviation from the long run 
equilibrium or the error of disequilibrium at time t (Johnston and Dinardo, 1997).     
Given that the variables in level are integrated of order one, as was reported by the 
panel unit root tests, we proceed to examine the existence of a long run equilibrium 
relationship between these variables using panel data cointegration tests. In this study 
we adopt two panel cointegration tests: The Pedroni test, and the Kao test.  
Pedroni (1999, 2004) proposed two sets of residual-based tests. The first set is based 
on the within dimension approach including the panel v- statistic, panel ρ-statistic, 
panel PP-statistic, and panel ADF-statistic. These statistics are based on pooling the 
residuals of the regression within-group. The second set of the Pedroni cointegration 
test is based on the between dimension approach including three statistics: The group 
ρ-statistic, group PP-statistic, and group ADF-statistic. Group statistics are based on 
pooling the residuals between-group. Each of these tests considers the individual 
specific short-run dynamics, the individual specific fixed effects, the deterministic 
trends, and the individual specific slope coefficients (Pedroni, 2004). Thus, Pedroni 
(1999) makes use of the estimated residuals from the long run regression which can 
be specified in our study as follows:    
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆1𝑖𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑖𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆5𝑖𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (4.8) 
In this specification, 𝜇𝑖 allows for the country-specific effects, 𝜎𝑖 is a trend 
parameter, while 𝜀𝑖𝑡 refers to the estimated residuals representing the deviation from 
the long run equilibrium. The coefficients of the regressors (𝜆1𝑖, . . , 𝜆5𝑖) are allowed 
to differ across countries. Evidence of cointegration is provided when 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is 
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stationary. That is, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis of cointegration so that where  𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration implies that 𝜌𝑖 = 1. 
By applying the test on the variables of this study
34
, the following outcomes are 
obtained.  
Table 4.12. Pedroni cointegration test results 
Series: I P Y Trade Inf Exch    
Sample: 1971- 2012    
Included observations: 504   
Cross-sections included: 12   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration   
Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with lags from 3 to 9 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
      
    Statistic   Prob.   
Panel v-Statistic  3.459238  0.0003   
Panel rho-Statistic  2.471256  0.9933   
Panel PP-Statistic -0.922574  0.1781   
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.011699  0.0013   
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
    Statistic   Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  4.055087  1.0000   
Group PP-Statistic -0.495797  0.3100   
Group ADF-Statistic -2.328892  0.0099   
The results in Table 4.12 indicate that domestic investment, oil price, output, trade, 
inflation and the exchange rate are cointegrated according to three tests (the Panel v-
                                                          
34
 Oil price volatility is excluded from the cointegration test as the variable is stationary. 
155 
Statistic, Panel ADF-Statistic, and Group ADF-Statistic) at a 5% significance level 
since the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in the three tests. 
We also checked the long run relationship using the Kao test though it is less 
powerful than the Pedroni cointegration test. The following table reports the 
cointegration results according to the Kao test: 
Table 4.13. Kao cointegration test results 
Kao Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: I P Y Trade Inf Exch   
Sample: 1971- 2012   
Included observations: 504   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 5 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   t-Statistic    Prob. 
ADF   -6.541540   0.0000 
     
     
Residual variance  0.002561  
     
It can be seen from Table 4.13 that the null hypothesis of no cointegration according 
to the Kao panel cointegration test is rejected at a 1% significance level confirming 
the long run equilibrium relationship between the considered variables.  
The existence of a cointegration relationship between two variables means that at 
least one of the two variables Granger-causes the other (Lescaroux and Mignon, 
2008). Our previous cointegration tests show the existence of the long run 
relationship between investment and the explanatory variables, but for the purpose of 
this study, it would be also interesting to test the long run equilibrium between 
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investment and only the oil price using the same two tests (Pedroni, and Kao). 
Accordingly, the following results are obtained. 
Table 4.14. Pedroni cointegration test results (I /P) 
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration 
Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 9 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Within-dimension Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic 3.977258 0.0000 
Panel rho-Statistic 0.202069 0.5801 
Panel PP-Statistic 0.107432 0.5428 
Panel ADF-Statistic -2.619464 0.0044 
Between-dimension Statistic Prob. 
Group rho-Statistic 1.519354 0.9357 
Group PP-Statistic 0.899933 0.8159 
Group ADF-Statistic -3.046354 0.0012 
Table 4.15. Kao cointegration test results (I /P) 
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration 
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 9 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
ADF 
t-Statistic Prob. 
-2.651102 0.0040 
It can be seen from Tables 4.14 and 4.15 that there is a cointegration relationship 
between investment and the oil price according to the results of the Kao test and 
three statistics of the Pedroni test (Panel v-Statistic, Panel ADF-Statistic, and Group 
ADF-Statistic).  
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4.5.4. Estimating the long run coefficients  
Given that domestic investment, oil price, output, trade, inflation, and the exchange 
rate are cointegrated, the long run effect of the oil price and the other explanatory 
variables on domestic investment for each individual country in the sample can be 
examined by estimating  Eq (4.8) in which the country-specific fixed effects and time 
trend are considered. The model is estimated using the AUTOREG procedure in the 
SAS system which enables us to estimate the equation for each individual country 
using the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates as shown in the following table, 
which reports the long run coefficients of the regressors for each country in our 
sample.  
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Table 4.16: The long run coefficients of the individual countries 
Country 
 
Intercept P Y TRADE EXCH INF Trend 
Total  
R
2
 
Belgium 
Estimate 83.015 -0.1021 2.198 0.8146 -0.2054 0.0134 -0.0578 
94.14% S.E. 12.6724 0.033 0.9959 0.347 0.0835 0.0255 0.0174 
Pr <.0001 0.0055 0.0386 0.0288 0.0227 0.6053 0.0033 
Finland 
Estimate 73.7582 -0.0844 2.4358 -0.0313 -0.0218 0.0217 -0.0561 
90.97% S.E. 27.9413 0.0306 0.362 0.2716 0.0962 0.0402 0.0171 
Pr 0.0157 0.0121 <.0001 0.9093 0.8227 0.5954 0.0037 
France 
Estimate 87.54 -0.0655 1.7073 0.5837 -0.1108 -0.0524 -0.0542 
94.16% S.E. 14.059 0.0318 0.4829 0.2084 0.0666 0.0368 0.0115 
Pr <.0001 0.0522 0.002 0.0107 0.1111 0.1697 0.0001 
Germany 
Estimate 48.0363 -0.0808 2.0514 0.3409 -0.0013 0.0075 -0.0397 
97.17% S.E. 11.5545 0.0138 0.4974 0.2468 0.0634 0.0173 0.00847 
Pr 0.0004 <.0001 0.0005 0.1816 0.984 0.6688 0.0001 
Greece 
Estimate 114.517 -0.0959 2.725 0.3648 -0.057 -0.1619 -0.08 
82.82% S.E. 30.5694 0.0365 0.4276 0.2552 0.1094 0.0271 0.0163 
Pr 0.0011 0.0151 <.0001 0.1664 0.6076 <.0001 <.0001 
Italy 
Estimate 62.2558 -0.0525 0.7379 0.4896 -0.1733 0.0323 -0.0274 
96.28% S.E. 13.4378 0.0285 0.3965 0.1658 0.0647 0.0364 0.0108 
Pr 0.0001 0.0799 0.0768 0.0076 0.014 0.3853 0.0189 
Japan 
Estimate 78.3625 -0.1238 1.8541 0.6301 -0.0683 0.011 -0.0515 
98.86% S.E. 25.4767 0.0216 0.3463 0.2754 0.0601 0.0157 0.017 
Pr 0.0068 <.0001 <.0001 0.0352 0.272 0.4937 0.0076 
Korea,  
Rep. 
Estimate 81.3826 -0.051 1.4143 0.1056 -0.4383 0.0344 -0.0452 
99.81% S.E. 17.4885 0.0294 0.1911 0.1129 0.0652 0.016 0.0111 
Pr <.0001 0.0915 <.0001 0.3566 <.0001 0.0387 0.0003 
Netherlands 
Estimate 59.6146 -0.1376 2.6415 0.262 0.0502 -0.0159 -0.0526 
97.40% S.E. 13.1176 0.0228 0.556 0.3354 0.0671 0.0142 0.00971 
Pr 0.0002 <.0001 0.0001 0.4438 0.4634 0.275 <.0001 
Portugal 
Estimate 51.8373 0.0396 2.2525 0.171 0.0546 -0.1263 -0.043 
96.00% S.E. 17.5426 0.0356 0.45 0.213 0.1015 0.0394 0.0128 
Pr 0.0076 0.2789 <.0001 0.4311 0.5963 0.0043 0.0031 
Spain 
Estimate 100.908 -0.0844 3.2827 0.1467 -0.0527 -0.1005 -0.0822 
98.44% S.E. 16.06 0.0221 0.2795 0.1817 0.0549 0.04 0.00739 
Pr <.0001 0.001 <.0001 0.4286 0.3476 0.0203 <.0001 
Sweden 
Estimate 22.0866 -0.0407 3.0632 -0.1899 -0.0052 0.0228 -0.0392 
97.13% S.E. 10.4004 0.0155 0.3121 0.1788 0.0519 0.0162 0.00714 
Pr 0.0408 0.0125 <.0001 0.2956 0.9203 0.1673 <.0001 
The table shows that the long run coefficient of the oil price is negative and strongly 
significant at the 1% significance level in Belgium, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, 
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and Spain. It is also significant and negative at the 5% significance level in Finland, 
Greece, and Sweden, while it is significant and negative at the 10% significance level 
in France, Italy, and South Korea. The coefficient of oil price is insignificant only for 
Portugal. Thus, oil price increases influence domestic investment adversely in the 
oil-importing OECD economies. 
The long run coefficient of output is positive and significant in all countries so 
increases in the level of output would boost domestic investment in these countries.  
The estimation results also show that the coefficient of the time trend is highly 
significant for all the cross section, and the intercept is significant for all countries 
indicating that there are unobservable cross sectional effects influencing investment. 
However, the effects of the exchange rate and inflation are insignificant in most 
countries in the sample. 
Although the literature indicates that trade openness has the potential to boost 
investment, the results in the table show that the coefficient on trade is positive and 
significant only in four countries (Belgium, France, Italy, and Japan), but it is 
insignificant in the rest of the countries. Such outcomes might be due to considering 
current values of the variables while investment could respond in the next period. 
Therefore, the long run coefficients of the variables for the panel have been 
examined using both current values of the regressors, and then the lagged ones.  
The coefficients on the explanatory variables have been estimated for the panel using 
the Random Effects model, since the null hypothesis of the Hausman test cannot be 
rejected at the 5% significance level, suggesting that using the Random Effects 
estimator for the model is more efficient than the Fixed Effects estimator. The panel 
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dynamic long run model (including lagged investment) was also estimated using the 
two-step system GMM estimator to cope with the possible endogeneity of the lagged 
dependent variable. The results are reported in the following table.  
Table 4.17. Estimating the long run coefficients using the 
 One-way Random Effects estimator 
Explanatory 
variables 
One-way Random Effects estimates 
Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| 
Intercept 27.19629 4.4556 <.0001 
𝑃𝑡  -0.01706 0.00829 0.0404 
𝑌𝑡  1.300723 0.0305 <.0001 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡  0.085207 0.0545 0.1191 
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡  -0.03331 0.0229 0.1473 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡  -0.01383 0.00946 0.1446 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  -0.01837 0.00222 <.0001 
R-square  93.63% 
Hausman test 
m Value Pr > m 
8.73 0.1892 
Note: The one-way Random Effects estimator was used because the 
Hausman statistic cannot be calculated as different variables were 
dropped in the Random Effects model than in the Fixed Effects model.   
It can be seen from the table that the long run coefficient of oil price is negative and 
significant at the 5% significance level, indicating that a 1 percent increase in oil 
price reduces investment by about 0.02 percent in our sample. The table also shows 
that output has a highly significant positive influence on investment, but the 
coefficients of inflation, exchange rates and trade are not significant.  
To further check whether using lagged explanatory variables within the dynamic 
framework might alter the results, the model was re-estimated using the GMM 
estimator where the third lag of the lagged dependent variable, the second lag of oil 
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price, and the constant term were instrumented allowing three lags of each 
instrument in the estimation. Thus, the following results were obtained. 
Table 4.18. Estimating the long run coefficients using the two-  
step system GMM estimator 
Explanatory 
variables 
GMM estimates
 
 
Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| 
Intercept 17.13314 8.5988 0.0469 
𝐼𝑡−1  0.509542 0.0984 <.0001 
𝑃𝑡−1  -0.02924 0.00919 0.0016 
𝑌𝑡−1  0.215495 0.0999 0.0314 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−1  0.258245 0.1278 0.0438 
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−1   -0.01822 0.0128 0.1556 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−1  -0.03655 0.0238 0.1249 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑   -0.00501 0.00472 0.2890 
Sargan Test 
Statistic Prob > ChiSq 
544.06 0.94 
AR(m) test Statistic Pr > Statistic 
Lag 1 0.98 0.1641 
Lag 2 0.98 0.1641 
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test in Table 4.18 cannot be rejected indicating that 
over identifying of the instruments is acceptable. Also, the Autocorrelation test (AR 
test) of the residuals shows that there is no serial correlation in either the first or 
second lags of the residuals.  
Similar to the results found in the static specification using current values of the 
explanatory variables, estimation outcomes in Table 4.18 indicate that a 1 percent 
increase in oil price reduces investment by about 0.03 percent in the next period. The 
table also shows that the lagged dependent variable, and output are significant 
determinants of investment.  The coefficients on the exchange rate and inflation are 
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still insignificant using lagged values, but the coefficient on trade is positive and 
significant.  
4.5.5. The long and short run effect of oil prices on investment 
Having established that the variables in the investment model are cointegrated, we 
estimate a panel-based error correction model (ECM) in order to examine the short 
and long run effects of the oil price and other variables on investment. Thus we 
estimate the ECM using the two-step procedure from the Engle and Granger (1987) 
model. The first step is to estimate the long run model - Eq (4.8) - and save the 
estimated residuals (𝜀𝑖𝑡) which represent the deviation from the long run equilibrium.  
The second is to estimate the following panel data error-correction representation of 
the cointegrated variables as was established by Engle and Granger (1987). 
𝛥𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1∑ 𝛥𝐼𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝛽2∑ 𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3∑ 𝛥𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1                                                 
            +𝛽4∑ 𝛥𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                              (4.9) 
where 𝑗 = 0,… , 𝑝 refers to the number of lags included in the model,  𝛽5 is the speed 
at which the system converges to its equilibrium relationship and its sign is expected 
to be negative and significant.  𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 is the lagged Error Correction Term which 
represents the residuals saved from the long run equilibrium relationship between the 
variables in Eq (4.8). Since the variables are cointegrated, the coefficient on 
𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 is expected to be significant and negative referring to speed of adjustment to 
the equilibrium.   
All the variables in Eq (4.9) are stationary as the explanatory variables are in their 
differenced forms. The ECT is also supposed to be stationary since the panel 
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cointegration tests suggest the long run equilibrium relationship between the 
variables. To further check the staionarity of the ECT the IPS panel unit root test was 
applied on the series. Accordingly, the test outcomes confirm the stationarity of the 
ECT as it shown in Table 4.19 since the null hypothesis of unit root is strongly 
rejected at the 1% significance level. 
Table 4.19. IPS panel unit root on the Error Correction Term 
(ADF lags are set to be MAIC) 
Deterministic Variables 
Zt-bar Test 
Zt-bar Pr < Zt-bar 
CS Fixed -8.13 <.0001 
CS Fixed, Time -3.09 0.0010 
CS, TS Fixed -7.41 <.0001 
CS, TS Fixed, Time -2.92 0.0018 
Now we estimate the error correction model in order to check the short and long run 
impact of oil price on domestic investment in our data set. In the panel data set, 
estimating the ECM using the pooled OLS would result in a bias since it does not 
account for the country and time specific effects. Therefore, the ECM is estimated 
using the panel two-way Random Effects estimator to account for the cross sectional 
and time specific effects. The Hausman test indicates that the Random Effects 
estimator is more appropriate than the Fixed Effects estimator since the null 
hypothesis of the random effects cannot be rejected. We estimate the model 
including two lags of each regressor such that there is no autocorrelation in the 
residuals. The following table illustrates the parameter estimates of the ECM.  
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Table 4.20. Parameter estimates of the ECM using the  
Two-way Random Effects estimator 
Variable Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.00158 0.0204 0.9384 
𝛥𝐼𝑡−1  0.305243 0.0790 0.0001 
𝛥𝐼𝑡−2  -0.10346 0.0780 0.1858 
𝛥𝑃𝑡−1  -0.00179 0.0511 0.9721 
𝛥𝑃𝑡−2  -0.04778 0.0514 0.3531 
𝛥𝑌𝑡−1  0.274588 0.2179 0.2085 
𝛥𝑌𝑡−2  0.395277 0.2064 0.0563 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−1  -0.12718 0.0895 0.1562 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−2  0.172693 0.0904 0.0569 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−1  0.000183 0.00755 0.9806 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−2  -0.00999 0.00776 0.1987 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−1  0.057527 0.0516 0.2658 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−2  -0.04959 0.0537 0.3564 
𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1  -0.72574 0.0906 <.0001 
R
2
 0.3587 
Hausman Test for  
Random Effects 
m Value Pr > m 
9.20 0.7574 
The table shows that the long run coefficient is negative and highly significant 
indicating that oil price and the explanatory variables exert a significant effect on 
domestic investment over the long run.  
Since two lags are included in the ECM estimation we need to test the joint 
significance of the coefficients on the first and second lag for each explanatory 
variable. Therefore, the Wald test is implemented. The null hypothesis of this test 
indicates that the coefficients on the first and the second lag are jointly insignificant. 
The following table reports the test results:  
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Table 4.21. Wald test for the joint significance of the coefficient estimates  
resulted from using the Two-way Random Effects estimator 
Test Statistic Pr > ChiSq 
𝛥𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝐼𝑡−2 = 0  16.00 0.0003 
𝛥𝑃𝑡−1  = 𝛥𝑃𝑡−2  = 0  1.11 0.5733 
𝛥𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝑌𝑡−2 = 0  8.22 0.0164 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−2 = 0  5.05 0.0800 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−2 = 0  1.71 0.4259 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−2 = 0  2.02 0.3648 
The test results show that the oil price does not affect investment over the short term 
since the null hypothesis of Wald test cannot be rejected indicating that the 
coefficients on the first and the second lag are jointly insignificant. The outcomes 
also show that output and trade augment investment over the short run but only at the 
10% significance level. However, the results in both tables indicate that the exchange 
rate and inflation do not exert a significant impact on investment in the short run.  
Since the ECM includes the lagged dependent variable which could be correlated to 
the error, the ECM has been re-estimated by employing the GMM estimator, to 
check whether such bias is significant. The constant term and ΔYt−5 are instrumented 
allowing for two periods. The Wald test is also implemented. The ECM parameter 
estimates and the results of the Wald test are reported in the following two tables. 
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Table 4.22. Parameter estimates of the ECM using                                              
the GMM estimator 
Variable Estimate S.E. Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.077159 0.0285 0.0071 
𝛥𝐼𝑡−1 1.373177 0.3212 <.0001 
𝛥𝐼𝑡−2 -0.15822 0.1030 0.1256 
𝛥𝑃𝑡−1 -0.00452 0.0475 0.9243 
𝛥𝑃𝑡−2 -0.02948 0.0179 0.0998 
𝛥𝑌𝑡−1 -2.67063 1.1166 0.0173 
𝛥𝑌𝑡−2 0.618705 0.2690 0.0221 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−1 0.052334 0.2127 0.8058 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−2 -0.39806 0.3152 0.2075 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−1 0.007884 0.0152 0.6047 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−2 0.027554 0.0226 0.2231 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−1 0.142278 0.0695 0.0414 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−2 -0.10947 0.0731 0.1353 
𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 -1.02567 0.4104 0.0129 
Sargan Test 
Statistic Prob > ChiSq 
472.10 0.9928 
Maximum Number of Time Periods 2 
Estimate Stage 2 
 
Table 4.23. Wald test for the joint significance of the coefficient  
estimates using GMM 
Test Statistic Pr > ChiSq 
𝛥𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝐼𝑡−2 = 0  19.68 <.0001 
𝛥𝑃𝑡−1  = 𝛥𝑃𝑡−2  = 0  2.87 0.2380 
𝛥𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝑌𝑡−2 = 0  7.72 0.0211 
𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡−2 = 0  1.90 0.3868 
𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡−2 = 0  2.01 0.3663 
𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−1 = 𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑡−2 = 0  8.06 0.0177 
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It can be seen from Table 4.22 that the coefficient on the ECT is negative and 
significant suggesting that there is a long run relationship running from the oil price 
and the other regressors to investment. Although the second lag of the differenced oil 
price is negative and significant at the 10% level in Table 4.22, but similar to what 
has been found using the Random Effects estimator, the Wald test in Table 4.23 
indicates that the coefficients on the oil price are jointly insignificant suggesting that 
oil price does not cause investment over the short run. But output causes investment 
over the short run. Unlike the Random Effects results, trade does not cause 
investment over the short run, but the coefficients on the exchange rate are jointly 
significant.   
Overall, there a long run equilibrium relationship between investment and the 
explanatory variables including the oil price, and the significant and negative 
coefficient on the ECT in the estimated ECM confirms this long run relationship 
which runs from oil price, output, trade, the exchange rate, and inflation towards 
investment. In line with the firm-level literature, which show that the oil price 
increases influence firm investment adversely, our estimation outcomes show that the 
long run coefficient on the oil price for the panel set and for all individual countries 
at the macroeconomic level is significant and negative - except Portugal where the 
coefficient is insignificant. This result is expected since the oil price increases 
represent a demand shock which affects adversely on capital accumulation over the 
long run, and therefore on investment. Estimation of the investment model using 
differenced variables the outcomes indicate that the change in the oil price affect 
adversely on investment in the next period. However, the estimation outcomes of the 
Error Correction Model show that the oil price does not cause investment over the 
short run.  
168 
Furthermore, output increases augment investment over the long and short run. 
However, trade, the exchange rate, and inflation do not cause investment over the 
short run.  
4.6. Conclusions 
Literature related to oil prices considers mainly the effect of oil price changes on 
output and the effect of oil price changes on firm level investment. This study has 
examined the impact of the oil price and oil price volatility on aggrigate fixed 
investment in a group of oil-importing OECD economies over the period 1970-2012 
employing various estimation techniques.  
We first checked the stationarity of the variables by employing two panel unit root 
tests (IPS, LLC). The test results show that the level variables are integrated of order 
one, but they turn out to be stationary by differencing. Then, we analysed investment 
behaviour in our data set within the framework of the production function using 
differenced contemporaneous variables, but the results did not show a significant 
impact of oil price changes on investment. By re-estimating the model including 
lagged explanatory variables, the outcomes indicate that oil price changes and oil 
price volatility affect investment adversely.  
Since the variables are integrated of order one, we checked the cointegration between 
the level variables by employing panel cointegration tests. Accordingly, the Kao, and 
three statistics of the Pedroni tests show that there is a long run equilibrium 
relationship between investment, oil price, output, trade, inflation, and the exchange 
rate. Therefore, we estimate the Error Correction Model using both the Random 
Effects estimator and the GMM estimator, and found that the oil price and the other 
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explanatory variables cause investment on the long run, but the oil price does not 
cause investment in the short run. By estimating the long run equation for the panel 
set and for the individual countries we found that the long run coefficient on the oil 
price is negative and significant for each individual country, and for the panel set.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The crucial role played by crude oil in the global economy has motivated researchers 
to investigate various aspects in the oil industry and its effects on the economies of 
both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, employing various econometric 
methods, using both time series and panel data sets. A large proportion of oil-related 
literature has focused on the linkage between oil prices and output growth. Some 
studies have investigated drivers of oil prices, mainly within the framework of supply 
and demand. Other have assessed the implications of oil-abundance on the 
economies of oil-rich developing countries, focusing on transmission channels 
through which resource proceeds might exert adverse impacts on the developing 
economies.  
However, the economic implications of oil-infrastructure projects on transit 
countries, the impacts of oil abundance on domestic investment in oil-rich 
developing countries, and the effects of oil prices on domestic fixed investment at the 
macroeconomic level have been hardly addressed in previous research. 
Hence, this study contributes to the literature by examining the economic 
implications of the oil industry for domestic fixed investment in three groups of 
countries: transit countries which receive revenues from transit fees for allowing 
crude oil to be carried through their lands by cross-border oil pipelines; oil-rich 
developing economies which receive revenues from exporting crude oil; and oil-
importing developed economies in which crude oil is one of the substantial source of 
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fuel for industry and transportation, and electric power generation. These issues have 
been examined throughout three essays.  
The first essay examined the implications of constructing a cross-border oil pipeline 
project on the countries through which the pipeline passes. We employed the BTC 
pipeline as a case study and assessed the viability of the project for the Multinational 
Corporation (MNC), led by the UK’s BP, and the three host countries (Azerbaijan, 
Turkey, and Georgia) within the framework of the bargaining problem (the Nash 
bargaining solution, and the alternating offer bargain of Rubinstein). We found the 
Break-even transit charge at which a zero total surplus would be obtained, and then 
we computed the proportions of the total surplus which the participants would 
receive from operating the pipeline with two bargaining formulations: simultaneous, 
and sequential bargaining.  
The outcomes indicate that the project would generate a zero total surplus when the 
transit charge is equal to $3 per barrel, so with a rate higher than the break-even 
charge, each partner would receive revenues higher than his outside option.  The 
results also suggest that with the two bargaining scenarios, Azerbaijan, which owns 
the oil field, and has the lowest discount rate and the biggest outside option, would 
receive the highest proportion of the total surplus, followed by the MNC, then by 
Turkey, and finally by Georgia, which has the highest discount rate and the smallest 
outside option. However, Azerbaijan, which bargains first with the MNC, would 
receive higher payoffs with sequential bargaining than with simultaneous bargaining; 
whereas for the other three partners, simultaneous bargaining is more beneficial. This 
suggests that the gross payoffs received by the participants are affected by their 
discount rates, their outside options, and their bargaining orders. Furthermore, the 
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outcomes show that with bargaining over discounted flows, each bargaining process 
produces a different total surplus, which is attributed to players’ different discount 
rates by which revenues and costs are discounted over the life of the project. 
The second essay examined the impacts of oil abundance on domestic investment in 
oil-exporting developing non-OECD economies from 1996 to 2010. Domestic 
investment was modelled with both static and dynamic specifications, where oil rents 
and oil exports were used as proxies for oil abundance. The model was also 
supplemented with other controlling variables which have been used in the previous 
literature as determinants of domestic investment, including output growth, inflation, 
liquidity, the exchange rate, FDI, trade openness, and financial development - 
proxied by domestic credit provided by banking, and domestic credited provided by 
the private sector 
To estimate the investment model, panel data methods were employed including, 
Fixed and the Random Effects estimators, and the Arellano-Bond difference GMM. 
The model was estimated first including oil rents, and then using oil exports, in order 
to check the robustness of the results.  
In line with the resource curse literature which has documented adverse impacts of 
natural resource abundance on the resource-rich developing economies through 
different channels, such as the Dutch disease, revenue volatility, declining terms of 
trade, and rent-seeking and corruption, our results suggest that oil-abundance exerts 
adverse effects on the economies of oil-rich economies, but via its negative 
implications on domestic investment.  
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This reflects the poor performance of these countries’ governments concerning 
accountability and resource management, suggesting the necessity of setting an 
appropriate regulatory framework, and establishing accountability and transparency 
principles capable to well use oil revenues, and thus to channel them towards viable 
investment projects which, in turn, would drive sustainable development in these 
countries.  
Beside the significant effect of oil abundance, our results show that domestic 
investment is positively affected by output growth, FDI, financial development, and 
trade openness, but negatively influenced by inflation. These results are consistent 
with what has been established in the literature.  
The third essay examined the effect of the oil price and oil price volatility on 
domestic investment in 12 oil-importing OECD countries over 1970-2012. The 
investment model was specified within the framework of the production function 
where the explanatory variables include the oil price, oil price volatility, output, trade 
openness, inflation, and the exchange rate.  
First, we investigated the existence of the unit root in each variable by employing 
two panel unit root tests, namely, the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) and the Im, Pesaran, 
and Shin (IPS) tests. The test results thus indicate that all the variables are non-
stationary in level, but with differencing they turn out to be stationary. Afterwards, 
the investment model was estimated using the differenced variables, with both static 
and dynamic specifications, to examine the impacts of oil price changes and oil price 
volatility on investment, employing Fixed and Random Effects estimators, and the 
system GMM. Although the impacts of the contemporaneous values of the oil price 
change and oil price volatility on investment are insignificant, but estimation results 
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using lagged variables indicate that both the lagged differenced oil price, and oil 
price volatility exert significant and adverse effects on domestic investment.  
Having found that the variables are integrated of order one, we could investigate the 
existence of the long run relationship between the oil price/oil price volatility, and 
the other explanatory variables on domestic investment. Therefore, the Pedroni and 
the Kao panel cointegration tests were conducted. The outcomes of the Kao test and 
three statistics of the Pedroni test indicate that there is a long run equilibrium 
relationship between domestic investment, the oil price, and the other control 
variables.  
Hence, the long and short run effects of the oil price, output, trade openness, 
inflation, and the exchange rate were examined by estimating the Error Correction 
Model. The findings thus suggest that the oil price and the other controlling variables 
Granger cause investment over the long run; whereas the outcomes do not show clear 
evidence of the short run impact of the oil price on domestic investment.  
We also estimated the long run investment model for the panel set and for the 
individual countries. The findings indicate that the long run coefficient on the oil 
price is negative and significant for each individual country - except Portugal, in 
which the coefficient is insignificant - and for the entire panel set.  
Consequently, our findings are consistent with the firm-level literature, which has 
documented adverse effects of oil prices and oil price volatility on firm investment, 
but our analysis is at the macroeconomic level. Furthermore, given that investment is 
a basic determinant of output growth, our outcomes agree with the studies which 
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found that output growth is adversely affected by higher oil prices, but in our 
analysis via reducing investment.  
Future research can be implemented on assessing the viability of investment projects 
by employing the multilateral bargaining problem taking uncertainty into account. 
Also, the hold-up problem can be addressed within the framework of multilateral 
bargaining. Furthermore, it would be possible to conduct further research on the 
impact of oil-price and oil price uncertainty on investment at the firm level in a panel 
set of oil-rich developing economies. It would be also interesting to examine the 
linkage between oil revenues and domestic saving in oil-rich developing economies.  
176 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
Abel, A. 1983. Optimal investment under uncertainty. American Economic Review, 
73(1), pp. 228–233. 
Abel, A., and Blanchard, O. 1986. Investment and sales: some empirical evidence. 
NBER Working Paper No. 2050. 
Adenfelt, M. 2010. Exploring the performance of transnational projects: Shared 
knowledge, coordination and communication. International Journal of Project 
Management, 28(6), pp. 529–538. 
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. 1999. Rents, Competition, and Corruption. The American 
Economic Review, 89(4), pp. 982-993.   
Aizenman, J. and Marion, N.P. 1993. Policy uncertainty, persistence and growth. 
Review of International Economics, 1(2), pp.145–163. 
Akanbi, O.A. 2012. Role of governance in explaining domestic investment in 
Nigeria. South African Journal of Economics, 80(4), pp. 473–489. 
Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections. 2002. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company 
founded. Alexander's Institute for Global Energy Research. 30 August. available at: 
http://www.gasandoil.com/news/central_asia/06e64ce97241a092b52d5a35d6be6a60.  
Altunsoy, I. 2008. PKK claims responsibility for BTC pipeline explosion. Today’s 
Zaman, 8 August. Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/business_pkk-claims-
responsibility-for-btc-pipeline-explosion_149686.html. 
Apergis, N. and Miller, S.M. 2009. Do structural oil-market shocks affect stock 
prices? Energy Economics, 31(6), pp. 569–575. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte 
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic 
Studies, 58, pp. 277-297. 
177 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. 1995. Another look at the instrumental variables 
estimation of error components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, pp. 29-51. 
Arezki, R. and Bruckner, M. 2011. Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: evidence 
from panel data regressions. European Economic Review, 55, pp. 955–963.  
Ashley, R.A. and Tsang, K.P. 2013. International evidence on the oil price-real 
output relationship: Does Persistence Matter. Working paper series. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2185548.  
Azis; I.J. 1992. Interregional allocation of resources: the case of Indonesia. Regional 
Science Association International, (71)4, pp. 393-404. 
Bacon, R. and Tordo, S. 2004. Crude oil prices: Predicting price differentials based 
on quality. The World Bank, Public policy for the private sector, Note No 275.   
Baker, S.R., Bloom, N., and Davis, S.J. 2013. Measuring economic policy 
uncertainty. Chicago Booth Paper No. 13-02. 
Baran, Z. 2005. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Turkey. The 
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute- Silk Road Studies Program, pp. 103–118. 
Barsky, R.B. and Kilian, L. 2004. Oil and the macroeconomy since the 1970s. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, pp. 115–134.  
Baumeister, C. and Robays I.V. 2010. Cross-country differences in the effects of oil 
shocks. CESifo Working Paper No. 3306.  
Bayoumi, T. 1990. Saving-investment correlations. Immobile capital government 
policy or endogenous behavior? IMF Staff Papers, 37 (2), pp. 360-387. 
Begoyan, A. 2004. United States policy in the South Caucasus: securitisation of the 
Baku-Ceyhan Project. Iran and the Caucasus, 8(1), pp. 141-155. 
Behrman, J.R., Sengupta, R. and Todd, P. 2005. Progressing through PROGRESA: 
an impact assessment of a school subsidy experiment in rural Mexico. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 54(1), pp. 237-275. 
178 
Berument, H., Ceylan, N. and Dogan, N. 2010. The Impact of oil price shocks on the 
economic growth of selected MENA countries.  The Energy Journal, 31, pp. 149-
175. 
Billmeier, A., Dunn, J. and Selm, B. 2004. In the pipeline: Georgia’s oil and gas 
transit revenues. IMF Working Paper No. 209. 
Blanchard, O.J. Gali, J. 2009. The macroeconomic effects of oil shocks: why are the 
2000s so different from the 1970s?. In Gali J. and Gertler M. (eds.). International 
Dimensions of Monetary Policy. University of Chicago Press, pp. 373–428. 
Blundell, R. and Bond. S. 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in 
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, pp. 115-143. 
Bond, S. and Malik, A. 2009. Natural resources, export structure, and investment. 
Oxford Economic Papers, 61. pp. 675–702. 
Bond, S.R. and Cummins, J.G., 2004. Uncertainty and investment: an empirical 
investigation using data on analysts' profits forecasts. FEDS Working Paper No. 20. 
Bosworth, B., and Collins S. 1999. Capital flows to developing economies: 
implications for saving and investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 
pp. 143-180. 
BP (British Petroleum). 2004. BTC Signs Project Finance Agreements. Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/btc-signs-project-
finance-agreements.html.  
BP (British Petroleum). 2006. BTC celebrates full commissioning. Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/btc-celebrates-full-
commissioning.html. 
BP (British Petroleum). 2010. AIOC Gives Chirag Oil Project Go Ahead. Available 
at: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/aioc-gives-chirag-oil-
project-go-ahead.html. 
179 
BP (British Petroleum). 2014. Statistical Review of World Energy, June, 63rd 
edition.   
Brautigam, D., Fjeldstad O.H, and Moore, M. 2008. Taxation and state-building in 
developing countries. Cambridge University Press.  
Bredin, D., Elder, J. and Fountas, S. 2011. Oil volatility and the option value of 
waiting: An analysis of the G-7. Journal of Futures Markets, (31)7, pp. 679–702. 
Breitung, J. 2000. The local power of some unit root tests for panel data, in: Baltagi 
B. (ed.). Nonstationary panels, panel cointegration, and dynamic panels. Advances in 
Econometrics, 15, JAI: Amsterdam, pp.161-178. 
Byrne, J.P. and Davis, E.P. 2005. The Impact of Short- and Long-run Exchange Rate 
Uncertainty on Investment: A Panel Study of Industrial Countries. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics.  67(3), pp. 307–329. 
Caballero, R.J. and Pindyck, R.S. 1996. Uncertainty, investment and industry 
evolution. International Economic Review, 37, pp. 641–662. 
Caglayan, M. and Munoz-Torres, R.I. 2008. The effect of the exchange rates on 
investment in Mexican manufacturing industry. University of Warwick/Department 
of Economics, Working Paper No. 846. 
Caprio, G. and Howard, D. 1984. Domestic Saving, Current Accounts, and 
International Capital Mobility. International Financial Discussion Paper No. 244.  
Cavalcanti, T., Mohaddes, K. and Raissi, M. 2010. Oil Abundance and growth. CAF 
Working paper No. 3.  
CESD (Center for Economic and Social Development- Azerbaijan). 2010. Ending 
dependency: How is oil revenues effectively used in Azerbaijan?. Report 2010. 
CME group (Chicago Mercantile Exchange). 2013. Light Sweet Crude Oil (WTI) 
Futures and Options. Available at: www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/files/en-
153_wti_brochure_sr.pdf. 
180 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. 2004. Greed and grievance in civil wars. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 56, pp. 563–585. 
Coxhead, I. 2007. A New Resource Curse? Impacts of China’s Boom on 
Comparative Advantage and Resource Dependence in Southeast Asia. World 
Development, 35(7), pp. 1099-1119. 
CSR Network. 2003. Environmental, Land, Community and Social Overview: Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project. International Finance Corportaion.  
Darby, J., Hallett, A.H., Ireland, J. and Piscitelli, L. 1999. The impact of exchange 
rate uncertainty on the level of investment. The Economic Journal, 109(454), C55-
C67. 
Dooley, M., Frankel, J. and Mathieson, D. J. 1987. International capital mobility:  
what do the saving- investment correlations tell us? NBER Working Paper No. 2043. 
Dufey, A. 2009. Project finance, sustainable development and human rights. Case 
study 1: the Baku Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. International Institute for 
Environment and Development, draft paper.   
ECSSD. 2008. Caucasus transport corridor for oil and gas products. World Bank. 
Edo, S. E. 2013. Crude oil discovery and exploitation: the bane of manufacturing 
sector development in an oil-rich country, Nigeria. OPEC Energy Review. 37(1), pp. 
105–124. 
EIA (US Energy Information Administration). 2012. 2011 Brief: Brent crude oil 
averages over $100 per barrel in 2011. Available at:..................................................... 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4550. 
EIA (US Energy Information Administration). 2013. Price difference between Brent 
and WTI crude oil narrowing. Available at:…………………………………………... 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11891.  
EIA (US Energy Information Administration). 2014a. Annual Energy Outlook 2014 
with Projections to 2040. 
181 
EIA (US Energy Information Administration). 2014b. Azerbaijan: International 
energy data and analysis. Report 2014 
EIA (US Energy Information Administration). EIA Energy Glossary.  
Eicher, T. 1999. Trade, development and converging growth rates: Dynamic gains 
from trade reconsidered. Journal of International Economics, 48(1), pp. 179–198. 
Eifert, B., Gelb, A., and Tallroth, N.B. 2003. Managing oil wealth. The political 
economy of oil-exporting countries – why some of them have done so poorly, IMF, 
Finance & Development, Vol 40, No. 1. 
Elder J. and Serletis A. (2010): Oil price uncertainty. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, vol. 42, issue: 6, pp.1137-1159.  
Elkind, J. 2005. Economic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. The 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline: Oil window to the west. The Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, pp. 39-60. 
Engle, R., and Granger, C. 1987. Cointegration and error correction: representation, 
estimation, and testing. Econometrica, 55, pp. 257–276. 
Feldstein, M. and Horioka, C. 1980. Domestic saving and international capital flows. 
Economic Journal, 90, pp, 314–329. 
Ferderer, J. 1996. Oil price volatility and the macroeconomy. Journal of  
Macroeconomy. 18(1), pp. 1–26. 
FFM (Fact-Finding Mission). 2002. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey Pipeline Project -
Turkey Section. Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale. Kurdish Human 
Rights Project. The Corner House. Ilisu Dam Campaign. PLATFORM. Preliminary 
Report, August 2002. 
FFM (Fact-Finding Mission). 2003. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline - Turkey section. 
Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale. Kurdish Human Rights Project. 
PLATFORM. The Corner House. Report, June 2003. 
182 
FFM (Fact-Finding Mission). 2005. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline: Human 
Rights, Social and Environmental Impacts - Georgia Section. Centre for Civic 
Initiatives. Committee for the Protection of Oil Workers Rights. CEE Bankwatch 
Network. Green Alternative. Kurdish Human Rights Project. PLATFORM. 
Urgewald. Final report of FFM, 16-18 September. 
Fielding, D. 1997. Adjustment, trade policy and investment slumps: evidence from 
Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 52, pp.121-137. 
Gavin, M. 1992. Income effects of adjustment to a terms of trade disturbance and the 
demand for adjustment finance. Journal of Development Economic, 37, pp. 127–153. 
Gelb, A. and Grasmann, S. 2010. How Should Oil Exporters Spend Their Rents? 
Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 221.  
Ghalayini, L. 2011. The Interaction between Oil Price and Economic Growth. 
Middle Eastern Finance and Economics, Issue 13, pp 127-141.    
Gillard, M. 2004. Government admits failing BP pipeline was experimental 
engineering. Article published by Baku Ceyhan Campaign, 24 November 2004.  
Global Witness and Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa-Angola (OSISA-
Angola). Oil revenues in Angola: Much more information but not enough 
transparency. Report, February 2011. 
Greene, J. and Villanueva, D. 1991. Private investment in developing countries. 
International Monetary Fund, IMF Staff Papers, 38 (1), pp. 33-58. 
Gulen, H. and Ion, M. 2013. Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment. Purdue 
University mimeo. 
Guney, A., and Ozdemir, S. 2011. Is the regional economic cooperation in south 
Caucasus myth or reality? The Journal of Faculty of Economics and Administrative 
Sciences/  Suleyman Demirel University, 16(1), pp. 133-145. 
Gylfason, T. 2001. Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development. 
European Economic Review, 45, pp. 847-859. 
183 
Hadri, K., 2000. Testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data. Econometric 
Journal, 3, pp. 148–161. 
Hamilton, J.D. 1983. Oil and the macroeconomy since World War II. Journal of 
Political Economy, 91(2), pp. 228-248.  
Hamilton, J.D. 1988. A Neoclassical model of unemployment and the business cycle. 
Journal of Political Economy, 96, pp. 593-617.  
Hamilton, J.D. 2008. Oil and the macroeconomy. In New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics, 2nd edition, edited by Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, Palgrave 
McMillan Ltd.  
Hamilton, J.D. 2011. Historical Oil Shocks, University of California - Prepared for 
the Handbook of Major Events in Economic History.  
Harchaoui, T., Tarkhani, F. and Yuen, T. 2005. The Effects of the Exchange Rate on 
Investment: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing Industries. Bank of Canada 
Working Paper No. 22. 
Harrison, A.E. 1996. Openness and growth: A time-series, cross-country analysis for 
developing countries. Journal of Development Economics, 48(2), pp. 419–447. 
Hartman, R. 1972. The effects of price and cost uncertainty on investment. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 5(2), pp. 258–266. 
Hayes, M.H. and Victor, D.G. 2003. Factors that explain investment in cross-border 
natural gas transport infrastructures: a research protocol for historical case studies.  
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) Working Paper No. 8.  
Hildyard, N. 2007. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline - A background article. 
The Corner House, 30 May.  
Hoegl, M. and Weinkauf, K. 2005. Managing task interdependencies in multi-team 
projects: a longitudinal  study. Journal  of Management Studies, 42 (6), pp. 1287–
1308.    
184 
Hooker, M.A. 1996. What Happened to the Oil Price-Macroeconomy Relationship?. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 38, pp. 195-213.  
House, R. 2000. Overview of the GLOBE program and the findings. IFSAM 
Conference. Juillet: Montréal. 
Huang, Y. 2009. Dynamic panel data evidence on the finance- investment link. 
Journal of Statistics: Advances in Theory and Applications, 2(2), pp. 135-158. 
IFC (International Finance Corporation). 2006. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline project. World Bank Group. Lessons of Experience, September, No 2.  
ILO (International Labour Organization). Main statistics (annual): wages by 
economic activity, in manufacturing. 
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H. and Shin Y. 2003. Testing for unit root in heterogeneous 
panels. Journal of Econometrics, 115, pp. 53–74. 
Interfax. 2012. Kazakhstan still hoping for acceptable BTC pipeline charges for 
Tengiz oil, Interfax, 5 April. Available at:……………………………………………..  
http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=322118.  
Jarosiewicz, A. 2008. Oil transport through the Caucasus is a top priority issue in 
Kazakh oil export policy. Centre for eastern studies, Issue 6.   
Jo, S. 2012. The effects of oil price uncertainty on the macroeconomy. Bank of 
Canada, BoC Working Paper No. 40.  
Johnston, J. and DiNardo, J. 1997. Econometric methods. Fourth edition. McGraw 
Hill Companies. 
Julio, B. and Yook, Y. 2012. Political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles. 
Journal of Finance, 67, pp. 45–83. 
Kannan, P. 2008. Perspectives on high real interest rates in Turkey. IMF Working 
Paper No. 251. 
185 
Karl, T.L. 2007. Oil-Led development: social, political, and economic consequences. 
CDDRL Working Papers No. 80. 
Kellogg. R. 2010. The effect of uncertainty on investment: Evidence from Texas oil 
drilling. NBER Working Paper No. 16541. 
Kilian, L. 2008. The economic effects of energy price shocks, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 46, pp. 871–909. 
Kilian, L. 2009. Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: Disentangling Demand and 
Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market. American Economic Review, 99(3), pp. 
1053-1069.  
Kilian, L. and Park, C. 2009. The impact of oil price shocks on the US stock market. 
International Economic Review, 50, pp. 1267–1287. 
Kilian, L., Rebucci, A. and Spatafora N. 2009. Oil shocks and external balances. 
Journal of International Economics, 77 , pp. 181–194. 
Kim, D.H., Lin, S.C. and Suen, Y.B. 2013. Investment, trade openness and foreign 
direct investment: Social capability matters. International Review of Economics and 
Finance, 26 , pp. 56–69.  
Knight, F.H., 1921. Risk, uncertainty, and profit. Hart, Schaffner & Marx; Houghton 
Mifflin Company, Boston, MA. 
Kraay, A., Ventura, J. (1999): Current accounts in debtor and creditor countries. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:1137–1166. 
Kreps, D.M. 1990. Game theory and economic modelling. Oxford University Press.  
Krishna, V. and Serrano, R. 1996. Multilateral bargaining. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 63(1), pp. 61-80. 
Lautier, M. and Moreaub, F. 2012. Domestic investment and FDI in developing 
countries: the missing link. Journal of Economic Development, (37), No. 3, pp. 1-23. 
186 
Leahy, J.V. and Whited, T.M. 1996. The effect of uncertainty on investment: some 
stylized facts. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28, pp. 64-83. 
Lensink, R. and Bo, H. Sterken, E. 2001. Investment, capital market imperfections, 
and uncertainty: theory and empirical results. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Lescaroux, F. and Mignon, V. 2008. On the influence of oil prices on economic 
activity and other macroeconomic and financial variables, CEPII Working Paper No. 
5.  
Levin, A., Lin, C.F. and Chu, C.J. 2002. Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and 
finite sample properties. Journal of Econometrics, 108(1), pp. 1–24.  
Levine, R., and Renelt, D. 1992. A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth 
regressions. American Economic Review, 82(4), pp. 942–963. 
Levine, S., Taylor, G., Arthur, D., and Tolleth, M. 2014. Understanding crude oil and 
product markets. The Brattle group, a report for the American Petroleum Institute.   
Listhaug, O. 2005. Oil wealth dissatisfaction and political trust in Norway: A 
resource curse?. West European Politics, 28(4), pp. 834-851. 
Loree, D.W. and Guisinger, S.E. 1995. Policy and non-policy determinants of US 
equity foreign direct investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(2), pp. 
281-299. 
 Lowi, M. R. 2004. Oil rents and political breakdown in patrimonial states: Algeria in 
comparative perspective. The Journal of North African Studies. 9(3), pp. 83-102. 
Luca, O. and Spatafora, N. 2012. Capital inflows, financial development, and 
domestic investment: determinants and inter-relationships. IMF Working Paper No. 
120. 
Mabro, R. 1987. Netback pricing and the oil price collapse of 1986. Oxford institute 
for energy studies. WPM 10.  
187 
Mahadevan, R. and Asafu-Adjaye, J. 2007. Energy consumption, economic growth 
and prices: A reassessment using panel VECM for developed and developing 
countries. Energy Policy, 35(4), pp. 2481–2490. 
Mansley, M. 2003. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and BP: A Financial Analysis 
- Building tomorrow’s crisis? PLATFORM, Reprot May 2003.  
Maznevski,  M. and  Chudoba,  K.  2000.  Bridging space over time:  global virtual 
team dynamics and effectiveness. Organization Science, 11 (5), pp. 473–492. 
McKinnon, R.I. 1973. Money and capital in economic development. The Brookings 
Institution. Washington, D.C.  
Mehlum, H., Moene, K. and Torvik, R. 2006. Institutions and the resource curse. 
Economic Journal, 116, pp. 1–20. 
Mileva, E. 2008. The impact of capital flows on domestic investment in transition 
economies. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 871. 
Mody, A. and Murshid A.P. 2005. Growing up with capital flows. Journal of 
International Economics, 65, pp. 249-266. 
Moreen, A.L. 2007. Overcoming the Resource Curse: Prioritizing Policy 
Interventions in Countries with Large Extractive Industries. Pardee RAND Graduate 
School, PhD Dissertation. 
Mork, K.A. 1989. Oil and the macroeconomy when prices go up and down: An 
extension of Hamilton’s Results. Journal of political economy, 97(3), PP. 740-744.  
Mork, K.A., Olsen, O., and Mysen, H.T. 1994. Macroeconomic responses to oil price 
increases and decreases in seven OECD countries. The Energy Journal, 15(4), pp. 
19-35. 
Moss, T. and Young, L. 2009. Saving Ghana from its Oil:  The Case for Direct 
Distribution. CGD Discussion Paper 186.   
188 
Murphy, R. 1984. Capital Mobility and the Relationship between Saving and 
Investment Rates in OECD Countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 
3, pp. 327-342. 
Muthoo, A. 1999. Bargaining theory with applications. Cambridge University Press.  
Muthoo, A. 2000. A Non-technical introduction to bargaining theory. World 
Economics, 1(2), pp. 145-166.  
Nagarajan, M. and Sosic, G. 2008. Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among 
supply chain agents- Review and extensions. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 187, pp. 719–745. 
Natural Resources Canada. 2011. Seismic hazard calculations. Available at:      
http://www.earthquakescanada.nrcan.gc.ca/hazard/zoning/haz_e.php. 
Ndikumana, L. 2000. Financial determinants of domestic investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: evidence from panel data. World Development, 28, No. 2, pp. 381-400. 
Ndikumana, L., and Verick, S. 2008. The linkages between FDI and domestic 
investment: unravelling the developmental impact of foreign investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Development Policy Review, 26(6), pp. 713–726. 
Obstfeld, M. 1986. Capital mobility in the world economy: theory and measurement. 
Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, 24, pp. 55-104 
Osborne, M. and Rubinstein, J. 1990. Bargaining and markets. Academic Press 
Limited, 24–28 Oval Road, London NW1 7DX. 
Ostry, J. and Reinhart, C. 1992. Private saving and terms of trade shocks: evidence 
from developing countries. IMF Staff Papers 9, pp. 495–517. 
Ovadia, J.S. 2013. The Nigerian “one percent”and the management of national Oil 
wealth through Nigerian content. Science & Society 77:3, 315-341. 
189 
Papava, V. 2005. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline: oil window to the west - the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline: implications for Georgia. The Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute. Silk Road Studies Program, pp. 85–102.  
Peachey, R. 2011. Petroleum investment contracts after the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 31(3), 
pp.739-769. 
Pedroni, P. 1999. Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with 
multiple regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61, pp. 653–670. 
Pedroni, P. 2004. Panel cointegration: asymptotic and finite sample properties of 
pooled time series tests with an application to the ppp hypothesis: new results. 
Econometric Theory, 20, pp. 597–627. 
Peuch, J. C., May 25, 2005. Caspian-Mediterranean oil pipeline launched in Baku. 
Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058992.html . 
Pindyck, R.S. 1991. Irreversibility, uncertainty, and investment. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 29, pp. 1110–1148. 
Pollin, R. 1997. Financial intermediation and the variability of the saving constraint. 
The macroeconomics of saving, finance, and investment. University of Michigan 
Press, pp. 309-365. 
Pomfret, R. 2010. Trade and Transport in Central Asia. Global Journal of Emerging 
Market Economies, 2(3), pp. 237–256. 
Robinson, C. 2005. Governments, competition and utility regulation. The Institute of 
Economic Affairs, Edward Elgar publishing Ltd, UK.  
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R. and Verdier, T. 2006. Political foundations of the 
resource curse. Journal of Development Economics, 79, pp. 447–68. 
Roodman, D. 2006. How to Do xtabond2: an introduction to difference and system 
GMM in Stata. The Center for Global Development, Working paper No. 103. 
190 
Ross, M. 2001. Does oil hinder democracy? .World Politics, 53, pp. 325–61. 
Roth, A.E. 1979. Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, Springer-Verlag.  
Safak, E., Chelidze, T., Akhundov, A., and Bayraktutan, M.S. 2008. Seismic hazard 
and risk assessment for Southern Caucasus-Eastern Turkey energy corridors. A 
proposal for NATO Science for Peace Programme, April 2008. 
Sagheb, N. and Javadi, M. 1994. Azerbaijan's "contract of the century" finally signed 
with western oil consortium. Azerbaijan International (2.4), 65, pp. 26-28. 
Salahuddin, M. and Islam, M.R. 2008. Factors affecting investment in developing 
countries: A panel data study. Journal of Developing Area, 42(1), pp. 21–37. 
Sandbu, M.E. 2006. Taxable resource revenue distributions: a proposal for 
alleviating the natural resource curse. World Development, 34(7), pp. 1153–1170. 
Serven, L. 2003. Real exchange rate, uncertainty and private investment in LDCs. 
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(1), pp. 212–218. 
Shaw, E.S. 1973. Financial deepening in economic development. New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
Simons, G.F., Vazquez, C. and Harris, P.H. 1993. Transcultural leadership: 
empowering the diverse workforce. Houston, TX, Gulf Publishing. 
Sinclair, S. 1998. World Bank guarantees for oil and gas projects. World Bank, Note 
No 157. 
Smith, G. 2004. The BTC pipeline case study: following through on global compact, 
commitments. Embedding human rights into business practice. A Joint publication of 
UN Global Compact and the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, pp. 
69-79.  
Soares, F.V., Ribas, R.P. and Osório R.G. 2007. Evaluating the impact of Brazil’s 
Bolsa Família: cash transfer programmes in comparative perspective. International 
Poverty Centre, IPC Evaluation Note No 1. 
191 
Sovacool, B.K. 2009. Energy policy and cooperation in Southeast Asia: the history, 
challenges, and implications of the trans-ASEAN gas pipeline (TAGP) network. 
Energy Policy, 37, pp. 2356–2367. 
Sovacool, B.K. 2010. Exploring the conditions for cooperative energy governance: a 
comparative study of two Asian pipelines. Asian Studies Review, 34(4), pp. 489-511. 
Stijns, J.P.C. 2006. Natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation. 
World Development, 34, pp. 1060–1083. 
Tang, S., Selvanathan, E.A. and Selvanathan, S. 2008. Foreign direct investment, 
domestic investment and economic growth in China: a time series analysis. UNU 
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). Research 
Paper No. 19. 
Thamhain, H.J. 2004. Linkages of project environment to performance: Lessons for 
team leadership. International Journal of Project Management, 22, pp. 533–544. 
The Corner House, Kurdish Human Rights Project and PLATFORM. 2011. The 
Legal Regime for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline Project: Company 
Undertakings on the OECD Guidelines and Implications of the UK National Contact 
Point’s. Final Statement on the BTC Specific Instance.   
The Corner House. 2008. BTC pipeline inflaming conflict, say groups. ECGD did 
not assess human rights impacts of conflict risks. The Corner House, 20 August. 
The Guardian. 2010. US embassy cables: Aliyev changes tune after Georgia 
invasion- says BP. The Guardian, 15 December. Available at:………………………..                                                                                                               
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/167669.  
Thornton, P. and Howden, D. 2005. Oil pipe to loosen OPEC grip turned on. The 
new Zealand Herald, 26 May. Available at:                           . 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10127544.  
Torvik, R. 2002. Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare. Journal of 
Development Economics, 67, pp. 455-470. 
192 
Transparency International. 2011. Corruption perception index 2011 
TurkStat (Turkish Statistical Institute). 2010. Results of the structure of earnings 
survey/Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport. Available at: 
http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10718.  
UNDP (United Nation Development Program). 1999. Azerbaijan Human 
Development Report 1999. 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2013. Human Development 
Report 2013. 
Vamvakidis, A., Wacziarg, R. 1998. Developing countries and the Feldstien-Horioka 
puzzle. IMF Working Paper 2. 
Wacziarg, R. 2001. Measuring the dynamic gains from trade. World Bank Economic 
Review, 15(3), pp. 393–429. 
Wang, Y., Chen, C.R. and Huang, Y.S. 2014. Economic policy uncertainty and 
corporate investment: Evidence from China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 26, pp. 
227–243. 
Wong, D.Y. 1990. What do savings–investment relationships tell us about capital 
mobility?. Journal of International Money and Finance, 9, pp. 60–74. 
World Bank. 2004. Operational guidance for World Bank Group staff, public and 
private sector roles in the supply of gas services in developing countries. World 
Bank, Washington, DC.  
World Development Indicators (WDI). 2013. World DataBank, World Bank. 
World Development Indicators (WDI). 2014. World DataBank, World Bank. 
World Health Organization/Regional Office for Europe. 2010. European region: 
seismic hazard distribution map. Available at: http://data.euro.who.int/e-
atlas/europe/images/map/regional/european-seismic.pdf. 
193 
Yang, B. and Lam, Y. 2008. Resource booms and economic development: the time 
series dynamics for 17 oil-rich countries. Applied Economics Letters, 15(13), pp. 
1011-1014. 
Yoshizaki, Y. and Hamori, S. 2013. On the influence of oil price shocks on economic 
activity, inflation, and exchange rates. International Journal of Financial Research,      
4, pp. 33–41. 
Zakaria, N., Amelinckx, A. and Wilemon, D. 2004. Working together apart? 
Building a knowledge sharing culture for global virtual teams. Creativity and 
Innovation Management, 13 (1), pp. 15–29. 
